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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Technological innovation, knowledge diffusion and employee entrepreneurship and 
mobility are closely related phenomena. Multiple literature streams in strategy, entrepreneurship 
and technology management focus on explaining them. However, relatively little is known about 
the micro-level variation in technological tasks as their driver. To improve our understanding of 
the role technology plays in these phenomena, I examine how the complexity of the 
technological problems that employees solve affects innovation performance and employees’ 
choices about entrepreneurship and mobility. In essay 1 I examine whether modeling the 
innovative process as an iterative and adaptive search of boundedly rational agents is a valid 
approach. I develop a novel measure of technological complexity and empirically analyze how 
technological complexity affects innovation performance. In essay 2 I develop a model 
connecting attributes of technological tasks with the probability of idea rejection within 
incumbent firms. I show that rejection of profitable ideas within incumbent firms may occur 
without asymmetric information, incomplete contracts or resource constraints. In essay 3 I look 
at how technological complexity affects decisions to engage in employee entrepreneurship and 
mobility within the context of the U.S. semiconductor industry. The dissertation highlights a new 
driver of innovation patterns, knowledge flows and employee entrepreneurship and mobility with 
implications for firm performance and competitive dynamics. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Technological innovation, knowledge diffusion and employee entrepreneurship and 
mobility are closely related phenomena. Multiple literature streams in innovation management, 
strategy and entrepreneurship focus on explaining them. 
Understanding what drives successful innovations became a central concern of an 
eclectic body of research. Many scholars, dating back at least to Schumpeter (1934), propose to 
conceptualize innovations as novel combinations of existing resources (Schumpeter, 1934; 
Penrose, 1959; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Mahoney, 1995) or knowledge (Henderson and Clark, 
1990; Galunic and Rodan, 1998). The more recent work on complex adaptive systems (Frenken, 
2000, 2001a, 2001b; Fleming and Sorenson, 2001, 2004; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004; Murmann 
and Frenken, 2006; Sorenson, Rivkin and Fleming, 2006; Marengo, Pasquali and Valente, 2007) 
examines innovation by focusing on the process of searching for novel combinations. By means 
of analogy to the concepts of mutation and recombination in biology and to the associated NK 
modeling framework (Kauffman, 1993, 1995), the complexity scholars theorize that innovations 
emerge from bounded, iterative, trial-and-error searches for novel combinations of existing 
building blocks over a complex search space. Such a conceptualization of the innovative process 
is theoretically appealing since it provides an important counterpart to neoclassical economics 
models that may not capture real life dynamics due to the assumptions of equilibrium and strong 
rationality (Camerer and Fehr, 2006). 
The notion of innovation is closely related to entrepreneurship. For instance, 
entrepreneurial ideas frequently originate within existing firms. An extensive body of work 
examines both antecedents and consequences of employee entrepreneurship (e.g Anton and Yao, 
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1995; Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco and Sarkar, 2004; Hellman, 2007; Klepper and Thompson, 
2010).1 Employee entrepreneurship has been heralded as a driver of innovation (Agarwal, et al., 
2004; Klepper, 2005), a critical source of new capabilities and heterogeneity in performance 
(Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Agarwal, et al., 2004) and an impetus to the creation and growth 
of industries and regional clusters (e.g. Klepper, 2001). Through employee entrepreneurship, the 
new venture not only inherits the industry-specific knowledge brought in by its founders 
(Agarwal et al., 2004; Chatterji, 2009), but its strategies bear the imprinting mark of the 
founders’ prior work experience (Klepper and Thompson, 2010). 
Exploiting ideas identified while working within incumbent firms through employee 
entrepreneurship can be seen as a form of knowledge transfer. Similar to employee 
entrepreneurship, scholars have long recognized intra-industry employee mobility (i.e. post-exit 
joining of another firm within the industry) as a powerful engine for knowledge diffusion 
between established firms as well as between incumbents and startups (Almeida and Kogut, 
1997; 1999; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Agarwal et al., 2004; Agarwal, Ganco and Ziedonis, 
2009). 
At the heart of the issues above are questions that relate to the underlying drivers. What 
factors affect the value of innovation, whether innovations are exploited or not and in which 
organizational setting? Are there any common drivers that affect all these phenomena? 
Answering such questions in a coherent framework is important due to the inherent linkages 
between the creation and exploitation of knowledge that connect multiple levels of analysis. To 
investigate the possible common drivers of innovation performance, exploitation of ideas within 
                                               
1 Employee entrepreneurship is typically defined as the founding of a new venture by an individual who worked for 
an incumbent firm that operates in the same industry and has no ownership relationship with the new venture 
(Agarwal, Ganco and Ziedonis, 2009). 
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incumbent firms, employee entrepreneurship and mobility decisions, as well as the associated 
knowledge flows, I examine the role of technology. 
The nature of innovation and knowledge required to solve technological problems may 
affect choices individuals make about how they exploit the knowledge. This may have important 
consequences for patterns of knowledge diffusion and competitive dynamics. The main focus of 
my dissertation is to contribute to a better understanding of how technology affects innovation 
patterns and the origins of employee entrepreneurship and mobility. More specifically, I study an 
area which has received relatively little attention - how the micro-level variation of the 
technological context affects innovation performance and how it shapes employees’ 
entrepreneurship and mobility decisions. The prior studies suggest that technologically more 
advanced firms generate more entrepreneurs (Brittain and Freeman, 1980; Franco and Filson, 
2006) and that underexploited technological opportunities may lead to employee 
entrepreneurship (Agarwal, et al., 2004). Additionally, there is abundant anecdotal evidence 
revealing that employees often quit after their technological ideas are rejected by parent firms. 
For instance, Klepper and Thompson (2010) trace most of their cases of employee 
entrepreneurship in the early automobile, semiconductor and laser industries to disagreements 
about technological strategy. However, whether and how technology matters at a “finer grain” 
and how it affects employees’ decisions to exploit their knowledge is less clear. 
The key underlying driver of innovation performance and employee entrepreneurship and 
mobility decisions that I examine is the technological complexity of inventors’ prior patenting 
activities within the incumbent firm. The technological complexity - being one of the key 
determinants of innovation performance dynamics - should also affect patterns of employee 
entrepreneurship and mobility. I model and measure complexity using the methodology of the 
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NK modeling literature (Kauffman, 1993; Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000; Fleming and Sorensen, 
2001). Complex problems are those that have rugged optimization space due to dense 
interdependencies between individual component choices (Kauffman, 1993; Rivkin, 2000). 
Technological complexity affects characteristics of knowledge at multiple levels. This 
makes its use as the main contextual variable of interest attractive in addition to the modeling 
tractability provided by the NK model. Technological complexity may not only affect the 
innovative dynamics within incumbent firms but also influence how such knowledge diffuses 
across firms. For instance, solving technologically complex problems may lead to breakthroughs 
(Fleming and Sorenson, 2001) but knowledge necessary to solve such problems is more tacit 
(Polanyi, 1983; Lowe, 2002; Agrawal, 2006), may require unstructured technical dialogue 
(Monteverde, 1995) and the solution outcomes are more uncertain (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001). 
The uncertainty associated with complexity may also lead to greater over-optimism when 
pursuing entrepreneurial decisions (Shane, 2002; Ziedonis and Lowe, 2006). At the same time, 
complexity may affect frictions in decision-making (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Gavetti, 2005) 
and increase the likelihood of idea rejections at the parent firm (Klepper and Thompson, 2010). 
As a result, technological complexity appears to be a viable driver affecting not only innovations 
but also employee entrepreneurship and mobility decisions. 
To provide an overview of the three essays and describe the overall study, I develop a 
conceptual framework connecting the individual essays through a common driver of 
technological complexity (Figure 1.1). Technological complexity is theorized to affect the 
performance of innovations and how the innovations are exploited. In the first essay, I examine 
the question of what is the best approximation of innovative process. The traditional approach of 
neoclassical economics often assumes full rationality and thus provides a polar opposite to the 
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agent-based models that assume very limited rationality. Whether simplifying human behavior 
towards more rationality as in neoclassical models or less rationality as in agent-based models is 
more appropriate should be decided on the basis of the predictive powers of the respective 
models. To contribute to this discussion, I model the innovative process as an iterative 
experimentation using an agent-based model. The main question that I address is whether such 
approach is a valid approximation of the technological problem-solving. In particular, I use the 
NK model for predicting innovation performance. 
Importantly, technological complexity matters at multiple levels. It affects whether 
opportunities are present and the ability of inventors to discover them. As a result, it may also 
affect how the opportunities are exploited. In the second essay, I rely on the notion that iterative 
and adaptive search of boundedly rational agents is a valid approximation of technological 
problem-solving. I use an agent-based model to examine the relationship between technological 
complexity and idea rejection within parent firms. My main question is what attributes of the 
underlying technological problems affect idea rejection within parent firms. These are factors 
that are driven by the technology itself and are separate from agency costs, asymmetric 
information or resource constraints - factors that have been examined in the prior literature 
(Anton and Yao, 1995; Cassiman and Ueda, 2006; Hellman, 2007; Klepper and Thompson, 
2010). The core objective of developing the agent-based model is to isolate the effects of 
technological attributes like problem difficulty and technological breadth and show that rejection 
of profitable ideas may occur even in the absence of factors associated with asymmetric 
information, contract incompleteness or resource constraints. Could technological tasks that 
employees solve serve as an independent driver of idea rejection? What attributes of the tasks are 
relevant and what are their effects on idea rejection? Answering these questions is important 
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since idea rejection is frequently assumed to be a precursor to employee entrepreneurship 
(Hellman, 2007; Klepper and Thompson, 2010). The empirical evidence suggests that employees 
frequently leave existing firms to start their own firms after they disclose ideas to their parent 
firms and these are rejected (Klepper and Thompson, 2010), they implement knowledge they 
encounter within parent firms (Bhide, 1994), and, more specifically, they have knowledge which 
is underexploited within these parent firms (Agarwal et al., 2004). 
Technological complexity affects performance of innovations and whether these 
innovations are exploited from within the firms they originate. However, technological 
complexity also influences the characteristics of knowledge that is required for solving such 
tasks. Does it have implications for the ability of employees to transfer their knowledge and 
ideas and implement them outside of the incumbent firm? How important is the organizational 
setting of the recipient organization? Answering these questions is critically important for 
determining not only knowledge flows and mobility patterns but also competitive dynamics and 
industry structure. If more complex knowledge embodies more opportunities then who exploits 
them? Which firms are best positioned to absorb such knowledge and thus compete with the 
parent firm? 
In the third essay, I address these questions by examining how technological complexity 
affects the ability of employees to transfer and replicate their knowledge in other organizational 
settings. I theorize that complexity affects underexploited opportunities that are embodied in 
knowledge carried by employees and also their ability to transfer such knowledge to other 
organizational settings. Such dynamics, in turn, affects employee exit choices. 
In conclusion, the dissertation examines micro-level technological variation as an 
antecedent of innovation performance, idea rejection, knowledge flows and employee 
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entrepreneurship and mobility. The phenomena represent multiple levels of analysis – innovation, 
individual inventor and incumbent firm. I connect these levels of analysis by studying a common 
driver of technological complexity. Such approach provides a unique opportunity to look at the 
creation and exploitation of knowledge in a coherent framework with implications for firm 
performance, knowledge diffusion and industry structure. 
8 
FIGURES 
Figure 1.1  
Technological complexity as a driver of innovation performance, project rejection and employee 
entrepreneurship and mobility decisions 
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CHAPTER 2 
ESSAY 1: THE INNOVATIVE PROCESS AS A LOCAL SEARCH OVER A COMPLEX 
LANDSCAPE: EVIDENCE FROM THE DISK DRIVE INDUSTRY 
INTRODUCTION 
Understanding what drives successful innovations became central to an eclectic body of 
research. Many scholars, dating back at least to Schumpeter (1934, 1939), propose to 
conceptualize innovations as novel combinations of existing resources (Schumpeter, 1934, 1939; 
Penrose, 1959; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Mahoney, 1995) or knowledge (Galunic and Rodan, 
1998; Henderson and Clark, 1990). More recent work on complex adaptive systems (Frenken, 
2000, 2001a, 2001b; Fleming and Sorenson, 2001, 2004; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004; Murmann 
and Frenken, 2006; Sorenson, Rivkin and Fleming, 2006; Marengo, Pasquali and Valente, 2007) 
extends this view by focusing on the process of searching for novel combinations. By means of 
analogy to the concepts of mutation and recombination in biology and to the associated NK 
modeling framework (Kauffman, 1993, 1995), the complexity scholars theorize that the 
innovations emerge from bounded, iterative, trial-and-error searches for novel combinations of 
existing building blocks over a complex search space. 
Such a conceptualization of the innovative process is theoretically appealing (Frenken, 
2000, 2001a, 2001b; Fleming and Sorenson, 2001, 2004; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004; Murmann 
and Frenken, 2006; Sorenson et al., 2006; Marengo et al., 2007) since it provides an important 
counterpart to neoclassical economics models that may not capture real life-dynamics due to the 
assumptions of equilibrium and strong rationality (Camerer and Fehr, 2006). However, 
perceiving the innovative process as a search by boundedly rational agents and modeling it with 
the NK model may represent the “opposite extreme” of the neoclassical models – with the hyper-
rational agents being replaced by naïve automatons. Such a problem is a valid critique of the 
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agent-based approach and thus trying to ascertain the validity of the model is an important 
empirical task. 
Nevertheless, the empirical tests of the NK framework are limited and provide mixed 
results. Fleming and Sorenson (2001) empirically test some predictions of the NK model but find 
only partial support. They report that core predictions of the NK model are inconsistent with the 
data. The authors conclude that the NK models developed primarily to approximate blind 
biological evolution have limited applicability to the innovative process – presumably because 
cognition plays an important role. In support of the argument, Fleming and Sorenson (2004) find 
that scientific knowledge facilitates the search for innovations as problem complexity increases. 
To revisit the issue, I ask the question again: Is modeling the innovative process as a 
bounded, iterative search over a complex landscape a valid approximation? More specifically, 
can we predict innovation performance based on the empirical counterparts of the N and K model 
parameters? To investigate these questions, I develop a relatively direct test of the NK model 
using a single industry dataset and a novel patent-level measure of technological complexity. 
To foreshadow my main results, I find that the model predictions and the empirical 
estimates are consistent for the core predictions of the NK model. I also perform supplemental 
analyses, which reveal that the quality of the correspondence between the model predictions and 
the empirical estimates depends on how broadly one defines the industry. Including a broader 
range of patents seems to deteriorate the ability of the measure to capture technological 
complexity by violating some assumptions necessary for construction of the measure. 
The paper provides a contribution to both technology management and complexity 
literatures (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004; Fleming and Sorenson, 2001, 2004; Frenken, 2000, 
2001a, 2001b; Marengo, Pasquali and Valente, 2007; Murmann and Frenken, 2006; Sorenson, 
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Rivkin and Fleming, 2006) by showing that the NK model may be a reasonable approximation of 
the innovative process. In addition to the few recent papers that focused on empirical 
implementation of the NK model (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001; 2004; Lenox, Rockart and 
Lewin, 2007), the paper serves an important objective - bringing the rich theoretical NK 
modeling literature to the data. 
THE INNOVATIVE PROCESS AS A LOCAL SEARCH 
The application of the NK modeling framework (Kauffman, 1993, 1995; Levinthal, 1997; 
Frenken, 2000, 2001a, 2001b; Fleming and Sorenson, 2001; Rivkin, 2000, 2001; Ethiraj and 
Levinthal, 2004) to the innovative process hinges on several assumptions. The problem solved 
by the agent as well as the agent’s search capability are assumed to be exogenous, and its 
properties are controlled by simulation parameters. More specifically, the size of the solved 
problem (number of components that need to be combined) and the level of interdependence 
(number of interactions among components) are controlled by the parameters N and K. The 
innovative process is typically performed by the trial-and-error local search (one component 
decision is altered at a time) – which is either a conceptualization of the search for novel 
combinations of existing knowledge (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001, 2004), the search by 
imitation (Rivkin, 2000, 2001) or the search for new solutions (e.g. Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2001; 
Frenken 2001a). Extensions of the basic NK framework allow modeling agents with more 
powerful search capabilities (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Gavetti, 2005; Ganco, 2009), but even 
in these implementations agents are always boundedly rational. Full rationality (in the sense of 
locating the best solution achievable in the search space) within the context of the NK model 
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makes no sense since the focus is on the potential and extent of sub-optimality of discovered 
solutions.2 
The core implications of the NK model reside in the relationship between the variables N 
and K and the payoff. The payoff is measured as either potentially achievable on the landscape 
(i.e. the global peak) or achieved by agents on average. Prior research has shown (Kauffman, 
1993, 1995; Levinthal, 1997) that higher values of complexity (higher K/N) create a more rugged 
search space with a higher global peak, a higher potential performance, but also lead to a 
premature lock-in called the complexity catastrophe (Kauffman, 1993). As the value of 
opportunities increases with K for a given N the landscape consists of many “peaks and valleys”, 
and better opportunities become on average harder to find through a local search. The size of the 
system determined by N or, more precisely, the ratio between K and N determines problem 
complexity (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001).3 With increasing N the peaks are more spread out 
throughout the search space which increases maxima since conflicting tradeoffs are less likely (a 
component affecting performance of more than one other component). Consequently, an increase 
in N attenuates the likelihood of complexity catastrophe and increases the average as well as the 
global peak. Since the space is easier to search, the reward for the best, relative to the mean 
performance, also decreases.4 Due to potentially different effects on the average versus the best 
                                               
2 Also note that the application of the NK model does not necessarily require that inventors recombine existing and 
stable functional “building blocks” of knowledge. However, the measure of technological complexity does. I discuss 
this issue more extensively below. 
3 There exists a special case of the interaction pattern when N is irrelevant for ordering of payoffs (it only affects the 
variance of the overall payoff distribution). In this case, only K/2 neighbor components on each side are linked, the 
space wraps around as a torus and K is low relative to N. 
4 The majority of the existing literature within the domains of strategy and technology management assumes that the 
size of the solved problem N is fixed. Aside from some discussion in Kauffman (1993, 1995) the information on 
how N and K exactly interact is not readily available. Consequently, the purpose of the section that follows is not 
only to establish baseline results for the comparison with the empirical model but also disentangle the driving force 
behind both the performance mean and its variance. 
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agents, the NK model has implications not only for the mean performance but also for its 
variance, which necessitates an analysis that looks at both.  
The above imagery as well as the NK modeling apparatus has spurred many studies and 
led to important insights. For instance, Ethiraj and Levinthal (2004) study how underlying 
technological complexity and its modularization interact and affect performance. Murmann and 
Frenken (2006) theorize how innovations and dominant designs emerge over time and Frenken 
(2001a) suggests how complexity changes with the industry life-cycle. Further studies look at the 
link between organizational attributes and technological problem solving (e.g. Marengo et al., 
2007; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2007).  
The more fundamental question is whether the NK model is a valid approximation of the 
innovative process. The only study to date that tackles this issue explicitly is by Fleming and 
Sorenson (2001) who laid an important groundwork for resolving it. The authors hypothesize and 
test some of the predictions of the NK model. Importantly, Fleming and Sorenson (2001) found 
no support for the core prediction that the performance in rugged landscapes is driven by the 
interaction between the N and K attributes – i.e. technological complexity does not matter. 
To revisit the issue of how the NK model approximates the innovative process, I take the 
following approach: first, I simulate the basic NK model and use regression analysis to obtain 
predicted values of performance as a function of the N and K parameters. I then carry out a 
similar analysis empirically by developing measures of N and K and performing regression on a 
single-industry dataset. I then conclude by comparing the two sets of predicted values. 
NK MODEL OF LOCAL SEARCH FOR INNOVATIONS 
I use the basic NK model to generate theoretical predictions. First, I generate n values of 
Ni with integers uniformly drawn from the interval U[1,10]. Second, I generate n values of K 
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again with integers uniformly drawn from the interval U[0,Ni-1].5 Each observation consists of a 
pair {Ni,Ki}. The sample consists of n such pairs. Third, using the simulation of the NK model 
(Kauffman, 1993), I generate an NK landscape using each pair {Ni,Ki} as an input and simulate 
an agent that searches this landscape. For each observation, I then record the discovered 
converged value for each NK run.6 I measure the actual absolute payoff achieved on the 
landscape.7 The sample now consists of n triples {Πi,Ni,Ki} where Πi is the converged 
performance achieved by an agent through a local search after 50 periods on a random landscape 
given by the input pair {Ni,Ki}.8 Instead of using the standard approach in the literature to 
tabulate the results for different values of K and N, I apply a regression analysis to the simulated 
data. The estimated “pseudo-empirical” predicted values from such an exercise then serve as the 
basis for comparison with the empirically estimated predictions. The NK model is seen as 
“mimicking” the empirical data generating process. 
Since the NK model predicts not only the effect of N and K on the mean but also on the 
variance, I need to find an approach that allows estimation of the effect of the independent 
variables not only on the mean but also on the residuals. The empirical studies using the NK 
model (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001, 2004) typically utilize a negative binomial model with 
variance decomposition for the estimation from the empirical sample. Since the negative 
binomial models rely on count data as the dependent variable, its use is not feasible for the data 
                                               
5 K can be at most N-1. See the appendix for more details and for a formal definition of the model. 
6 An alternative would be to record the distribution of the actual peaks rather than the discovered peaks. However, 
that would assume that the nature of the search is irrelevant and that the distribution of discovered peaks is identical 
to the distribution of the actual peaks. I thank Dan Levinthal for valuable discussion on this point. 
7 An alternative would be to measure the relative payoff in the form Relative payoff = Actual payoff / Global max. 
However, by using relative payoffs I would implicitly assume that the inventors compete only with patents that have 
the same attributes of the search space as defined by K and N. In other words, achieving a global max on a smooth 
landscape – by solving a simple problem - would be as valuable as achieving a global max on a very rugged 
landscape by solving a very complicated problem, and both should receive the same number of citations. Subsequent 
testing also showed that the model with the relative payoff as the dependent variable fits the data poorly. 
8 In the period 50, for the given range of the values N and K almost all agents find a local peak. Period 50 
approximates for performance in the limit. Extending the last period to more periods does not alter any of the results. 
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generated through the NK simulation. To maintain as much consistency as possible and allow for 
joint estimation of the mean and variance, I utilize the classic model of multiplicative 
heteroscedasticity (Harvey, 1976; Green, 1996). This model extends the standard MLE OLS 
framework by allowing joint estimation of the conditional variance with the conditional mean. 
The estimated equations have the form (Harvey, 1976): 
)...(                       )'exp(i                               ][
)...(                          '                               ][
niiz
niiuixiy
122
11




 
where zi is the vector of observations on a set of variables that are possibly but not necessarily 
related to the regressors in [1]. Since I am interested in the impact of K and N on the mean and 
variance, in my case, zi = xi for all i. Harvey’s estimator requires that the disturbance terms ui are 
independently and normally distributed with zero means. The first element in zi is a constant 
term. All the elements in zi must be bounded from below for all i=1..n. All of these conditions 
are naturally satisfied in the simulated NK model. The independence is satisfied by the 
simulation design (draws of the pairs {Ni,Ki} are independent) and the normality of the payoffs 
follows from the fact that I use normal distribution for the generation of the individual 
component payoffs. 
The effects of the inputs N and K may be non-linear so I estimate a higher order 
polynomial of N and K. To ensure that the interactions are products of the independent variables 
and to be consistent with prior empirical studies (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001, 2004, Sorenson et 
al., 2006) I estimate the effect of 1/N instead of N. The results of this estimation where integers 
N are drawn from U[1,10] and K from U[0,N-1] are reported in Table 2.1. The models differ by 
the degree of polynomial. I have estimated the model up to the fifth degree polynomial though 
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only the first three are reported.9 The estimation is implemented as reghv procedure in Stata. The 
regression results are shown in Table 2.1. 
Clearly, the effects of N and K on the payoffs are highly non-linear. Although almost all 
of the coefficients are statistically significant, it is evident that the coefficients on the interaction 
terms are important in determining the payoffs. This holds even as I take into account different 
magnitudes of the underlying variables (i.e. K is between 0 and 9 and K/N between 0 and 0.9). 
For instance, at N equals 3 and change in K from 0 to 1, the impact of the interaction terms on 
the payoff is 3.93 times larger than the effect of the coefficients on K and K2. It implies that the 
payoffs in the NK model are driven by a delicate interplay between the N – size of the problem 
being solved - and K – the number of linkages among the problem components. In other words, 
problem complexity is the key determinant of performance dynamics in the model. 
Complementing the regression results in Table 2.1, predicted values for the mean and the 
variance as a function of N and K are shown in Figures 2.1-2.6. Figure 2.3 shows an increase in 
N for fixed K. With increasing problem size the peaks spread out over a larger space and 
conflicting tradeoffs are less likely, which improves mean performance. However, this occurs at 
a decreasing rate since as N gets large relative to K it is increasingly unlikely that a single 
component affects performance of more than one other component. 
A higher value of K implies higher global maxima but also a more rugged landscape and 
increased potential for lock-in. More dense linkages between the components lead to better 
opportunities but also create difficulties in their exploitation. Nevertheless, the K value itself has 
smaller direct impact on the actual discovered payoffs than the interplay between the K and N. 
An increase in N mitigates the impact of a rugged landscape. For low values of K/N, as K/N 
                                               
9 I have also tried to include cross products of all terms. Despite some of the coefficients - especially for the variance 
portion of the model - being significant their magnitude is very small and they do not seem to change the nature of 
the predicted effects. I omit them for the sake of simplicity and estimation power. 
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increases (Figure 2.1), the agent is able to exploit the increasing payoff of local peaks. High 
relative N allows better fine-tuning of the solution due to lower likelihood of conflicting trade-
offs. However, this occurs at a decreasing rate since increasing K for fixed N increases the 
number of linkages and the likelihood that they will be conflicting (a single component choice 
affecting multiple other components for a given K and N), which rapidly increases the chances of 
lock-in and eventually leads to a decline in the payoffs as K/N goes to 1.  
The case with K/N fixed and changing both N and K shows similar non-linearity (Figure 
2.5). In this case, the pattern is driven by the coefficients on the terms 1/N and K. As N and K 
increase, the performance again increases though at a decreasing rate as is the case with the fixed 
K. The marginal benefit of having larger space outweighs the costs of increases in K since the 
coefficients on K are small.10 
Although the interpretation of the variance portion of the estimated model is less 
straightforward, the results show that the variance is non-linear and driven by all components - N, 
K, the interaction terms K/N and their higher order terms (Table 2.1). It is also notable that the 
variance decreases for all cases and at a decreasing rate (Figure 2.2, 2.4, 2.6). The intuition 
behind this result is that increases in K/N make differences across landscapes less random 
(Figure 2.2). The average payoff achieved on a more rugged landscape will be similar across 
landscapes since all will exhibit similar lock-in problems. Within a landscape the differences 
may very well increase with K/N as a higher K makes distribution of payoffs within a landscape 
more dispersed. The increasing within-landscape differences contribute to the decreasing rate at 
which across-landscape differences decrease. However, the across-landscape effect dominates.11 
                                               
10 For instance, with K = 1 and N = 2 the probability that the focal component does not affect any other component 
beyond itself is 0. For K = 2 and N = 4, this probability increases to 1/27. Even for a fixed K/N the likelihood of 
conflicting tradeoffs increases. 
11 If we would measure the relative payoffs instead of the actual payoffs the variance would increase with K/N. 
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Increasing N (Figure 2.4) lowers variance by allowing an easier search through smoother space 
and decreasing both the within- and across-landscape variation. This is again at a decreasing rate 
since a higher N slows down a search and imposes time constraints on the agent. For high N, 
some agents might be cut-off before settling on a local peak, which leads to increasing within-
landscape variance. 
To summarize, the above analysis suggests that the payoffs in the NK model are 
determined by the interplay between the attributes of the innovation that lead to an increase in 
available innovation opportunities (K) and attributes that simplify their discovery (N). If the NK 
model is a good representation of a particular innovative process the empirical data should 
exhibit similar patterns. Inventors must strike a delicate balance when selecting the innovation 
design to capitalize on the trade-offs between the number of components and the linkages 
between them: 
Proposition: The performance of innovations will be driven by the interplay between the N 
(number of innovation components) and K (number of linkages among the components) in a way 
consistent with the simulated NK model. 
DATA AND ANALYSIS 
To test the conjecture that the NK model is a good approximation of the innovative 
process I focus on a single industry - the disk drive industry - as characterized by the US Patent 
Class 360. I analyze inventions (patents), seeing them as precursors of innovations and marking a 
successful solution of a technological problem. The US Patent classification associates function 
of the invention and of its parts with classes and subclasses, which allows construction of the 
measures of N and K. 
I focus on this particular industry for several reasons. Analogous to prior research 
(Fleming and Sorenson, 2001, 2004; Sorenson et al., 2006), the measure of interdependence 
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proposed here requires a good correspondence between the subclasses and physical components 
of an invention. As previously suggested (Fleming and Sorenson, 2004; Sorenson et al., 2006) 
such correspondence tends to be good for electronics patents. As the example below indicates, 
the correspondence between components and subclasses is likely to be exceptionally good in 
disk drive patents. Similarly, the disk industry experienced waves of innovations with varying 
degrees of technological complexity (Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 2001). Innovations in the 
industry typically progressed from more architectural in the early stages to component 
innovations when new architectural innovation reignited the search again (Chesbrough and 
Kusunoki, 2001). Most of the innovations in the industry were component innovations with some 
of them having a dramatic impact on the subsequent technological evolution of the industry –
 like those that marked the transitions from air bearing ferrite core heads to thin film magneto 
resistive heads or spindle motors with ball bearings to thin film bearings (Coughlin, Waid and 
Porter, 2005). 
The measure also requires stability across observations (the functional nature of 
components classified in a particular subclass needs to be relatively stable) which necessitates a 
single and, as I explain below, relatively narrow industry focus. The Class 360 covers only 
magnetic storage (Dynamic Magnetic Information Storage or Retrieval), which provides a 
narrow and well-defined industry definition. The industry, as defined by this class, is also in its 
very mature stage. It implies that most of the important inventions have been undertaken and 
exhaustive ex-post analysis with “self-contained” data can be performed. It is also convenient 
that the patents classified in a single patent class well represent the disk drive-related patents 
introduced by firms operating within the industry (Hoetker and Agarwal, 2007). 
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My main interdependence measure is based on analyzing 30,861 patents classified in 
Class 360 between 1972 and 2004 and 18,185 prior to 1999. The year 1972 is given by the 
establishment of class 360 and the first patents issued with this classification. Establishment of a 
separate patent class marks the transition from magnetic drum storage and suggests that the 
knowledge base related to the disk drives was not only different from prior categories but also 
sufficiently stable that the creation of a new patent class was possible. The patents issued in the 
last 5 years of the sample are excluded from the estimation to consistently measure citations over 
a 5-year period following the patent issue. To empirically test the NK model, I start with the 
empirical framework from prior studies (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001, 2004) and then extend it 
by developing additional controls and verifying its robustness to alternative model specifications. 
Dependent Variable 
I measure patent performance by the number of citations a patent receives in the first 5 
years post patent issuing date - i.e. the citing patent application date must be no later than 5 years 
after the cited patent issue date. As a result, patents in the last 5 years of the industry data are not 
used in the estimation as independent variables.12 Since the main objective of the citation counts 
is to obtain a proxy for the general patent usefulness or performance (Trajtenberg, 1990; Hall et 
al., 2000; Fleming and Sorenson, 2001), I use citations from all patents and not just from the 
ones classified in the class 360. Restricting the citations only to within industry citations would 
bias the measure toward the patents with narrow applicability and reduce variability in the 
dependent variable. Nevertheless, I have confirmed that restricting citations only to the within-
industry citations has no effect on the shape of the predicted values of the model.13 
                                               
12 The results are robust to different specifications of this time window (4 vs. 6 years). 
13 The correlation between the two citation counts (all citations and those from patents classified in the Class 360) is 
0.8. Using only within industry citations leads to more precise estimates of the variance equation and less precise 
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Independent Variables 
N: Number of Components 
Consistent with prior studies (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001, 2004; Sorenson et al., 2006), 
I operationalize the number of components by the number of subclasses. The estimation and 
testing of the NK model requires good correspondence between the physical components (or 
“chunks of knowledge,” Sorenson et al., 2006) and patent subclasses. The focus on the disk drive 
industry was partly motivated by expectation of a good correspondence. I include the number of 
components in the form 1/N to reflect the fact that the interaction should be a product of two 
independent variables. 
K: Level of Interdependence 
One of the contributions of the current paper is to construct and test a new measure of 
technological interdependence K. My measure of interdependence is based on a representation of 
the interaction matrix from Kauffman’s NK theory (1993, 1995). The interaction matrix in the 
NK model specifies the interdependencies between the individual components of a complex 
system and typically has the form: 
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The numbers represent components of the system and x stands for the existing interaction 
between the corresponding components. The interaction between components is present when 
change in the input value (component A vs. B being chosen) of the jth component leads to the 
                                                                                                                                                       
estimates of the mean equation relative to all citations and some loss of overall estimation power. 33% of the sample 
for the dependent variable when created using only the citations from within the Class 360 is either zero or one 
citation as opposed to only 17% when created using all citations. Only results with all citations are reported. 
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change in the payoff of the ith component. The model assumes that the underlying functional 
structure of the system is exogenous and agents optimize it by selecting (or designing) 
appropriate functional components. An x along the diagonal indicates that payoff of each 
component depends on its own design or choice. Then, typically, rows are influenced by 
columns so an x in the first row and third column indicates that the payoff contribution of the 
first component is affected by the design or choice of the third component.14 The matrix above is 
a case with N = 4 and K = 2.15 
As opposed to the binary interactions in the NK model, I estimate the amount of 
interaction in each “cell” of the interaction matrix. For each component, I estimate the amount of 
interaction it has with all other components. The K associated with the component i, Ki is the 
sum of interactions the focal component has with all other components. Interdependence K of an 
invention is then an average of the individual component Ki’s. 
Note that every patent represents a solution of a different technological problem. Every 
invention can be thus represented by an independent NK landscape. However, I am inferring K 
(which is a property of the landscape) from the final position of the inventor on the landscape by 
assuming that the solution will be composed of components that serve a certain function - i.e. 
functional blocks - and that these blocks were also used in other inventions. I am deriving the K 
of the focal landscape (which is given by the relationships between its functional blocks) by 
analyzing the pattern in which the functional blocks are utilized across all inventions within the 
industry. Such an inference implicitly assumes that a given component will serve the same 
function on all inventions and thus the relationships between the functional blocks are stable 
within the sample. For instance, to solve the friction problem of the disk drive head inventors 
                                               
14 The overall system payoff in the NK model is determined by the mean of the payoff contributions of the 
individual components. See the technical appendix for more details. 
15 The K does not include the interaction with itself. 
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may coat the head surface with a thin metal film. Inventors may optimize this function by 
selecting different metals. My inference implies that the component “thin metal film” will always 
serve the function of mitigating surface friction. This assumption necessitates my core 
assumption of a single industry. The interdependence of the “thin metal film” with other 
components may be very high within the disk drive patents but not necessarily outside of this set. 
Whenever this subclass appears on a disk drive patent it is more likely to appear with subclasses 
representing “recording head” or “disk surface.” However, within a broader context such an 
inference of interdependence may be incorrect as the function may be industry-specific. The 
subclass “thin metal film” may recombine with a wide variety of subclasses when one looks 
across industries. The necessity of a stable functional context requires focus on a single industry 
and a self-contained patent data set. 
More specifically, the key idea behind the measure is that when two functional blocks 
(represented by patent subclasses) are coupled we are more likely to observe components 
belonging to these subclasses in a single invention. If there is a high coupling between the 
functions A and B and the component a is classified in patent subclass A, aA and b is in B, bB 
(USPTO classifies patents into subclasses by their functions), then we are more likely to 
encounter components a and b appearing on a patent together. In other words, high 
interdependence between A and B implies that whenever an inventor solves a problem related to 
one of these functions she needs to redesign or include the coupled function as well, and we are 
likely to observe the components optimizing these functions together in a patent (e.g. head 
surface and recording head). Similarly, if the patent improves architecture of multiple functions 
we are likely to observe all components that correspond to these functions coupled to the 
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architecture. On the other hand, if A and B are independent with respect to each other, we are 
likely to observe A combined with other subclasses without B being present.  
Technically, the measure of interdependence K is computed in several steps. First, I 
compute the interdependence Ki for each focal component (subclass) of patent l: 
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where j belongs to all subclasses except i. The focal patent l is excluded from the calculation of 
these counts.16 The measure K for the patent l is then calculated as follows: 
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For instance, when calculating the interdependence of the first subclass (first subclass is focal 
“i”) the interdependence between the first and the third subclasses is the number of patents where 
the first and third subclasses appear together, divided by the number of patents where only the 
first subclass appears. 
Using the focal industry dataset to derive the measure assumes stability in the nature of 
interdependencies between the individual functional components over time within the given 
industry.17 The variable Ki thus captures the interdependence between subclasses A and B that is 
not patent-specific. The invention is assumed to consist of building blocks that have certain level 
of interdependence associated with each pair of its components. If subclasses A and B appear on 
two patents, one in the beginning of our observation period and another at the end, the 
interdependence between them would be identical. The assumption of the stability of 
                                               
16 I also exclude patents that include subclasses that are very rare and appear only on the focal patent. If I would 
include these patents I might bias the measure of K. Rare subclasses would appear as highly interdependent which 
may not be the case. I also exclude patents with only one subclass. In the model, N = 1 implies K = 0. However, in 
the data, the interdependencies may be hidden at a finer grain, which may create heterogeneity that I am unable to 
capture. These procedures eliminate about 7% of the patents from the estimation sub-sample.  
17 As I discuss below, I subject this assumption to a multitude of robustness checks. 
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interdependencies between the subclasses (“building blocks”) is not entirely realistic, but 
assuming stability at least within a certain time frame is a necessary simplification. The measure 
of K is also in the interval [0, N-1] and, thus, has the correct scaling consistent with the NK 
model. 
It is also important to note that I use the current subclass classification as published by 
the USPTO at the end of my sample time frame.18 The subclasses assigned to patents at the time 
of issue (called the original classification or “ocl”) are sometimes abolished as irrelevant, and 
new classes are created (24% of the patents in my sample have at least one subclass that is 
subject to reclassification) and patents are reclassified. I believe that the current classification is 
more precise since it is more likely to represent the same functional components in different 
patents by the same subclass. However, as I show below, I have verified that the results are fully 
robust whether I use the original or the current classification.19 
To highlight the mechanics of the measure, it may be instrumental to discuss an example 
(Table 2.2). The patent #5,949,612 “Low friction sliding hard disk drive system” was classified 
into the following subclasses (the subclasses are listed with the calculated values of Ki).20 Figure 
2.7 provides the description of a patent from the first page of the patent document. 
I note that the most interdependent classes in the above patent are the “stock material” 
subclasses 428. Within the context of the main class 360, the “material” subclasses typically 
represent the surface of the rotating disk or material of the reading head. The functional context 
of these subclasses tends to be the same across many patents. Whenever the “stock material” 
                                               
18 I utilize the NUS-MBS patent database maintained by Kwanghui Lim. The source of the subclass classification is 
the field “ccl-2004-12” which originates from the USPTO CASSIS DVD 2004-12.  
19 I thank Mu-Yen Hsu for a valuable discussion on this issue. 
20 The patent has received 24 citations. 
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subclass appears on the patent, it is more likely that the subclass representing the disk or the head 
appears as well, suggesting interdependence. 
It is also illustrative to look at how the measure orders the patents within the industry. If I 
order the patents according to complexity, K/N, the patents range from K/N = 0 to K/N = 0.704 
with the mean of 0.077 and the median of 0.062. The patents with higher values of K/N are 
typically those that solve specific design and method issues with the disk’s mounting, disk 
surface, head design or application specific issues of the tape handling mechanism - loading, 
reeling, etc. Around the mean value tend to be inventions addressing more systemic issues like 
data processing, mounting structures, cartridge design issues, etc. Among the least complex 
inventions are those that deal with methods of data processing, memory design issues, wiring and 
grounding of the systems, controllers, signal filters, etc. As an interesting extreme example, one 
of the patents with a very low complexity, K/N is an IBM patent 5,953,180 describing different 
markings of the disk assembly mechanism.  
Control Variables 
When inventors file patent applications they do so in anticipation of economic returns – 
supposedly in a technological area where they expect such returns to be the greatest. 
Consequently, the distribution of patents across subclasses is not random, which creates an 
endogeneity problem that needs to be addressed. The approach that I adopt is to include a set of 
proxy variables that should control for unobserved differences potentially driving the results as 
well as employ a host of robustness checks using alternative measures and model specifications. 
Technology Controls 
From the perspective of the above endogeneity problem, the main concern with the 
proposed measure is that it relies on relative frequency counts for the inference of 
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interdependence. Inventors are more likely to patent in attractive technological areas so 
attractiveness (unrelated to interdependence) in a certain domain may affect both the frequency 
ratios used to measure K as well as the number of citations. The objective of some of the controls 
is thus to proxy for the general attractiveness of a given technological area. 
Prior studies have tackled this issue by introducing the technology mean and variance 
controls (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001, 2004). I utilize a similar approach but I add several 
additional controls complementing those used in prior research. The technology mean control 
has the form: 
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The weight ilp  is the number of subclasses categorized in the main class i on patent l. For 
instance, if a patent has 5 subclasses classified in the main class 360 the p360 = 5/9 and 360 would 
be the count of citations per patent that patents classified in the class 360 received. I again use 
the entire industry for this computation. Note that patents classified in class 360 may be also 
classified in other main classes. Similarly, the variance measure is defined as: 
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Note that the means µi and σi are at the main class level (and then are weighted by the number of 
subclasses in a given class i) but the measure Ki is at the subclass level. To control for the 
possibility that the citations matter at a finer-grain than at the main class level I add measures of 
technological mean and variance at the subclass level. These measures have the form: 
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These measures are, in fact, “quality” measures reflecting weighted citations per patent in a 
technological domain of a given patent. To control for the possibility that it is the density of 
patents in a given technological area that is the proxy for attractiveness I add a simple patent 
density measure that has the form:  
 i ill  subclass in  patentsofcount  of subclasses ofnumber  for patent control densityPatent 
1   [7] 
Prior Art Citations 
The prior art citations - in the form of the number of references made by the focal 
patent - control for the localness of search and propensity to patent (Fleming and Sorenson, 
2001). Building more on the existing patents suggests that the inventor searches in the 
neighborhood of the existing knowledge (Podolny and Stuart, 1995) as opposed to looking for 
truly novel knowledge. The propensity to be cited correlates with the number of citations a patent 
makes on average, and, thus, the number of citations a focal patent makes may capture 
“idiosyncratic differences in patenting activity that [the] class controls miss” (Fleming and 
Sorenson, 2001). 
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Number of Main Classes 
Consistent with the logic described in prior studies (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001, 2004), 
a higher number of main classes may mean broader applicability and relevance of the patent for 
subsequent innovations. The patents with more classes may also be more at risk for subsequent 
citations simply because they happen to be in the same class as the subsequent patent. 
Number of Trials 
The number of prior trials measures the number of times a particular combination of 
subclasses has been used before (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001, 2004). It serves to capture the 
number of peaks that have been already found and search limitations associated with the 
exhaustion of combinatorial possibilities. Using this control should capture the pre-emption or 
crowding out - factors that likely affect citation patterns. 
Time Dummies and Inventor Fixed Effects 
I add time dummies to all regressions as a way of capturing changes over time. Using the 
matching algorithm described in Agarwal et al. (2009) I also match inventor names to create 
unique inventor identifiers. To control for unobserved heterogeneity at the individual inventor 
level, I run the models using the inventor fixed-effects. On average, each patent lists multiple 
inventors so using inventor fixed-effects changes the sample structure. Instead of an observation 
being a patent it becomes an inventor-patent with an increase in the sample size. For this reason, 
I report the fixed-effects models as a robustness check. 
The descriptive statistics of the sample are provided in Table 2.3. 
30 
Regression Models 
I adopt the estimation technique from prior studies (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001, 2004), 
but I test its robustness using alternative specifications. Since it is necessary to estimate both the 
conditional variance and the conditional mean (ideally jointly) of a data with a count dependent 
variable, the choice of an estimation method is relatively limited. Ideally, I would like to use a 
method that is fully equivalent to the multiplicative heteroscedasticity model used in the 
estimation of the theoretical model. Since the dependent variable in the NK model is normally 
distributed and I use non-normally distributed citation counts as the dependent variable in the 
empirical model, clean use of the same model specification on both sets of data is not possible. 
Using the multiplicative heteroscedasticity model on count data violates the normality 
assumption necessary for consistent estimates using maximum likelihood. 
For the joint estimation of the variance and mean of the citation count data I use the 
Negbin II specification (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986) of the negative binomial regression as the 
main model. This specification allows joint maximum likelihood estimation of the mean and the 
dispersion parameter α conditional on the exogenous regressors (STATA implements this routine 
as gnbreg). The Negbin II model has the form: 
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The above formulation implies that the variance-mean ratio is (1+exp(Ziδ)exp(Xiβ)) 
where Zi  is the vector of exogenous regressors affecting the dispersion parameter and the over-
dispersion is linear in the mean. 
Since OLS is a consistent estimator even with count data, I use a simple two-step 
procedure as an alternative model. In the first step, I regress citations on all variables predicting 
the mean. In the second step, I regress squared residuals from the first step on the variables 
predicting the variance. I also run the multiplicative heteroscedasticity model on the empirical 
sample as a robustness check. I run all models with robust standard errors. 
Despite the theoretical section suggesting that the best fit is provided by the model with 
the third degree polynomial, such a model is difficult to estimate empirically. The terms in the 
higher order polynomial are highly correlated and the standard errors increase rapidly. 
Consequently, I use the model with the second degree polynomial as the basis for comparisons. 
RESULTS 
Table 2.5 shows the estimated main models. Model 1 includes only the control variables. 
Model 2 is a full Negbin II model with the NK and control variables. Model 3 is the second 
degree polynomial model from the simulated data (Model 2 from Table 2.1). 
Since in the Negbin models the predicted values are a non-linear function of the variables, 
I cannot compare the coefficients directly. However, I can compare the signs and the relative 
effect in the mean portion of the model since exp(.) is a monotonic transformation. The 
correspondence between the coefficients as well as the predicted values (Figures 2.8, 2.10, 2.12) 
of the mean portion between the empirical and the theoretical model is strong.21 The empirical 
                                               
21 The figures are created as follows: the value which is fixed is at the 50th percentile in the empirical sample and the 
x axis starts and ends at the 5th and 95th percentiles, respectively. For instance, in Figure 8, the N is fixed at 3 which 
is the median of the sample and the x axis starts at K = 0 (5th percentile) and ends at K = 1 (95th percentile). 
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estimation also correctly captures the smaller direct effect of the interdependence K and its 
square term K2 and the stronger and significant effect of its interactions with N. For instance, at 
N = 3 and a change from K = 0 to K = 1 the effect of interaction term coefficients on citations is 
twice as large as that of the coefficients on K and K2. Empirical analysis thus supports the 
prediction of the model that even as the level of interdependence determines the nature of the 
landscape what matters for performance is the interplay between the interdependence and the 
number of components. The effects of the interdependence and the number of components 
cannot be analyzed in isolation – i.e. technological complexity does matter. 
Overall, the effects of K and N and their interaction terms are relatively large. For 
example, for N = 3, deviating from the mean level of K/N by one standard deviation increases the 
citations on average by about 0.5. As the inverted U-shaped relationship in Figure 2.8 and the 
concave and increasing relationship in Figure 2.10 suggest, I find a strong support for the 
complexity catastrophe (Kauffman, 1993, 1995). The complexity catastrophe implies that the 
penalty for interdependence will be strongest when K is close to N for small N. Further, I find 
that at fixed K, increasing N improves performance but at a decreasing rate - consistent with the 
NK model. Overall, the mean estimation of the empirical model captures the attributes of the 
simulated NK model well. 
On the other hand, the results of the variance portion of the model are statistically weaker 
(Figure 2.9, 2.11, 2.13) and tend to be inconsistent with the NK model. The most notable 
difference is that the estimated variance tends to closely scale with the mean. This could happen 
for several reasons. First, the precision of the measure of interdependence K may decrease with 
K. Since patent interdependence negatively correlates with the frequency of its subclasses in the 
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sample and positively with the number of subclasses N, it is possible that K of patents with 
higher interdependence will be based on fewer data points and estimated with more noise.  
Second, the noise in the citation counts as a measure of economic value may increase 
with its magnitude. The count models typically assume independence between events, which is 
potentially violated in the case of citation counts due to preferential attachment (Barabasi and 
Albert, 1999; Powell et al., 2005). In other words, a patent with many citations is more likely to 
receive additional citation because it is well known (it has already received many citations) and 
not necessarily because it has exceptional economic value. The patent citations are not only a 
noisy estimate of the economic value but also the noise may increase with the number of 
citations. In such a case, the conditional variance will positively correlate with the conditional 
mean, which may yield the observed predicted patterns and overwhelm the dynamics predicted 
by the model. 
A third possible explanation is related to a more fundamental issue of the NK model. In 
the simulations, I measure absolute payoffs. The absolute payoffs are affected by the attributes of 
the problem space as well as by the ability of agents to search it. I suggested that it is reasonable 
to expect a similar pattern in the sample of patent data since innovations with different natures of 
the search spaces (different N and K) compete for citations with each other. An alternative 
approach would be to measure relative performance (conditional on how well an agent can 
perform on a landscape given by N and K). The focus on relative performance in the model 
would imply increasing variance with the level of complexity. However, the mean estimates 
based on the NK model measuring relative payoffs does not seem to fit the empirical estimates 
which provides evidence against this specification of the model. At the same time, focusing on 
relative performance would imply a decreasing relationship in Figure 2.9 rather than an inverted-
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U. In general, the estimation of the variance relationship is considerably less robust than the 
mean estimation and appears to be very sensitive to possible biases in the measures. 
Alternatively, it could be the case that the NK model fails to predict the variance pattern 
of the real-life dynamics while capturing the mean performance relatively well. It could also be 
the case that the assumptions of the NK model that have been hypothesized to be violated in real 
life – like the effects of cognition (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001) manifest themselves strongly in 
the variance portion of the model. On average, inventors may behave like local searching 
automatons. However, cognitive differences allow some inventors to capture opportunities 
present in highly complex technological domains, which has a positive effect on variance of the 
observed performance. 
The coefficients on controls have generally expected signs and are consistent with prior 
studies (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001, 2004). However, a count of main classes has a negative 
effect on citation counts after controlling for interdependence, which suggests that more 
generalist patents are less valuable within the industry. I also find that Number of Prior Trials 
and Prior Art Citations - factors commonly characterizing a local search (March and Simon, 
1958; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Stuart and Podolny, 1995; Fleming and Sorenson, 2001) - are 
positive and significant in their effects on citations. The positive effect on the Number of trials 
suggests that the positive spillovers outweigh the crowding out effects and slightly increase 
citations. I also find that within a single industry context the technology mean control is 
considerably more important at the subclass rather than at the main class level. 
Table 2.6 provides a comparison of the results with the ones based on the prior measure 
of interdependence (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001). Model 3 shows the results based on the prior 
measure applied to the disk-drive industry. Model 4 reproduces the results reported in a prior 
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study (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001). The mean estimates are similar in both models (Model 3 
and 4), which suggests that the measure developed by Fleming and Sorenson (2001) is not 
sensitive to the single industry assumption. However, the measure developed in this paper 
(Model 2) not only improves the fit of the model but also captures dynamics that more closely 
correspond to the NK model. 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND LIMITATIONS 
Even though the empirical model (or at least its mean portion) seems to perform 
relatively well, the results need to be taken with caution for several reasons. Beyond the standard 
concerns arising from the use of patent data, I will mention the most pertinent ones that remain. 
The robustness checks are reported in Table 2.7.22 
The first possible issue relates to the construction of the measurement sample. I 
constructed the measure of interdependence based on the tabulation of subclass frequencies and 
co-occurrences in the entire industry. To test the robustness of this assumption I constructed the 
measure on several different sub-samples. In Model 5, I show results of the estimation where I 
split the sample into two equal-sized sub-samples by randomly assigning each observation either 
into a measurement sub-sample or a regression sub-sample. The values of K of the patents in the 
regression sample were calculated based on tabulations of subclasses in the measure construction 
sub-sample.23 The coefficient estimates of this exercise are highly consistent with the main 
model. The predicted values were very similar to the ones reported for the main model. The 
results are also robust to the use of the classification system. In Model 4, I show results using 
                                               
22 Note that I do not use the citations to measure knowledge flows but rather to infer their economic importance, so 
the criticism by Alcacer and Gittelman (2006) does not apply to my estimation framework. 
23 I have also used additional rules for creating the sub-sample for the measure inference like using only the first 10 
years, last 10 years or moving, 10-year and 5-year windows. All yielded qualitatively identical results. 
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original classification as opposed to the reclassified patents as of the end of the estimation time 
frame. 
The second issue relates to truncation. One may argue that patents represent only the best 
inventions that in expectation exceed a certain threshold value. Thus, the empirical results can be 
seen as based on truncated data. Similar to prior studies (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001), I 
estimated the simulated NK model on truncated data for various percentiles of truncation. The 
estimated coefficients appear qualitatively robust to truncation though the usual attenuation 
results (Greene, 1996). From this perspective, our empirical results could be seen as conservative 
and biased downwards. 
Third, to test the robustness of the model specification I analyzed the data using a simple 
2-step OLS procedure, a multiplicative heteroscedasticity model and a model with inventor 
fixed-effects combined with the 2-step OLS. The pattern of the predicted values of all models is 
consistent with the main negative binomial model. The magnitude of the coefficients of the mean 
portion of the multiplicative heteroscedasticity model is substantially smaller than in the OLS 
models, likely resulting from the bias (due to the violation of the distributional assumption). 
Fourth, I have tested the robustness of the results to the choice of the industry sample. 
This exercise has confirmed the conjecture that the measure is sensitive to the single-industry 
assumption and stability in the “knowledge blocks.” I have tried to calculate the measure of K 
based on an expanded sample including Data Processing classes 700-714 (memory, input/output, 
arithmetic processing, data and file management, artificial intelligence, etc.) and the estimation 
lost a significant amount of power. Importantly, as opposed to class 360, which has patenting 
activity spread out relatively evenly over most of our sample period and declines towards the end, 
almost all patenting activity in classes 700-714 occurs between 1995 and 2004. This suggests 
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that the technologies patented in classes 700-714 represent a different stage of the technology 
life-cycle which violates the assumptions underlying the measure. Nevertheless, I have also 
estimated the model on a well-defined sample of 30,000 semiconductor design patents with 
almost identical results. It implies that though the model is applicable across domains, the self-
containment of the sample is critical. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The main objective of my study was to test the conjecture that the iterative trial-and-error 
local search represented by an NK model is a good approximation of the innovation process. 
Using an empirical analysis that is based on a novel measure of technological complexity I find 
relatively strong support for the NK model when predicting the conditional mean of observed 
citation patterns. More specifically, I find that the technological complexity (i.e. K/N) is a key 
predictor of these dynamics. The paper not only provides evidence in support of the NK model 
but also shows an empirical operationalization of the model measures and their boundary 
conditions. This opens multiple avenues for future research. 
Prior studies (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001, 2004; Sorenson et al., 2006) found a 
relatively weak effect of technological complexity, K/N, on the patent performance and conclude 
that the payoffs are driven by the single parameter K. Fleming and Sorenson (2001) suggest that 
“’the complexity catastrophe’ operates almost entirely as a function of the degree of 
interdependence among the system components. Since this diverges from the predictions of the 
NK model, these findings suggest a need to consider seriously how evolution in social systems 
differs from biological evolution.” My analysis provides a refinement of this conclusion. On 
average, inventors behave in a way that is not dissimilar to the predictions of the NK model and 
perhaps analogous to biological evolution. The key attributes of the adaptive search in the NK 
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landscape are its boundedness and experimentation. The process is driven by incremental 
improvements resulting from the trial-and-error steps guided by path dependency. As the 
performance of a biological genome results from the interplay between its length and linkages 
between the individual genes, the performance of innovations appears to arise from the interplay 
between the number of components and the interdependence between them. Analogous to 
species climbing the “hills” of biological fitness, inventors face complexity catastrophe when 
solving very complex problems. However, my findings also highlight possible differences. In the 
biological systems, the selection operates at the level of population or species. In the 
technological systems, it also operates at the level of individual inventors through cognition 
(Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000). Cognition is typically assumed to accelerate the search process by 
allowing “offline,” directed and distant “jumps” over the search space (Kauffman, 1993, Gavetti 
and Levinthal, 2000; Gavetti, 2005). It relaxes the constraints of myopia and allows for skipping 
the small trial-and-error steps by traversing large sections of the search space. In contrast to the 
predictions of the NK model, my results suggest that variance of the performance increases with 
complexity. Even though on average inventors face lock-in problems associated with complexity, 
thanks to cognitive differences and vast heterogeneity in search abilities some inventors may be 
able to discover opportunities that are present in complex technological spaces. My analysis 
suggests that solving complex problems provides opportunities, and cognitive diversity perhaps 
allows one to exploit them. 
The study produces several important questions. The natural question that arises is the 
one related to optimality. If inventors have full discretion over the choice of components should 
we not be more likely to observe optimal performance? The analysis suggests that this is not the 
case. The peak of citations is at the 87th percentile of the distribution of K/N in the sample. Most 
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of the inventions in the sample have very low complexity. The question is why? One possible 
explanation may relate to the problem of unobservable costs. In expectation of high costs in 
terms of time, effort and financial resources inventors may decide not to work on complicated 
problems. On the other hand, even though solving simple problems may lead to lower expected 
returns it may be cheap and can be done quickly. 
At a more fundamental level the question is what drives the distributions of N and K in 
the data. To what extent are attributes like N and K exogenous? How much discretion do 
inventors have over these attributes? The innovations are rarely standalone - it is reasonable to 
see them as embedded in an intricate web of relationships to other innovations within the 
systems in which they function. The disk drive inventions are embedded within the architecture 
of the personal computer. The inventors may have some discretion over the number of 
components and linkages but such discretion may be limited due to the interdependencies with 
the overall system. The functionality within the environment may pre-determine the invention 
structure. The question is when and how this matters. What is the role of the individual in this 
process? How do inventor attributes affect the innovation performance and what factors interact 
with the complexity? Disentangling these underlying mechanisms is an important venue for 
further research. 
This study contributes to multiple literature streams. I show that the innovation process 
can be successfully modeled using the NK model. This not only shows an empirical 
operationalization of the model but also connects the innovation and complexity literatures 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990; Mahoney, 1995; Galunic and Rodan, 1998; Frenken, 2000, 2001a, 
2001b; Fleming and Sorenson, 2001, 2004; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004; Murmann and Frenken, 
2006; Sorenson, Rivkin and Fleming, 2006; Marengo, Pasquali and Valente, 2007). In a broader 
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sense, the study implies that agent-based models could be a viable counterpart of neoclassical 
economic models when used carefully while being aware of their limitations. 
In conclusion, I theorized and found evidence that the NK model provides a reasonable 
approximation of the innovation process. In the course of my investigation, I have found 
important contingencies in the proposed operationalization of the model. Furthermore, the 
analysis revealed intriguing patterns in the nature of technological complexity which opens 
interesting questions and promising possibilities for continued research.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 2.1 Multiplicative heteroscedastic regression on NK simulated data 
 
Payoff Model 1 
(Linear) 
Model 2 
(2nd degree) 
Model 3 
(3rd degree) 
MEAN    
1/N -0.18*** -0.69*** -0.58** 
1/N2  0.547*** 0.59* 
1/N3   -.084 
K -.019*** -0.037*** 0.0017 
K2  0.0009* -0.0056* 
K3   0.00036* 
K/N 0.0016 0.5927*** 0.731*** 
(K/N)2  -0.498*** -1.078*** 
(K/N)3   0.4576*** 
Cons. 0.745*** 0.715*** 0.648*** 
VARIANCE    
1/N 2.44*** 5.67*** 6.835*** 
1/N2  -2.93*** -11.16*** 
1/N3   7.184*** 
K -0.21*** -0.091* -0.59*** 
K2  0.000076 0.084*** 
K3   -0.0046*** 
K/N 0.895*** -0.419 3.65*** 
(K/N)2  0.448* -4.775*** 
(K/N)3   2.2825*** 
Cons. -2.78*** -3.13*** -3.238*** 
Pseudo R2 0.4116 0.4198 0.4219 
n 200,000 200,000 200,000 
Log Likelihood -60935.183 -60085.581 -59865.773 
Significance levels: † 10%, * 5%, **1%, *** 0.1%, double-sided test  
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Table 2.2 Example of K calculation: patent #5,949,612 “Low friction sliding hard disk drive 
system” 
 
Subclass 
(as of 
12/2004) 
Description Ki 
360/97.01 Record transport with head stationary during transducing, Disk record 0.14 
360/122 Head, Head surface structure 0.07 
360/135 Record medium, Disk 0.6 
360/246.1 Head mounting, Disk record, Full contact suspension 0.15 
428/654 All metal or with adjacent metals, Composite: i.e., plural, adjacent, spatially 
distinct metal components (e.g., layers, joint, etc.), Al-base component, Next to 
Al-base component 
2.3 
428/694tr Composite (nonstructural laminate), Of inorganic material, Metal-compound-
containing layer, Defined magnetic layer, Dynamic recording medium, Metal thin 
film magnetic layer, Specified surface feature or roughness. 
1.45 
428/694tf Composite (nonstructural laminate), Of inorganic material, Metal-compound-
containing layer, Defined magnetic layer, Dynamic recording medium, Metal thin 
film magnetic layer, Topcoat, or protective overlayer, Fluorocarbon or 
organosilicon layer. 
1.95 
428/900 Magnetic feature. 0.67 
 K#5,949,612 =  0.92 
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Table 2.3 Descriptive statistics  
 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
1) Citations 7.42 9.09 0 180 
2) Mean technology control (main class level) 7.99 1.06 2.67 18.96 
3) Variance technology control (main class level) 85.30 34.36 17.27 412.70 
4) Mean technology control (subclass level) 7.98 2.80 1.58 55.36 
5) Variance technology control (subclass level) 66.40 63.16 1.27 1849.16 
6) Patenting density in focal technology 370.58 243.44 2.50 1239 
7) Number of prior art citations 6.94 6.78 0 145 
8) Number of main classes 1.88 0.95 1 8 
9) Number of repeated trials 3.92 15.40 0 309 
10) 1/N 0.34 0.14 0.034 1 
11) K 0.36 0.62 0 13.47 
12) K/N 0.08 0.08 0 0.70 
Observations: 18,185     
 
 
 
Table 2.4 Correlation table 
 
Correlations 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10) 11) 
1) Citations 1           
2) Mean technology control (main class level) 0.232 1          
3) Variance technology control (main class level) 0.165 0.769 1         
4) Mean technology control (subclass level) 0.508 0.574 0.404 1        
5) Variance technology control (subclass level) 0.380 0.436 0.495 0.739 1       
6) Patenting density in focal technology 0.055 -0.170 -0.077 0.055 0.103 1      
7) Number of prior art citations 0.149 0.098 0.056 0.158 0.083 -0.031 1     
8) Number of main classes 0.097 0.301 0.169 0.195 0.096 -0.469 0.088 1    
9) Number of repeated trials 0.040 -0.076 -0.034 0.023 0.056 0.356 0.002 -0.154 1   
10) 1/N -0.146 -0.156 -0.055 -0.151 -0.079 0.251 -0.068 -0.431 0.183 1  
11) K 0.081 0.118 -0.031 0.101 0.009 -0.123 0.053 0.410 -0.026 -0.437 1 
12) K/N 0.055 0.027 -0.060 0.014 -0.052 -0.039 0.043 0.265 0.130 -0.203 0.707 
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Table 2.5 Negative binomial models of citation counts, patent class 360 
 
Variable Model 1 
Controls only 
Model 2 
Full model 
Model 3 
NK simulation  
(from Table 2.1) 
MEAN EQUATION:    
1/N  -2.418*** -0.69*** 
1/N2  1.696*** 0.547*** 
K  -0.353** -0.037*** 
K2  0.048*** 0.0009* 
K/N  3.183*** 0.5927*** 
(K/N)2  -5.277*** -0.498*** 
Mean technology control (main 
class) -0.058*** -0.050*** 
 
Mean technology control (subclass) 0.197*** 0.194***  
Patenting density in focal technology 0.000*** 0.000***  
Number of prior art citations 0.013*** 0.012***  
Number of main classes 0.010 -0.044***  
Number of repeated trials 0.002*** 0.001**  
Constant 0.555*** 1.111*** 0.715*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes  
    
VARIANCE EQUATION (ln(alpha))    
1/N  1.241* 5.67*** 
1/N2  -1.491** -2.93*** 
K  0.123† -0.091* 
K2  0.011 0.000076 
K/N  -1.896*** -0.419 
(K/N)2  1.912 0.448* 
Variance technology control (main 
class) 0.001† 0.001* 
 
Variance technology control 
(subclass) 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 
Patenting density in focal technology 0.000*** 0.000***  
Number of prior art citations -0.001 0.000  
Number of main classes -0.197*** -0.179***  
Number of repeated trials -0.002*** -0.002*  
Constant -0.935*** -1.118*** -3.13*** 
Year dummies Yes Yes  
    
Wald χ2 6288 6169  
Pseudo R2 0.0584 0.0643 0.4198 
Observations 21,711 18,185 200,000 
Log likelihood -61540.623 -51539.739 -60085.581 
Significance levels: † 10%, * 5%, **1%, *** 0.1%, double-sided test 
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Table 2.6 Negative binomial models of citation counts, comparison with prior measures 
 
Variable Model 1 
NK 
simulation  
(Table 2.1) 
Model 2 
Full model 
Model 3 
Fleming and 
Sorenson 
(2001) 
measure, 
Disk-drive 
sample 
Model 4 
(from 
Fleming and 
Sorenson, 
2001) 
MEAN EQUATION:     
1/N -0.69*** -2.418*** -2.813*** -1.5823*** 
1/N2 0.547*** 1.696*** 2.48*** 0.8778† 
K -0.037*** -0.353** 0.472*** 0.2893*** 
K2 0.0009* 0.048*** -0.124*** -0.1225*** 
K/N 0.5927*** 3.183*** 0.103 0.2571* 
(K/N)2 -0.498*** -5.277*** 0.01 - 
Mean technology control (main cl.)  -0.050*** -0.08*** 0.9019*** 
Mean technology control (subclass)  0.194*** 0.111***  
Patenting density in focal technology  0.000*** 0.000***  
Number of prior art citations  0.012*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 
Number of main classes  -0.044*** 0.029* 0.0432*** 
Number of repeated trials  0.001** 0.003*** -0.0009 
Single class24  - -0.751** -0.1135 
Constant 0.715*** 1.111*** 0.258* 0.1933** 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
     
VARIANCE EQUATION (ln(alpha))     
1/N 5.67*** 1.241* -2.493*** 0.4942 
1/N2 -2.93*** -1.491** 2.625* 0.7613 
K -0.091* 0.123† -0.016 -0.6098*** 
K2 0.000076 0.011 -0.056† 0.2544*** 
K/N -0.419 -1.896*** 0.547* -0.3984† 
(K/N)2 0.448* 1.912 -0.07 - 
Variance technology control (main 
class) 
 
0.001* 0.003*** 
-0.0203*** 
Variance technology control 
(subclass) 
 
0.003***  
 
Patenting density in focal technology  0.000*** 0.000***  
Number of prior art citations  0.000 0.007*** -0.0001 
Number of main classes  -0.179*** -0.065** -0.03 
Number of repeated trials  -0.002* 0.001 -0.0036† 
Single class  - -1.104* -0.5465 
Constant -3.13*** -1.118*** -0.687*** 0.0616 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
     
Wald χ2  6169 2639  
Pseudo R2 0.4198 0.0643 0.0272  
Observations 200,000 18,185 20,157 17,264 
Log likelihood -60085.581 -51539.739 -59927.666 -41,024.85 
Significance levels: † 10%, * 5%, **1%, *** 0.1%, double-sided test 
                                               
24 Patents with a single class were dropped from my estimation. The measure as developed here does not allow 
calculation of complexity for single class patents. 
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Table 2.7 Robustness checks 
 
Variable Model 1 
NK 
simulation  
(from Table 
2.1) 
Model 2 
2-step  
OLS 
Model 3 
2-step OLS  
and Inventor  
Fixed-Effects 
Model 3 
Multiplicative  
hetero- 
scedasticity  
model 
Model 4 
Neg. bin.  
(original  
classification) 
Model 5 
Neg. bin.  
(regression and  
measure  
estimation  
sub-samples) 
MEAN EQUATION:       
1/N -0.69*** -19.716*** -21.305*** -10.79*** -1.732*** -1.836*** 
1/N2 0.547*** 16.185*** 16.314*** 8.503*** 1.202*** 1.336*** 
K -0.037*** -1.641*** -1.676** -1.57*** -0.19* -0.175 
K2 0.0009* 0.132*** 0.285** 0.123*** 0.025 0.021 
K/N 0.5927*** 18.421*** 20.314*** 13.623*** 2.25*** 2.314*** 
(K/N)2 -0.498*** -28.429*** -46.297*** -14.737** -3.868*** -4.394*** 
Mean technology control  
(main class) 
 
-0.679*** -0.29* -0.226*** -0.059*** -0.054*** 
Mean technology control  
(subclass) 
 
1.733*** 1.453*** 1.331*** 0.194*** 0.193*** 
Patenting density in focal  
technology 
 
0.001** 0.001** 0 0*** 0*** 
Number of prior art citations  0.108*** 0.031* 0.087*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 
Number of main classes  -0.269*** -0.191 -0.031 -0.035*** -0.027* 
Number of repeated trials  0.019** 0.017** 0.008* 0.002** 0.003** 
Constant 0.715*** 2.628*** 3.462** 0.33 1.009*** 1.044*** 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Inventor dummies   Yes    
R2  0.2986 0.1622    
       
VARIANCE EQUATION  
ln(alpha) or squared residuals 
      
1/N 5.67*** -291.026*** -169.994‡ -3.608*** 1.389* 0.456 
1/N2 -2.93*** 259.888*** 117.096‡ 2.306*** -1.984** -0.84 
K -0.091* -23.278† -25.278‡ -0.046 0.119 0.014 
K2 0.000076 2.274* 8.317†‡ 0.023* 0.001 0.006 
K/N -0.419 326.095** 145.371‡ 2.822*** -1.838** -1.122 
(K/N)2 0.448* -406.746 -435.125‡ -8.004*** 3.748* 3.59† 
Variance technology control  
(main class) 
 
-0.05 -0.13 -0.002* 0.001 0.001 
Variance technology control  
(subclass) 
 
1.562*** 0.668*** 0.014*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
Patenting density in focal  
technology 
 
0.03† -0.002 0.001*** 0*** 0* 
Number of prior art citations  1.88* -0.025 0.026*** -0.001 -0.001 
Number of main classes  -10.291** -2.241 -0.154*** -0.199*** -0.209*** 
Number of repeated trials  0.309 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 
Constant -3.13*** 19.272 44.32 2.92*** -1.103*** -1.041*** 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Inventor dummies   Yes    
       
Wald χ2     6159.87 3072.52 
Pseudo R2 (NB) or R2 (OLS) 0.4198 0.08 0.0256 0.1322 0.06 0.0612 
Observations 200,000 18,185 40,444 18,185 18,611 9,327 
Log likelihood -60085.581   -57198.951 -52797.893 -26401.639 
Significance levels: † 10%, * 5%, **1%, *** 0.1%, ‡ jointly significant at 5%, double-sided test 
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Figure 2.1 Mean as a function of K (N is fixed at 10)25 
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Figure 2.2 Variance as a function of K (N is fixed at 10) 
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25 In the conditional heteroscedastic model the mean predicted value has the linear form Xβ and the variance value 
the form exp(Xβ). 
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Figure 2.3 Mean as a function of N (K is fixed at 2) 
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Figure 2.4 Variance as a function of N (K is fixed at 2) 
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Figure 2.5 Mean as a function of N (K/N is fixed at 0.2) 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.58
0.6
0.62
0.64
0.66
0.68
0.7
N
P
ay
of
f (
K
/N
 is
 fi
xe
d 
at
 0
.2
)
 
 
Linear
2nd degree
3rd degree
4th degree
5th degree
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Variance as a function of N (K/N is fixed at 0.2) 
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Figure 2.7 Example description: patent #5,949,612 “Low friction sliding hard disk drive system” 
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Figure 2.8 Estimated mean citations as a function of K (N is fixed at 3)26 
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Figure 2.9 Estimated variance of citations as a function of K (N is fixed at 3) 
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26 In the Negbin II specification of the negative binomial model, the predicted values have the form exp(Xβ) for the 
mean portion and (1+ exp(Zβ)exp(Xβ))exp(Xβ) for the variance portion. 
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Figure 2.10 Estimated mean citations as a function of N (K is fixed at 0.2) 
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Figure 2.11 Estimated variance of citations as a function of N (K is fixed at 0.2) 
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Figure 2.12 Estimated mean citations as a function of N (K/N is fixed at 0.06) 
2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
N
Pa
yo
ff
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.13 Estimated variance of citations as a function of N (K/N is fixed at 0.06) 
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CHAPTER 3 
ESSAY 2: WHAT IS THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN EMPLOYEE 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP? 
INTRODUCTION 
Entrepreneurial ideas frequently originate within existing firms. An extensive body of 
work has examined both antecedents and consequences of employee entrepreneurship (Anton 
and Yao, 1995; Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco and Sarkar, 2004; Casiman and Ueda, 2004; Dahl, 
Østergaard and Dalum, 2005; Klepper, 2005; Dahl and Reichstein, 2006; Agarwal, Audretsch 
and Sarkar, 2007; Hellman, 2007; Chatterji, 2009; Klepper and Thompson, 2009; Elfenbein, 
Hamilton and Zenger, 2010; Ioannou, 2010; Mostafa and Klepper, 2010).27 Employee 
entrepreneurship has been heralded as a driver of innovation (Agarwal et al., 2004; Klepper, 
2005), a critical source of new capabilities and heterogeneity in performance (Rosenkopf and 
Almeida, 2003; Agarwal et al., 2004; Dahl and Reichstein, 2006) and an impetus to the creation 
and growth of industries and regional clusters (Klepper, 2001; Dahl et al., 2005; Agarwal et al., 
2007; Mostafa and Klepper, 2010). Consequently, understanding mechanisms leading to 
employee entrepreneurship is of utmost importance for both academic researchers and 
practitioners. These mechanisms are non-trivial. From the perspective of the employees, 
employee entrepreneurship implies the choice to pursue ideas outside of the parent firms. 
Employees may opt for risky and costly exits, giving up the security and support of being with 
the parent. From the perspective of the incumbent organization that has invested the critical 
resources necessary for the knowledge creation, it implies internal imperfections and lost 
opportunities. When explaining employee entrepreneurship, the existing literature has relied on 
                                               
27 Employee entrepreneurship is typically defined as the founding of a new venture by an individual who worked for 
an incumbent firm that operates in the same industry and has no ownership relationship with the new venture 
(Agarwal, Ganco and Ziedonis, 2009). 
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agency costs and incomplete contracts (Pakes and Nitzan, 1983; Anton and Yao, 1995; Kim and 
Marschke, 2005; Hellman, 2007), information asymmetries (Agarwal et al., 2004; Franco and 
Filson, 2007; Klepper and Thompson, 2009) or resource constraints (Cassiman and Ueda, 2006). 
A related literature has examined intra-firm decision-making and learning processes through the 
agent-based approach (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003; Ethiraj and 
Levinthal, 2004; Sommer and Loch, 2004; Miller, Zhao, and Calantone, 2006; Barr and Saraceno, 
2009; Kavadias and Sommer, 2009; Miller and Lin, 2009; Banerjee and Cole, 2010; Grahovac 
and Butler, 2010; Miller and Martignoni, 2010). 
By connecting these theoretical approaches, I highlight a novel mechanism potentially 
leading to employee entrepreneurship. I show that employee entrepreneurship may emerge due 
to a mechanism that does not necessitate agency costs, asymmetric information, resource 
constraints or heterogeneity in agent quality. I assume bounded rationality and a need for 
collaboration when agents solve complicated problems. Modeling employee entrepreneurship 
with the agent-based approach (Levinthal, 1997; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000) allows greater 
focus on drivers that were not previously studied. In particular, questions related to technology 
seem well suited to such an analysis. The problems solved by employees are closely linked to the 
underlying technology. Looking back at the literature, the question of how the micro-level 
variation in technology affects employee entrepreneurship is uncharted territory. The prior 
studies suggest that technologically more advanced firms generate more entrepreneurs (Brittain 
and Freeman, 1986; Franco and Filson, 2007) and that underexploited technological 
opportunities may lead to employee entrepreneurship (Agarwal et al., 2004). Additionally, there 
is abundant anecdotal evidence of employees quitting after their technological ideas are rejected 
by the parent firms. Klepper and Thompson (2009) trace most of their cases of employee 
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entrepreneurship in the early automobile, semiconductor and laser industries to disagreements 
about technological strategy. Even the most well-known examples of employee entrepreneurship 
were cases when technological ideas were rejected by the parent firm. For instance, Fairchild 
Semiconductor formed when the “traitorous eight” - employees of Shockley Semiconductor 
Laboratories who included Robert Noyce and Gordon Moore - disagreed with Shockley about 
the prospects of Shockley’s four layer germanium diode technology in comparison to silicon 
transistors (Holbrook, Hounshell, Klepper and Cohen, 2000; Shurkin, 2006). History repeated 
itself later at Fairchild when Robert Noyce and Gordon Moore left to form Intel after Sherman 
Fairchild - who funded the venture - disagreed with Noyce about the prospects of his strategy 
and refused to promote him as a new CEO (Berlin, 2001; Shurkin, 2006). The anecdotal 
evidence also suggests that some industries and some periods within the industry life-cycle 
experienced booms of employee entrepreneurship (Agarwal et al., 2004; Klepper and Thompson, 
2009). In the semiconductor industry, Fairchild Semiconductor generated many Fairchildren and 
at the time proudly proclaimed that “We Started It All!” (Moore, 1998). Overall, technology 
seems to matter for employee entrepreneurship at a very fine grain and its importance possibly 
increases with technological intensity of the problems that employees solve. How exactly it 
affects entrepreneurship is unclear. This study tries to take a first step towards filling this gap. 
To briefly foreshadow my main results, the model predicts that the likelihood of project 
rejection will increase as the technological problems become more difficult and the technological 
landscape more volatile. The effect of technological shocks on project rejection rises faster for 
more simple problems. For very complex problems, even a small technological shock can 
dramatically increase project rejection but additional volatility has little effect. The model also 
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suggests that solving problems with intermediate technological breadth leads to a higher 
likelihood of project rejection relative to general or specialized problems. 
EXTANT LITERATURE EXPLAINING ANTECEDENTS OF EMPLOYEE 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
The existing theoretical explanations of employee entrepreneurship fall into several broad 
categories based on the type of imperfection researchers employ. In a frictionless equilibrium 
environment, employee entrepreneurship would not emerge – all profitable new projects would 
be developed within existing firms. Scholars explaining employee entrepreneurship thus assume 
frictions, including agency costs and incomplete contracts (Pakes and Nitzan, 1983; Anton and 
Yao, 1995; Kim and Marschke, 2005; Hellman, 2007), asymmetric information (Franco and 
Filson, 2007; Klepper and Thompson, 2009) or resource constraints (Cassiman and Ueda, 2006). 
For instance, Anton and Yao (1995) focus on designing an employment relationship that 
would mitigate incomplete contracts for intellectual property rights. They assume that employees 
personally discover innovations in an environment with non-enforceable property rights. To 
avoid expropriation or ex-post competition with the incumbent firm, an employee may decide 
not to disclose the innovation to the employer and instead exits to commercialize it. Similarly, 
Hellman (2007) assumes an inability to contract for private benefits and predicts employee 
entrepreneurship as arising from an employer policy of discouraging exploration by its 
employees. He assumes that employees faced with the choice of either working on an assigned 
task or developing their own ideas derive higher private (non-contractible) benefits from working 
on their own ideas. This may lead to excessive exploration (time spent on own ideas as opposed 
to the ones assigned by the employer). The employer may curb such over-exploration by 
rejecting some profitable ideas. 
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Cassiman and Ueda (2006) assume that the incumbent firm can only implement a limited 
number of projects over its lifetime. They assume a perfect market for innovations and assume 
that each proposal has three attributes - potential for complementarities (value generated if 
projects are developed internally), cannibalization, and an intrinsic value. If a project offers low 
complementarities the focal firm may reject it to wait for better future projects. However, a 
startup may find this project profitable, leading to employee entrepreneurship. Franco and Filson 
(2007) assume asymmetric information. In their model, each employee receives a wage and has a 
fixed probability of imitating its employer’s knowledge (the agent’s productivity does not 
depend on whether the employee managed to imitate the knowledge or not). The employee thus 
“pays” for the probability of imitating the employer’s knowledge through lower wages. 
Conditional on imitating the knowledge, however, it becomes optimal to exit since the employer 
is unwilling to compensate for the increase in the employee’s stock of knowledge. The model by 
Klepper and Thompson (2009) hinges on the temporary imperfections arising from the 
information asymmetries in the decision-making process. Each firm consists of Bayesian agents 
that in each period draw a noisy signal of the optimal strategy. The authors assume that there 
exists a subset of agents that have lower variance of their signal draws. However, the rest of the 
agents do not know that some agents have more precise estimates of the strategy. Then, even 
though the prior estimates of the optimal strategy are identical and the posteriors converge in the 
limit, there is a temporary divergence in the estimates between the two types of agents, which 
leads to idea rejection and employee entrepreneurship. 
The type of imperfections built into the models and the exact mechanism driving 
employee entrepreneurship vary, but all models highlight two salient features: 1) not all viable 
entrepreneurial ideas are exploited within incumbent firms, and 2) imperfections within the 
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parent firm environment result in some form of conflict, which potentially leads to exit and 
exploitation of entrepreneurial ideas outside of the parent firm boundaries. 
The model I propose utilizes the same basic notions – imperfections in the parent firm 
processes lead to the possibility of rejection of viable entrepreneurial opportunities. I assume that 
problems tackled by the agents are complicated and, due to their bounded rationality, solving 
them requires a combination of rational optimization and trial-and-error experimentation. I also 
assume that problem-solving is a collaborative effort necessitating diverse expertise. Such 
framing of the discovery process allows greater focusing on my main question - what is the role 
of technology in the rejection of viable entrepreneurial ideas? 
MODEL PRELIMINARIES AND MAPPING OF THE PARAMETERS TO THE CONTEXT 
OF EMPLOYEE ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
The key component of the model is the NK landscape (Figure 3.1; Kauffman, 1993, 
1995). The use of the NK model is well established within the strategy literature as a way to 
analyze situations where boundedly rational agents face complicated environments (Levinthal, 
1997; Rivkin, 2000; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004).28 Analogous to prior literature (Ethiraj and 
Levinthal, 2004; Rivkin, 2000), I assume that binary bits of the decision vector represent choices 
about the technological strategy of the firm. The value of each bit – either zero or one – 
represents a decision about these elements (e.g. decision A vs. decision B is chosen). In each 
period, a firm thus makes N choices about various components of its technological strategy. 
Consistent with prior literature (Kollman, Miller and Page, 2000; Sommer and Loch, 
2004; Gavetti, 2005), I assume that agents within the firm search an identical NK landscape. It 
implies that the incumbent firm employees collaborate on solving a joint problem. The key 
component of the NK model is the K parameter controlling the degree of interdependence 
                                               
28 Interested readers should consult Levinthal (1997) or Kauffman (1993, Ch. 6) for an introduction to the NK model. 
60 
between the decision elements (i.e. controlling the ruggedness of the space). The performance 
contribution of each element of the decision vector xi, i = 1…N, is affected by K other elements 
xj, where j is not equal to i. A high value for K implies a rugged landscape and a very 
complicated problem to be solved (i.e. it is NP-hard, Rivkin, 2000). The NK landscape is 
generated using the standard procedure (Kauffman, 1993; Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin 2000). 
Mapping of the K parameter to our Context 
The ruggedness of the landscape, controlled by the parameter K, typically proxies for the 
difficulty of the problem that is being solved (Rivkin, 2000; Kollman et al., 2000). As K and the 
density of interdependencies between the problem components increase, the problems are getting 
more difficult. The problems with high K can also be thought of as “non-decomposable” (Simon, 
1969). It is conceivable that settings with higher technological intensity – like the semiconductor, 
laser, and auto industries in my examples above - will present more complex problems. The 
literature also suggests that the need for vertical integration may increase problem coupling due 
to the linkages between upstream and downstream activities (Sorenson, 1997). K may also proxy 
for differences in the product design matrix (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2007) when it captures the 
density of interactions between design components (i.e. the components A and B are 
interdependent if a change in component A affects the performance of component B).  
An alternative way of thinking about the mapping between the parameter K and problem 
difficulty is to think of it as a proxy for problem modularization (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; 
McCormack, Rusnak and Baldwin, 2006; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004). As a way of tackling 
underlying problem complexity, problems may be modularized by delineating modules and 
standardizing the interfaces between the modules (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; McCormack, et al., 
2006). Standardization of interfaces limits the degree of freedom for the designers but also limits 
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cross-module interactions. This, in turn, makes problems simpler to solve, and the 
compartmentalization into modules allows a parallel and decentralized search. Such mapping is 
consistent with the existing literature. Christensen (1997), in his study of thin film heads in the 
disk drive industry, describes that “…modularity narrows degrees of freedom in design.” 
Similarly, Fleming and Sorenson (2001) suggest that the “…onset of complete modularity 
severely limits opportunity.” Consequently, a landscape with high K may proxy for an 
environment before the onset of modularization and the emergence of dominant design 
(Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Suarez and Utterback, 1995) 
when designers are faced with complex problems with dense interactions. 
Mapping of the N parameter to our Context 
The parameter N controls whether the problem is narrow and specialized (low N) or 
broad and cutting across multiple domains (high N). I assume that the problem breadth always 
exceeds the expertise of an individual agent. To solve a problem, a firm needs to make choices 
about N individual decision elements, but the individual agents have “expertise” only for a subset 
of these elements. When different agents have expertise over different elements, some form of 
collaboration is highly beneficial. Consequently, problem breadth determines the need for 
collaboration. 
These assumptions are consistent with the notion that modern technological knowledge 
requires specialization and “depth” of knowledge rather than breadth (Jones, Uzzi, and Wuchty, 
2007; Jones, 2009). The new knowledge does not simply replace the old but rather builds upon it, 
which increases the need for both specialization and collaboration (Jones, 2009). The empirical 
evidence supports the argument that the importance of collaborative innovation and 
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technological problem-solving increased dramatically over the last few decades (Jones, Uzzi, and 
Wuchty, 2007; Jones, 2009; Singh and Fleming, 2010). 
Modeling Need for Collaboration, Cognitive Search and Experimentation 
I model the technological expertise of agents using the notion of a cognitive search. 
Analogous to the NK models of cognition (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Gavetti, 2005), I assume 
that agents create a cognitive representation of reality. Based on past experiences, education and 
skill endowments, agents can create a simplified version of the actual rugged landscape – which 
then guides them in subsequent experimentation (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Gavetti, 2005). 
The combination of cognitive search and trial-and-error experimentation provides significantly 
more powerful search capabilities relative to experimentation alone (Gavetti and Levinthal, 
2000). I assume that agents are able to search in their domain of expertise. 
More specifically, I define expertise as those decision elements (i.e. dimensions of the 
problem space) that can be changed by the agent to perform the search. For example, let’s 
assume that first, second and fifth are the “expertise” dimensions of the agent A with N equals 5. 
I will use the following notation to describe such a situation: _ _ **_. The stars denote 
dimensions outside of the area of expertise of this agent and the underscores represent the ones it 
can search. It is important to note that the payoff depends on the entire vector of the length N (i.e. 
all individual decisions need to be made) and not only on the contribution of the “expertise” 
dimensions. Decisions along the dimensions outside of the expertise of the agent A directly and 
indirectly (through interdependencies) affect the agent’s payoff. The problem is the same for all 
agents - though the limited expertise allows the agents to search only portions of the space. This 
necessitates cooperation. The remaining dimensions must be searched by other agents or left 
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unsearched and remain as gaps in the problem space. The agents can search dimensions within 
their domain of expertise either through cognitive search or experimentation (i.e. local search). 
The above setup embodies several additional assumptions. First, it implies that there are 
no private benefits. A given decision implies equal payoffs for the firm as well as for the 
individual employee. Such an approach also abstracts from property rights and agency costs. I 
assume that agents can perfectly evaluate each other’s proposals (i.e. no asymmetric information). 
Similarly, there are no frictions related to managerial diseconomies (Penrose, 1959) and no noise 
in the communication or transfer of knowledge (Agarwal et al., 2004; Franco and Filson, 2007). 
The agent experiments by an alteration of a single random decision element of the 
decision vector. If a change implies a higher payoff, the agent moves toward it. For instance, if N 
equals 5 and if the agent’s possible move from 00101 to 00100 (the expertise is again _ _ **_) 
results in the increased payoff, the agent will make the move. Otherwise, it will stay at the 
original position.29  
The cognitive search is significantly more powerful. The agent is assumed to 
“understand” the linkages and their impact on the expertise dimensions of the problem space. 
Consequently, it can consider a large number of changes or fully optimize over this subset. For 
instance, from the solution 00101, the 00**1 can be a solution based on cognitive search. The 
solution _ _ 10_ is outside of the expertise of the agent. I assume that the agent cannot change 
these elements even though they affect the agent’s payoff. In general, the difference between 
experimental and cognitive search is in the distance and the number of solutions the agent can 
consider in one step. For the experimental search, the agent can evaluate only one local change, 
for instance 00101 → 00100. However, using the cognitive search it can consider significantly 
more distant solutions. Following prior studies (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Gavetti, 2005), I 
                                               
29  Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) term such search experiential search. 
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assume that every agent can fully optimize over its expertise dimensions. In one step, the agent 
considers all strings (ordered samples with replacement) of zeros and ones and selects the best 
string in the places of the cognitive dimensions. In our case, the agent can select from eight 
choices in the position of underscores (00**0, 00**1, 01**0, 10**0, 01**1, 11**1, 11**0, 
10**1) and select the best one. However, to obtain the problem payoff, the agent needs to 
evaluate the entire decision vector. In other words, the impact of the other decisions on the 
overall payoff needs to be determined (since the problem is larger than the individual expertise 
covers). Prior literature (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Gavetti, 2005) has modeled this aspect by 
assuming that the agent creates unbiased expectation over all possible solutions in the outside 
dimensions that are consistent with the given proposal. For instance, we can assume that the 
agent needs to evaluate payoff of the decision 01**0. This proposal is consistent with four 
decision vectors (replace stars by the strings of zeros and ones): 01000, 01010, 01100, and 01110. 
Let’s assume the following payoff structure:  
Decision  Payoff 
01000  0.54 
01010  0.21 
01100  0.01 
01110  0.78 
 
Following the algorithm of Gavetti and Levinthal (2000), the payoff of the cognitive solution 
01**0 is 0.385 (which is the mean value of the four decisions consistent with 01**0). 
Figure 3.1 can provide an illustration of the nature of cognitive search.30 Imagine that N 
equals 6 and that the agent performs cognitive search over the first three dimensions of the space 
(let’s define this as the x axis). The agent first generates expectation over the second three 
dimensions (y axis) which can be seen as a cut through the space parallel to the y axis with height 
                                               
30 The visualization of the space is developed following the method discussed in Rivkin and Siggelkow (2007) 
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equal to the mean of values along the y axis for each of the points on the x axis. The outcome of 
the cognitive search is the highest point on this “mean slice” of the space along the x axis. 
The cognitive search provides only guidance – it is inherently imprecise and fuzzy. 
Nevertheless, the cognitive solution positions the agent in the correct “mountainous” region of 
the space.31 I model the agent as capable of selecting the best cognitive solution from all possible 
strings along the cognitive dimensions in one step. The solution based on the cognitive search is 
thus independent of the current state of the “non-expertise” dimensions. The cognitive search 
leads the agent to the same solution regardless of the state of the world along the outside 
dimensions. The cognitive search provides guidance in the subsequent experimentation but also 
“blinds” the agent from considering the current state of the world.32  
The cognitive search is thus powerful but imprecise. The experimental search adjusts the 
solution to a fine grain but is slow and prone to lock-ins. The value of the experimental search is 
especially useful when the agent is already located in the attractive region of the space and a high 
payoff is close. I follow prior studies (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Gavetti, 2005) and assume 
that agents perform cognitive search only once at the beginning of the simulation and then 
proceed through experimental search by adjusting the decision elements within their expertise. 
                                               
31 Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) find that such positioning is especially beneficial for spaces with a low to moderate 
degree of K when the peaks are spatially correlated. Once the value of K is high, the space becomes uncorrelated and 
the global peak can be anywhere (Kauffman, 1993; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000). 
32 A slightly different approach has been used by Sommer and Loch (2004), who assume, that the agent does not 
create expectation over all possible strings consistent with the given proposal but instead considers the outside 
dimensions as given. I adopt the specification of Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) - it better captures the idea that 
expertise provides guidance for subsequent experimentation. The main predictions of the model are robust to either 
version of the cognitive search. 
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Modeling Problem Breadth and Collaboration 
For simplicity, I assume that the firm size is constant at two agents.33 To reflect the 
observation that technological knowledge requires depth, specialization and collaboration (Jones, 
Uzzi and Wuchty, 2007; Jones, 2009; Singh and Fleming, 2010), I assume that the breadth of 
expertise is fixed and vary the problem breadth, N. If the firm needs to solve a more general 
problem it may need to assemble experts who cover all relevant technological domains. For 
instance, a structure of the firm solving a technologically specialized problem with N equals 5 
and E equals 4 (the parameter E controls the width of expertise of a single agent) may look as 
follows: 
N 1 2 3 4 5 
Agent 1 _ _ _ * _ 
Agent 2 _ * _ _ _ 
 
The agents overlap in three of the five dimensions. Agent 1 has exclusive expertise over the 
second and Agent 2 over the fourth dimension. An example of a firm solving a general problem 
with N equals 7 and E equals 4 may look like: 
N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Agent 1 _ _ _ * * * _ 
Agent 2 * * * _ _ _ _ 
 
Performing baseline simulations, as described below, shows that it is never optimal to leave 
some dimensions of the problem space unsearched by the agents.34 For instance, the following 
situation is never optimal: 
 
                                               
33 I do not model any explicit coordination or communication costs associated with adding agents. The model would 
thus imply that the firm size should be infinite. Since the coordination and communication costs are not essential for 
the mechanism, I abstract from these issues and focus on two agents for the sake of parsimony. 
34 The agent’s behavior is optimal if the agent achieves the best performance it can, given the constraints of the 
model. Optimal performance is the maximum over the alternatives available to the agent. Note that the optimal 
performance does not refer to the global maximum on the NK landscape. 
67 
N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Agent 1 _ _ _ * _ * * 
Agent 2 _ * _ _ _ * * 
 
The result holds across all K and all types of search behavior as described below. It is 
always optimal to cover the entire space of the problem by agents’ expertise. Note that the 
degree of overlap between the domains of expertise of the agents is a function of N (i.e. it equals 
2E-N). For all of the subsequent simulations, I assume that agents jointly cover all dimensions of 
the problem and do not leave any dimension unsearched. The structure also implies that any 
individual agent will have a more accurate cognitive representation of the problem space and will 
be more accurate in making its initial guess when solving a more specialized problem. 
Modeling the Decision-Making Process 
I model the decision-making process within the firm using a common and relatively 
simple algorithm (e.g. Kollman et al., 2000; Sommer and Loch, 2004).35 I assume that agents 
start searching the space independently, starting from the solution based on cognitive search and 
continuing with experimentation. The agents try to fine-tune their solution to find the best 
possible payoff. In each period, agents evaluate a change in one individual decision element from 
their expertise dimensions and propose the new solution only if they observe an increase in 
performance. For instance, in our case above, the agents in period 1 may evaluate: 
Period 0: Cognitive search 
N 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Agent 1 1 0 1 * 1 * 
Agent 2 * * 1 0 1 1 
↓ 
Joint solution implemented: 101011 
 
                                               
35 The qualitative results are not sensitive to different specifications of the decision-making rule. Different rules 
would affect the absolute performance but not the qualitative predictions of the model. 
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Period 1: Experimental search begins36 
N 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Agent 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Agent 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Proposals considered: Agent 1: 001011 
    Agent 2: 101111 
 
The agents can propose changes only within their domain of expertise. Further, I assume 
that agents perform search independently for k periods (Kollman et al., 2000). Agents do not 
consult on the proposals with each other but continue to fine-tune the implemented solution. 
Every kth period agents “meet,” compare the payoffs of the two proposals and select the better 
one. The selected proposal is implemented by the firm and the agents search for another k 
periods independently, starting from the new implemented solution. The parameter k represents 
the trade-off between the time the agents search in parallel and the implementation delay. A short 
period between meetings (small k) allows rapid increases in firm performance due to frequent 
implementation but it does not provide agents with sufficient time to perform local search. Long 
intervals (large k) between meetings give sufficient room for experimentation but create delay in 
project implementation and lead to a slow increase in performance of the firm. Since I do not 
explicitly model these trade-offs, I assume fixed k equals 5. The robustness of the qualitative 
predictions has been tested for a wide range of k.37 
Consistent with prior literature, I run the models with specific values for N, K, E and k. 
Due to the computational burden, I selected low values of N and K that lead to a reasonably fast 
convergence. The simulations were implemented in MATLAB and model parameters and 
assumptions are summarized in Table 3.1. 
                                               
36 Decisions that are within the expertise of each agent are in bold and the proposed changes are in bold and italics. 
37 If there is no penalty for the delay in implementing proposals it is best to have a large k. 
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BASELINE PREDICTIONS: SHARED EXPERTISE AND INCUMBENT FIRM 
STRUCTURE 
Before I can analyze the dynamics of project rejection, I need to develop another 
preliminary of the model – incumbent firm structure. Let’s assume that agents start solving a 
given problem by performing the cognitive search, which leads to the following proposals by the 
two agents: 
N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Agent 1 1 0 1 * * * 1 
Agent 2 * * * 0 1 1 0 
 
In the place of underscores are zeros or ones - representing the proposed solutions based 
on the cognitive search of both agents (the non-cognitive dimensions do not affect the proposals 
and are omitted). Note that along the seventh dimension there is a conflict in how the agents 
perceive the solution of the seventh decision. The question is whether it is optimal to create the 
firm in the presence of such differences. The presence of a conflict along the overlapping 
dimension suggests that the agents perceive the solution differently, and they may be guided to 
different portions of the space in their subsequent experimentation for the best payoff. Intuitively, 
one could expect that such cooperation is inefficient. 
Table 3.2 shows baseline simulations that confirm this conjecture. For all K and N 
combinations and regardless of whether agents subsequently experiment with the shared 
dimensions or not, having a firm that started with conflict in cognitive representations along the 
shared dimensions is not optimal. Note that the shared solution may be imperfect – it may not 
necessarily point to the best solution in the space. However, it is crucial that both agents “agree” 
on it. This leads to the baseline implication: 
Implication 1: It is not optimal for the firm to operate when there are solution differences in the 
shared portion of agents’ cognitive searches. 
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For the remainder of the paper, I assume that the incumbent firm starts with alignment. 
Table 3.2 reveals additional intuitive patterns. The benefit of the initial alignment between the 
agents’ cognitive searches decreases with N and increases with K. For highly specialized 
problems (low N), the likelihood that the agents search for the same solution (if aligned) is high 
and consequently the coordination is very valuable. Misalignment is, thus, very costly. Similarly, 
the value of coordination increases with K. If the agents are misaligned, it is very unlikely that 
they are searching for the same solution if the K is high. 
I also assume that conditional on incumbent firm formation, the agents implement a joint 
solution and use it as a starting point for the subsequent experimentation. For instance, if the 
cognitive searches of the agents lead to the following proposals, 
N 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Agent 1 1 0 1 * 1 * 
Agent 2 * * 1 0 1 1 
 
the incumbent firm would implement solution 101011 at time zero of the simulation. This 
simplifying assumption is not crucial qualitatively and is more efficient than the alternative.38, 39 
BASELINE PREDICTIONS: SHARED EXPERTISE AND EXPERIMENTATION 
The results in this section are extensions of a prediction reported by Gavetti and 
Levinthal (2000) and are analogous to classical thoughts in Strategy emphasizing the role of 
direction in coordinating an individual’s actions (Weick, 1987). Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) 
find that in a model where one agent searches the entire space (N equals 10) and the agent’s 
cognitive dimensions constitute a subset of the space (N1 equals 3) it is not optimal to search the 
                                               
38 The alternative would be to assume that each agent starts searching from its own solution. In such a case, the joint 
solution would emerge as the firm’s solution after the first meeting (as described below). 
39 Additional baseline simulations also confirm the optimality of the existence of an incumbent firm. The firm 
outperforms the same number of individuals searching independently, and it outperforms the arrangement where one 
agent searches the entire problem space. The combination of the cognitive search followed by the local search is 
superior to searching through either cognitive or local search separately. 
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cognitive dimensions N1. It is optimal to keep the initial solution based on the cognitive search 
intact even though it provides only an imprecise representation of the actual problem.40 In other 
words, the agent locally searching only the remaining N-N1 dimensions outperforms the agent 
that locally searches the entire N vector. Within my model, the agents have searching ability 
which is narrower than the entire space but can complement each other through collaboration.41 
Table 3.2 shows additional patterns when comparing different types of searches. In 
Figure 3.2, I highlight some of them and show three sets of simulation runs for different problem 
breadth N. The first model (solid line) represents the case where agents search experimentally 
their entire cognitive domains. In the second (dotted line), they keep the shared, overlapping 
dimensions intact and in the third (dashed line) they only search the shared dimensions. 
Consistent with Implication 1, Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2 show that agents that do not 
experiment with the shared solution outperform agents that experiment with the entire vector, 
and dramatically those that search only the overlap. The result holds for small as well as for large 
N. Again, the shared cognitive solution represents a set of core technological ideas around which 
is the search is organized. It is an implicit agreement on which subsection of the space is jointly 
searched and coordinates subsequent agents’ search efforts. Even though the shared solution is 
imperfect, it is better when it is left intact. It leads to another baseline implication: 
Implication 2: It is not optimal for the firm to deviate by experimental search from the alignment 
in the shared portion of the technological solution. 
                                               
40 In Figure 1, it implies that it is optimal to keep the position on the x axis, which is determined by the cognitive 
search, intact and perform experimentation only along the y axis. 
41 As I discuss above, the objective of my assumption to narrow the search only to the cognitive dimensions is to 
create an additional constraint that would necessitate collaboration. Alternatively, the assumption implies that if an 
agent proposes a change outside of its domain of expertise it will be always overridden by another agent’s idea 
based on its expertise. 
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The simulations highlight additional patterns. The benefit of not deviating from the 
shared solution decreases with the elapsed simulation time. The value of cognitive guidance is 
high only when agents are uncertain about the solution. When they start converging on a solution, 
the value provided by local search increases and the cognitive solution becomes relatively less 
important (Gavetti, 2005). Thus, the advantage associated with following the direction delineated 
by the cognitive search is temporary. 
MODELING DYNAMICS: THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGICAL SHOCKS 
In the model, the agents are uncertain about the best solution for a complex technological 
problem, they need to combine cognitive and experimental searches and they need to collaborate 
to maximize performance. However, the problem they are solving is static - the shape of the NK 
landscape does not change. Without the presence of asymmetric information, agency costs, or 
differences in rationality or quality, it is optimal for both of the agents to behave according to 
Implications 1 and 2 – maintain alignment and change only those decisions that fall outside of 
the shared expertise. In such an environment, there are no rational reasons for rejection of better 
technological ideas. However, the assumption of a static technological landscape may not be 
entirely realistic, and changes in the nature of problems may provide an important impetus that 
systematically affects project rejection. 
In particular, high-technology and early industry settings may be prone to frequent and 
more pronounced shocks and turbulence (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Ganco and Agarwal, 
2009; Vaaler and McNamara, 2010). Turbulent or high velocity settings typically embody 
nonlinear and unpredictable change, short product cycles, and rapidly shifting competitive 
landscapes (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).  
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To model the dynamic aspect of the technological landscape, I introduce exogenous 
shocks. Consistent with prior studies (e.g. Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Siggelkow and Levinthal, 
2003), at a given period the landscape is altered by redrawing the performance contributions of a 
subset s of individual decision components.42 The parameter s thus controls the size of the 
technological shock. A small s loosely represents technological changes at a component level. A 
large s loosely corresponds to more systemic changes – as in the replacement of germanium by 
silicon in the case of the early semiconductor industry (e.g. Holbrook et al., 2000). Note that 
component changes (small s) can still lead to large changes in technological landscape if 
problems are complex and interdependencies are dense. 
EMERGENCE OF EMPLOYEE ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Implications 1 and 2 show that it is sub-optimal to operate a firm that has misalignment 
in the portion of solution that is shared across the two agents. Even though some of the proposed 
ideas may improve short-term performance, the misalignment is not optimal in the long-run - the 
agents lose the guidance and coordination provided by the commonalities in their cognitive 
representations. The firm loses the direction around which it organizes the search (Gavetti and 
Levinthal, 2000; Weick, 1987). 
When the technological landscape shifts, it is reasonable to expect that it may affect how 
the agents perceive the solution – i.e. shift their cognitive representations. Even though the 
agents were aligned prior to the shock, they may have a conflict in the shared solution after it. If 
that occurs, both agents can improve their performance by stopping the collaboration and 
“renegotiating the truce” (Nelson and Winter, 1982) – replacing the conflicting agent with an 
aligned one. Note that right after the shock, no agent is better at judging the solution. The agents 
                                               
42 Since cognitive representations do not depend on the current state of the world, the period at which I shock the 
landscape is arbitrary. 
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may simply see the solutions differently even though they were on the same page before the 
shock. To examine how changes of N, K and s affect the likelihood of such conflicts, I assume 
that agents are fully aware of the technological shock. Following the shock, they perform new 
cognitive searches. I also assume that when the new cognitive searches by the agents lead to 
misalignment in the shared portion of the solution, because of Implications 1 and 2, one of the 
agents exits the firm, and I record such an event as project rejection. 
Figure 3.3 shows how increases in K affect the probability of conflict in the shared 
portion of the solution for various levels of N. The results confirm the conjecture that the 
likelihood of project rejection will increase with increases in problem difficulty or complexity. 
As the landscape becomes more rugged, the likelihood that after the shock the collaborating 
agents select different regions of the space as a starting point for their subsequent 
experimentation increases. Problem complexity increases the likelihood that the agents will 
perceive the new technological environment differently. This leads to the third implication of the 
model: 
Implication 3: The likelihood of project rejection increases with the complexity of problems 
solved by the incumbent firm. 
Figure 3.4 shows the impact of problem breadth N on the likelihood of conflict in the 
shared portion of the solution for various levels of K.43 The relationship shows a non-monotonic 
relationship between problem breadth, N, and the likelihood of project rejection.44 The 
relationship hinges on the extent of overlap in agents’ expertise – which is driven by problem 
                                               
43 Note that, by construction, the project rejection likelihood at N=E=5 is zero. 
44 Ideally, we would like to hold problem difficulty constant when manipulating the overlap between the agents’ 
expertise. The prior studies showed (Kauffman, 1993; Altenberg, 1996) that increasing N makes problems simpler 
for fixed K. As a result, the ratio K/N may be a better proxy for problem difficulty. However, even when comparing 
Prob(project rejection) while holding K/N fixed and varying N, I obtain an inverted-U relationship. Consequently, 
the results are robust to either specification of the parameters.  
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breadth. When the problem is general (high N), agents tend to perceive the best solution after the 
shock very differently. The agents have narrow expertise relative to problem breadth, their 
cognitive searches are crude and they are very different in their domains of expertise. However, 
the likelihood of conflict on a few overlapping decision components is still relatively small. 
When the technological problem is highly specialized (low N), agents’ cognitive searches are 
very powerful and precise. Even though the overlap is large (and the “potential” for conflict 
could be large), the agents perceive the best solution similarly. Consequently, the likelihood of 
conflict is relatively smaller. At the intermediate degree of problem breadth, the cognitive 
searches are less precise and there is also a potential for conflict due to the overlap. I can 
formulate this model prediction as follows: 
Implication 4: The likelihood of project rejection has an inverted U-shaped relationship with the 
technological breadth of the problems solved by the incumbent firm. 
Finally, Figure 3.5 shows the impact of shock size on the likelihood of project rejection 
for various levels of K.45 Larger shocks perturb the problem landscape more (i.e. affect more 
decision components) and, thus, increase the likelihood that the alignment in the shared solution 
prior to the shock will be no longer valid. The marginal effect of shock size is largest for more 
simple problems. For complex problems, even a small shock can spread through the system 
through the interdependencies and significantly alter the technological landscape of the problem. 
It then leads to misalignment of the shared solution and conflict. However, the additional effect 
of increasing the shock size is relatively minor. This observation leads to the last implication of 
the model: 
Implication 5: The likelihood of project rejection increases with the size of technological shocks 
with a negative interaction between shock size and problem complexity. 
                                               
45 The problem breadth is fixed at N = 9. Fixing N at different level shows identical patterns. 
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DISCUSSION 
The objective of my model was to develop a new theory linking characteristics of 
technological problems with employee entrepreneurship. I set out to highlight a novel 
mechanism that may underlie some of the observed regularities. Even though my primary 
objective was not to develop a model that would replicate all empirical patterns, it may be useful 
to examine how its predictions map onto existing findings. 
First, the mechanics of the model are, by construction, consistent with the empirical 
accounts maintaining that conflicts occur over the core strategies of incumbent firms 
(Christensen, 1997; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Klepper and Thompson, 2009). The ventures 
founded by former employees typically implement solutions that are closely related but not 
identical to solutions pursued by their parent firms (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Klepper and 
Thompson, 2009). This is consistent with my model. Differences in the shared solution cause 
conflict, but the two solutions are very similar. Both agents try to solve identical problems and 
only perceive the best solution differently. 
Second, the model structure is consistent with the accounts (Bhide, 1994; Lindholm and 
Dahlstrand, 2001; Klepper, 2002; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Klepper and Thompson, 2009) 
maintaining that the majority of employee entrepreneurs emerge due to idea rejection within 
incumbent firms. These scholars argue that employees try to convince their employers about the 
viability of their ideas and exit only when rejected. Similarly, in a survey of 100 fast-growing 
private companies, Bhide (1994) found that 71% of the entrepreneurial founders commercialized 
ideas they had encountered or discovered while working at other companies. 
Note that some of the existing explanations of employee entrepreneurship do not 
necessitate inherent conflict with the parent firm. For instance, in Cassiman and Ueda (2006) 
firm innovative efforts create more knowledge that the firm utilizes and projects that lack 
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complementarities with existing products may be rejected. However, the firm may still support 
exploitation of such ideas outside of its boundaries by licensing or other involvement. The model 
that I develop applies to disagreements about the orientation of the firm rather than to product 
portfolio decisions. The mechanism in my model, thus, more closely corresponds to the 
anecdotal evidence mentioned above. It remains an empirical question which mechanism is more 
pervasive and important in reality. 
Third, the empirical literature shows that the likelihood of employee entrepreneurship 
exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with industry age in automobiles (Klepper, 2002) and 
lasers (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005) but a decreasing rate in disk drives (Agarwal et al., 2004) and 
in a sample of venture capital-funded startups (Gompers et al., 2006).46 However, all of these 
studies are consistent in suggesting that employee entrepreneurship is more prevalent in the 
growth stages of an industry and declines as an industry matures. I do not model the evolution 
over the industry life-cycle since the technological shocks are assumed to be exogenous in the 
model. However, the model naturally implies (both Implications 3 and 5) a decline in idea 
rejection as an industry matures. Such a pattern simply emerges if we assume that growth phases 
exhibit technological volatility and lack of standardization, which resolve with industry age. The 
model is, by construction, consistent with the empirical evidence showing that shocks like IPOs 
or acquisitions (Brittain and Freeman, 1980; Romanelli and Schoonhoven, 2001; Stuart and 
Sorenson, 2003) create conditions that lead to more employee entrepreneurship originating from 
incumbent firms. 
                                               
46 By definition, some incumbents need to be present to generate employee entrepreneurs so the rate has to be 
increasing initially. However, some industries may experience a period of sharp increase when most of the early 
incumbents generate many employee entrepreneurs. Differences in the shape of the inverted U may contribute to the 
reported differences across studies. 
78 
Fourth, there is evidence that more technologically advanced firms (Brittain and Freeman, 
1980; Franco and Filson, 2006; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005) generate more employee 
entrepreneurs. If we expect that firms at the cutting edge of technological knowledge solve more 
complex and less standardized problems – this finding is consistent with Implication 3. In 
support of this argument, anecdotal evidence suggests that some settings like the early 
semiconductor industry had exceptional rates of entrepreneurial spawning (Moore, 1998). More 
empirical research is, however, needed to see how the technological complexity affects project 
rejection and employee entrepreneurship. 
Fifth, the model suggests that even small technological shocks can lead to a dramatic 
increase in conflict if the underlying technology is sufficiently complex. Even though none of the 
existing studies looked at the technological aspect, some studies provide indications in support 
for this argument. Hannan, Polos and Carroll (2003a, 2003b) develop a concept of organizational 
intricacy (loosely analogous to the notion of interdependence) and cascading organizational 
change and argue that even small changes can lead to significant organization turmoil if the 
linkages are sufficiently dense. Such a mechanism appears also consistent with case study 
evidence showing that interactions can amplify small changes, leading to dramatic organizational 
transformation (Plowman, Baker, Beck, Kulkarni, Solansky and Travis, 2007). 
Sixth, there is very limited literature that would indicate how problem specialization 
affects project rejection and entrepreneurship. Firms that produce a wider variety of products 
were found to generate more employee entrepreneurs in semiconductors (Brittain and Freeman, 
1980) and lasers (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005). However, firms with a single industry focus were 
reported to generate more employee entrepreneurs than firms operating in multiple industries in a 
sample of venture capital-backed startups (Gompers et al., 2005). Since the studies measured 
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different constructs (product categories, SIC codes) and found conflicting results, one cannot 
easily map them onto our construct of technological problem breadth. Clearly more research is 
needed, but the mechanism that I propose may prove useful in disentangling the underlying 
drivers. 
The predictions of the model may, to some extent, also map on to the extensive literature 
on team diversity (e.g. Pelled, Eisenhardt, and Xin, 1999; Harrison and Klein, 2007; Joshi and 
Roh, 2009). Within the model, solving more general problems directly implies collaboration of 
more diverse experts. For instance, Jehn, Northcraft and Neale (1999) found that functional 
diversity increases the likelihood of task conflict. However, this stream of studies typically looks 
at performance as the outcome variable, the findings depend on the operationalization of 
diversity (Bunderson and Sutcliffe, 2002; Harrison and Kleine, 2007) and overall predictions are 
mixed (Van Knippenberg and Schippers, 2007). At the same time, these studies do not examine 
technology as the underlying driver and project rejection as the operationalization of conflict. 
Consequently, the relevance of the findings for the model proposed in this paper is limited and 
clearly more empirical work is needed to examine these important relationships. 
Further, it may be useful to compare the model with theoretical explanations of employee 
entrepreneurship. For instance, sociological approaches to entrepreneurship maintain that 
employee entrepreneurship is driven by environmental context (Brittain and Freeman, 1980; 
Freeman, 1986; Thornton, 1999; Romanelli and Schoonhoven, 2001; Stuart and Sorenson, 2003; 
Audia and Rider, 2005; Dobrev and Barnett, 2005; Sørensen, 2007). Sørensen (2007) argues that 
the “fundamental premise of sociological approaches to entrepreneurship [is that] the social 
context shapes the likelihood of entrepreneurial activity, above and beyond any effects of 
individual characteristics.” Since the context may correspond to the nature of technological 
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problems that employees solve, this approach is fully consistent with the specification of my 
model. 
The logic behind the model is also consistent with the explanations of employee 
entrepreneurship relying on the existence of underexploited opportunities (Agarwal et al., 2004; 
Cassiman and Ueda, 2006; Franco and Filson, 2007; Klepper and Thompson, 2009). Following 
the change in the technological landscape, both agents propose viable ideas, but they are unable 
to decide which one is better (each agent prefers its own idea due to its cognitive constraints) and 
the firm cannot implement both. 
The model predictions and its mechanics have also subtle managerial and policy 
implications. They highlight the fact that technology has broader implications for performance, 
competitive patterns and knowledge spillovers. In a normative sense, managers need to be aware 
that solving difficult problems in uncertain technological environment carries a risk of employee 
entrepreneurship that can have a detrimental effect on the parent firm (Wezel, Cattani and 
Pennings, 2006; Campbell, Ganco, Franco and Agarwal, 2010; Aim et al., 2010). The predictions 
also have implications for knowledge spillovers. The extant literature (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; 
Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Agarwal, Ganco and Ziedonis, 2009) suggests that employee 
mobility is the key conduit for knowledge transfer. Since idea rejection increases with problem 
complexity, the model implies that it will be the more complex (and potentially more valuable) 
knowledge that exits the firm. The model highlights that the likelihood and impact of exit events 
does not depend only on the legal environment and geographical distance (Almeida and Kogut, 
1999; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Marx et al., 2007; Agarwal et al., 2009) but crucially 
depends on intricate mechanisms operating within incumbent firms. 
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LIMITATIONS, CONTRIBUTION AND CONCLUSION 
To make the model tractable, I assumed away several attributes that potentially influence 
decision-making processes within incumbent firms. 
First, I do not model firm size. Project rejection may depend on size as larger firms have 
well-defined administrative structures, communication channels and authority. In the model, the 
firm size is determined exogenously and I do not model any explicit communication, 
coordination costs or differences in authority. The model has to be seen as an abstract 
representation of reality, focusing on mechanisms that may take place irrespective of size. 
However, firm size may interact with our variables of interest. To determine exactly how 
remains a task for future work. 
I also do not explore how different patterns of interdependence (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 
2007) affect project rejection. I assume that interdependencies randomly link decision 
components. It is possible that there are non-trivial interactions between interdependence 
distributions and project rejection – especially when agents’ expertise does not map precisely 
onto modules and the structure is either over- or under-modularized (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004). 
Exploring these fine-grained interactions again goes beyond my immediate objective of 
highlighting a new mechanism leading to project rejection and remains for future research. 
I model the decision-making mechanism without assuming communication frictions, 
managerial diseconomies (Penrose, 1959) or additional imperfections like the Type I and Type II 
error in project evaluation (Sah and Stiglitz, 1988). It is reasonable to expect that communication 
costs, evaluation errors and managerial diseconomies positively correlate with problem 
complexity, amplifying Implication 3 of the model. At the same time, these costs may increase 
with the technological breadth, leading to conflict even when solving very general problems. If 
such effects are sufficiently strong they could potentially change the shape of the relationship 
82 
between problem breadth and project rejection toward a concave curve. Disentangling these 
interactions remains an important empirical task. 
Analogous to prior theoretical models discussed above, I do not examine whether 
rejected ideas lead directly to startups or some of them are exploited within existing rival firms. 
The implicit assumption of these approaches is that the same or similar imperfections exist at 
other incumbent firms. As a result, a large proportion of the rejected ideas may not be 
implemented in other established firms and will be exploited within startups. The likelihood of a 
startup founding will, thus, positively correlate with the likelihood of project rejection. Again, 
various contingencies may apply. A few recent empirical studies started to examine the factors 
that affect whether employees exit to join startups or rival firms (Campbell et al., 2010; Ganco, 
2010). 
This study contributes to multiple literature streams. Within the context of employee 
entrepreneurship literature (Agarwal et al., 2004; Cassiman and Ueda, 2006; Franco and Filson, 
2007; Hellman, 2007; Klepper and Thompson, 2009; Ioannou, 2010; Chatterji, 2009) the model 
provides the needed focus on factors that condition emergence of employee entrepreneurship.47 
By highlighting a new mechanism, the paper connects employee entrepreneurship literature with 
the technology management literature (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Suarez and Utterback, 1995; 
Fleming and Sorenson, 2001). It shows that the nature of technological problems has 
implications for how and who exploits emergent opportunities. The model also connects 
entrepreneurship and complexity literatures (Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000; Gavetti, 2005; 
Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2007). Connecting these two streams of research is particularly promising 
since agent-based modeling seems to be an excellent tool for modeling disequilibrium 
phenomena. By extending the framework proposed by Gavetti and Levinthal (2000), I contribute 
                                               
47 Klepper, S (2008). Keynote speech, DRUID International Conference, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
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to the complexity literature by developing an NK model with cognitive search and multiple 
cooperating agents. By modeling collaborating agents with bounded rationality iteratively 
solving complex problems, the study also contributes to the literature modeling intra-firm 
decision processes and learning (Sommer and Loch, 2004; Miller and Lin, 2009, Banerjee and 
Cole, 2010; Miller et al., 2006; Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2002; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004; Miller 
and Martignoni, 2010; Kavadias and Sommer, 2009). 
The purpose of my study is to extend the current theoretical understanding of employee 
entrepreneurship by introducing technology as an important driver. Both anecdotal and empirical 
evidence shows the importance of technological strategy in determining project rejection and 
employee entrepreneurship. To open the black box of this relationship, I rely on a novel 
modeling approach. The study sheds new light on one of the important contingencies affecting 
entrepreneurship and reveals promising pathways for continued research. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 3.1 Model parameters and summary of assumptions 
Parameter Description Value used 
 in text 
Underlying 
assumptions 
Robustness  
Tested 
Possible empirical 
proxies 
N Problem breadth 
(number of decision 
elements) 
6 - 9 Proxy for 
specialized versus 
general problems 
6 - 9 Patent based measures 
(Fleming and Sorenson, 
2001), product design 
matrix (Rivkin and 
Siggelkow, 2007) 
 
K Number of linkages 
between problem 
components (for each 
row of the interaction 
matrix),  
Randomly distributed 
within interaction 
matrix 
1 - 5 Proxy for 
problem 
difficulty, 
complexity, 
modularization 
1 - 5 Patent based measures 
(Fleming and Sorenson, 
2001), product design 
matrix (Rivkin and 
Siggelkow, 2007), 
vertical integration 
(Sorenson, 1997) 
E Breadth of expertise 5 Assume that E < 
N, Expertise does 
not cover all 
problem 
components 
4 - 6 Patent based measures 
(Fleming and Sorenson, 
2001) 
Agents Number of agents 2 Fixed team size 2 Number of team 
members 
k Number of periods 
between meetings 
(baseline models) 
5 Agents interact 
periodically 
1-100 
(alternative  
meeting  
rules tested) 
 
s Shock size 1-4 Change in NK 
landscape proxies 
for technological 
change 
1-4 Technological or 
environmental 
uncertainty 
Number of 
periods 
Observe payoff 
patterns (baseline 
models) 
20-50  3-100  
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Table 3.2 Convergent performance for different types of search and initial alignment 
 
Baseline models, periods = 20, runs=3,000 
 
                 
A) Experiment with all decisions within expertise 
Misalignment  
allowed? Yes No Diff.  Yes No Diff.  Yes No Diff.  Yes No Diff.  Yes No Diff. 
 K=1   K=2   K=3   K=4   K=5  
N=6 0.565 0.686 21%  0.562 0.757 35%  0.524 0.775 48%  0.484 0.746 54%  0.446 0.698 56% 
N=7 0.567 0.662 17%  0.552 0.718 30%  0.541 0.711 31%  0.496 0.703 42%  0.461 0.657 43% 
N=8 0.607 0.675 11%  0.624 0.718 15%  0.594 0.730 23%  0.581 0.705 21%  0.556 0.656 18% 
N=9 0.645 0.671 4%  0.694 0.739 7%  0.702 0.748 6%  0.684 0.735 8%  0.664 0.714 8% 
                    
B) Experiment only with decisions within expertise that are not shared - core is intact 
Misalignment  
allowed? Yes No Diff.  Yes No Diff.  Yes No Diff.  Yes No Diff.  Yes No Diff. 
 K=1   K=2   K=3   K=4   K=5  
N=6 0.600 0.750 25%  0.616 0.857 39%  0.599 0.918 53%  0.595 0.926 56%  0.574 0.906 58% 
N=7 0.625 0.726 16%  0.656 0.831 27%  0.661 0.864 31%  0.662 0.860 30%  0.629 0.820 30% 
N=8 0.661 0.716 8%  0.710 0.811 14%  0.715 0.832 16%  0.694 0.812 17%  0.679 0.782 15% 
N=9 0.675 0.694 3%  0.733 0.777 6%  0.746 0.791 6%  0.731 0.775 6%  0.708 0.752 6% 
                    
C) Percentage difference (i.e. C = (B-A) / A) 
 K=1   K=2   K=3   K=4   K=5  
N=6 6% 9%   10% 13%   14% 18%   23% 24%   29% 30%  
N=7 10% 10%   19% 16%   22% 21%   33% 22%   37% 25%  
N=8 9% 6%   14% 13%   20% 14%   19% 15%   22% 19%  
N=9 5% 4%   6% 5%   6% 6%   7% 5%   6% 5%  
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Figure 3.1 Visualization of a complex technological problem 
000
001
011
010
110
111
101
100
000
001
011
010
110
111
101
100
0
1
First three decision elementsSecond three decision elements
P
ay
of
f
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Converged performances for different values of K and N 
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Figure 3.3 Likelihood of project rejection as a function of K 
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Figure 3.4 Likelihood of project rejection as a function of N 
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Figure 3.5 Likelihood of project rejection as a function of shock size 
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CHAPTER 4 
ESSAY 3: EMPLOYEE ENTREPRENEURSHIP VERSUS MOBILITY: THE EFFECT 
OF TECHNOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY 
INTRODUCTION 
The intra-industry activities of employees post-exit from incumbent firms have received 
increasing scholarly attention within a wide range of disciplines. This is not surprising, given that 
a significant portion of a firm’s knowledge – a core source of competitive advantage – is 
embedded in the human capital of employees who are free to quit at will. Employee 
entrepreneurship – the post-exit founding of a new venture by an individual who worked for an 
incumbent firm – has been heralded as a hallmark of innovation (Klepper, 2005; Klepper and 
Thompson, 2008), a critical source of new firm capability development and heterogeneity in 
performance (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Agarwal, Echambadi, 
Franco and Sarkar, 2004; Dahl and Reichstein, 2006) and an impetus to the creation and growth 
of industries and regional clusters (Klepper, 2001; Dahl, Østergaard and Dalum, 2005; Agarwal, 
Audretsch and Sarkar, 2007; Mostafa and Klepper, 2010). Through employee entrepreneurship, 
the new venture not only inherits the industry-specific knowledge brought in by its founders 
(Agarwal et al., 2004; Chatterji, 2009), but its strategies bear the imprinting mark of the 
founders’ prior work experience (Klepper and Thompson, 2009). Similarly, scholars have long 
recognized intra-industry employee mobility (i.e. post-exit joining of another firm within the 
industry) as a powerful engine of knowledge diffusion between established firms as well as 
between incumbents and startups (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; 
Agarwal et al., 2004; Agarwal, Ganco and Ziedonis, 2009). 
At the heart of the issues raised above is a question that relates to the underlying drivers 
of employee entrepreneurship and mobility and their impact on the transfer of resources, 
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capabilities and knowledge. Entrepreneurship scholars have noted that opportunities frequently 
arise due to information asymmetries and access to “knowledge corridors” (Venkataraman, 
1997). Individuals working at existing organizations have preferential access to knowledge 
related to technological developments, markets, and environmental or regulatory drivers 
(Agarwal et al., 2004; Chatterji, 2009; Sørensen, 2007). Employee entrepreneurship and mobility 
represent key mechanisms for exploitation of these valuable resources and opportunities outside 
of the boundaries of parent firms. Furthermore, both employee entrepreneurship and mobility 
have been found to impact the performance of parent firms (Wezel, Catani and Pennings, 2006; 
Campbell, Ganco, Franco and Agarwal, 2010; Ioannou, 2010). A central question, however, 
relates to why and when the employee entrepreneurship and mobility occur. 
The main focus of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of origins of 
employee entrepreneurship and mobility events. In particular, I study an area which seems an 
uncharted territory – how the nature of technological problems that employees work on while 
employed within incumbent firms affects their entrepreneurship and mobility decisions.  
There is abundant anecdotal evidence suggesting that technology plays a prominent role 
in the employees’ decisions to exploit the knowledge and opportunities outside of parent firm 
boundaries. For instance, Federico Faggin, Intel employee and inventor of the original Intel 4004 
microprocessor, founded startup Zilog in 1975 after discovering that significant improvements to 
the Intel 8080 architecture are possible. His decision led to the famous Z80 microprocessor, 
improving the Intel 8080 both in terms of speed and costs.48 T. J. Rodgers founded Cypress 
Semiconductor in 1982 to exploit his experience with high-speed MOS designs acquired while 
working at AMD, American Microsystems and during his graduate education.49 Similarly, John 
                                               
48 Forbes.com, National Inventors Hall of Fame Foundation, Inc 
49 Cypress Semiconductor website, www.cypress.com 
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Birkner and H. T. Chua founded Quicklogic in 1988 as a way of exploiting their invention of 
Programmable Array Logic (later leading to field programmable gate arrays – FPGAs) that they 
invented while working on programmable logic in Monolithic Memories.50 In support of these 
examples, Klepper and Thompson (2009) trace most of their cases of employee entrepreneurship 
in the early automobile, semiconductor and laser industries to disagreements about technological 
strategy. The evidence thus invites the question of whether and how the technology affects the 
employee entrepreneurship and mobility decisions. Would these employees decide to use their 
knowledge outside of their parent firms if they happened to work on different technological 
problems? What characteristics of prior technologies matter in their decisions? We know very 
little about these questions. The current study is a first step towards answering them. 
The key variable that I investigate is the technological complexity of inventors’ prior 
patenting activities within an incumbent firm. I define and measure complexity using the 
methodology of the NK modeling literature (Kauffman, 1993; Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000; 
Fleming and Sorensen, 2001). Complex problems are those that have rugged optimization space 
due to dense interdependencies between individual component choices (Kauffman, 1993; Rivkin, 
2000). 
Using complexity as the main contextual variable of interest is attractive at multiple 
levels. Solving technologically complex problems may lead to breakthroughs (Fleming and 
Sorenson, 2001). However, the knowledge necessary to solve a complex problem is more tacit 
(Polanyi, 1983; Lowe, 2002; Agrawal, 2006), may require unstructured technical dialogue 
(Monteverde, 1995) and the solution outcomes are more uncertain (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001). 
The uncertainty associated with complexity may also lead to greater over-optimism when 
pursuing entrepreneurial decisions (Shane, 2002; Ziedonis and Lowe, 2006). At the same time, 
                                               
50 Computer History Museum, www.computerhistory.org, Quicklogic Website, www.quicklogic.com 
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complexity may affect frictions and the likelihood of idea rejection at the parent firm leading to 
disagreements (Klepper and Thompson, 2010; Ganco, 2010). As a result, the technological 
complexity variable appears to be a viable driver affecting both employee entrepreneurship and 
mobility decisions. 
Combining multiple theoretical approaches, I develop propositions connecting 
technological complexity with employee entrepreneurship and mobility. I hypothesize that 
technological complexity affects the ability of employees to replicate knowledge in other 
contexts. I test these propositions within the context of the U.S. semiconductor industry 
providing a canonical example of an industry driven by technological intensity, knowledge 
spillovers, employee mobility and entrepreneurship (Freeman, 1986; Macher and Mowery, 1998; 
2007; Agarwal et al., 2008). I base the analysis on a unique hand-collected dataset of 465 
dedicated semiconductor firms operating between 1973 and 2003. To briefly foreshadow the 
main results, I find that incumbent firm inventors patenting inventions with higher technological 
complexity are less likely to join rival firms, but, if they do exit, they are more likely to become 
entrepreneurs relative to joining rival firms. I also find that technological complexity increases 
the likelihood of team founding relative to individual founding. 
The paper contributes to multiple literature streams. Within the context of employee 
entrepreneurship literature (Agarwal et al, 2004; Klepper, 2005; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005) the 
study provides the needed focus on factors that condition the emergence of employee 
entrepreneurship (Klepper, 2008).51 I also contribute to the literature on employee mobility and 
knowledge spillovers (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Agarwal, 
Echambadi, Franco and Sarkar, 2004; Agarwal, Ganco and Ziedonis, 2008) by suggesting that, 
                                               
51 Klepper, S (June 2008). Keynote speech presented at the 25th DRUID Celebration Conference 2008. Copenhagen, 
Denmark. 
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consistent with the simulation studies (Rivkin, 2000), technological complexity is an important 
contingency affecting knowledge flows through employee mobility. I contribute to the 
complexity literature (Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000; Fleming and Sorenson, 2001) by showing a 
practical empirical application of theoretical models and constructs developed within the 
complexity theory. 
LITERATURE ON EMPLOYEE ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND MOBILITY 
Employee entrepreneurship and mobility literatures developed as separate lines of inquiry, 
but the questions related to the exploitation of parent firm knowledge, resources and 
opportunities outside of their boundaries connect them together. 
First, scholars within economics and strategy have focused on explaining employee 
entrepreneurship through imperfections within parent firms. At the individual level of analysis, 
researchers have typically attributed entrepreneurial opportunities to the decision-making 
imperfections within a parent firm (Anton and Yao, 1995; Cassiman and Ueda, 2004; Franco and 
Filson, 2006; Hellman, 2007; Klepper and Thompson, 2009). More specifically, studies suggest 
that employee entrepreneurship events occur due to the agency problems and contractual hazards 
arising from employees having an option to not disclose their inventions (Anton and Yao, 1995) 
or employees deriving private benefits from exploratory search (Hellman, 2007). At the firm 
level of analysis, studies typically attribute the presence of idle opportunities to frictions in 
knowledge transfer (Franco and Filson, 2006), managerial diseconomies of scale and under-
exploited knowledge (Agarwal et al., 2004) or intra-firm information asymmetries (Klepper and 
Thompson, 2009). 
Similarly, sociological approaches to entrepreneurship maintain that employee 
entrepreneurship is driven by environmental context (Brittain and Freeman, 1980; Freeman, 
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1986; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Thornton, 1999; Romanelli and Schoonhoven, 2001; 
Stuart and Sorenson, 2003; Audia and Rider, 2005; Dobrev and Barnett, 2005; Sørensen, 2007). 
Sørensen (2007) argues that the “fundamental premise of sociological approaches to 
entrepreneurship [is that] the social context shapes the likelihood of entrepreneurial activity, 
above and beyond any effects of individual characteristics”. 
Even though the underlying mechanisms differ, the studies underscore that the existence 
of profitable opportunities within parent firms that are left unexploited leads to employee 
entrepreneurship events. Supporting empirical evidence has been found in a variety of industry 
contexts, including disk drives, automobiles and lasers (Agarwal et al., 2004; Klepper, 2005; 
Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Franco and Filson, 2006). Similarly, in a survey of 100 fast-growing 
private companies, Bhide (1994) found that 71% of the entrepreneurial founders commercialized 
ideas they had encountered or discovered while working at other companies. 
The literature on employee mobility (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 
2003; Agarwal et al., 2004, 2008; Marx et al., 2009, 2010) typically focuses on implications of 
employee mobility on knowledge flows. This literature shows that employee mobility is a key 
driver of knowledge diffusion. The knowledge flows tend to be geographically localized 
(Almeida and Kogut, 1999), but mobility is also a strong conduit facilitating the knowledge flow 
over large geographical and technological distances (Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003). The 
knowledge brought in by mobile inventors tends to diffuse within hiring firms (Tzabbar, 
Silverman and Aharonson, 2005), is especially beneficial for small hiring firms (Almeida, Dokko 
and Rosenkopf, 2003) and has been hypothesized to be a driving force behind successful 
industrial clusters like Silicon-Valley (Saxenian, 1994; Gilson, 1999; Fallick, Fleischman and 
Rebitzer, 2005). On the other hand, parent firms try to reduce knowledge outflows through 
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employee mobility by increasing patenting efforts (Kim and Marschke, 1999) or building 
reputations for litigiousness (Agarwal et al., 2008). 
While the bulk of the literature related to employee entrepreneurship and mobility has 
employed an economics or strategy lens, the related literature in organizational behavior on 
voluntary turnover (Lee and Mitchell, 1994; Lee et al., 1999; Holton et al., 2005) is also relevant 
to the issue of why employees exit incumbent firms. The theories related to voluntary turnover 
focus on the process-related antecedents of voluntary exit and provide a window into micro-level 
decision-making. The core idea is that the decision to exit is a result of a multi-stage process that 
unfolds when several possibly sequential conditions are met. The process of decision 
“unfolding” is assumed to be triggered by a shock, and the ultimate decision to exit depends on 
the nature and number of outside options (Lee and Mitchell, 1994). While the literature does not 
pay much attention to whether the exits lead to mobility to existing firms or to new firm 
formation, it emphasizes that the decisions to exit depend on the interaction between the intra-
firm processes and attractiveness of outside options. 
Despite the focus of the literature on employee entrepreneurship and mobility, little is 
known about their relationship with technology. The results in the extant literature have been 
limited to the finding that more technologically advanced firms generate more employee 
entrepreneurship events (Brittain and Freeman, 1986; Franco and Filson, 2006) and that 
employee entrepreneurship may be driven by underexploited technological opportunities within 
the parent firms (Agarwal et al., 2004; Klepper and Thompson, 2009). From the perspective of 
the contextual approaches to entrepreneurship in economics and strategy, it is unclear if and how 
the technological context, as it varies across and within firms, affects employee entrepreneurship 
and mobility. 
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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
The centerpiece of imagery of complex systems research and related NK modeling 
literature is the notion of a rugged landscape. The rugged landscape (Kauffman, 1993, 1995; 
Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000) represents the problem space searched by the agents (i.e. in our 
context individual inventors solving a given technological problem). The agents are assumed to 
be bounded in their ability to optimize over the decision elements of this space and thus have to 
search for the optima by iterative experimentation – i.e. local search (Kauffman, 1993). As the 
ruggedness of the space increases (the space has more “peaks” and “valleys”), the global 
maximum increases but the problem is more difficult to solve. The boundedness of the agents’ 
search behavior potentially creates lock-in problems. Kauffman (1993) showed that ruggedness 
of the problem space increases with the density of linkages between individual decision 
components. For instance, if an inventor makes decisions on N components and all component 
decisions are independent (in the sense that changing the decision about the component Ni does 
not affect the performance contribution of any other component Nj) then the space is perfectly 
smooth and the inventor is able to locate the global optimum (see Figure 4.1). However, when 
there are interdependencies, the decision about the component Ni affects the performance of not 
only itself but also of all components Nj that are linked to (depend on) the component Ni. 
Consequently, small changes – e.g. a change in one decision component Ni – can lead to 
dramatic changes in overall performance of the system (defined as the average of the 
performance contributions of the individual components). What follows is that when the space is 
searched by a boundedly rational agent that can evaluate only options in the local neighborhood 
of the current decision (e.g. those decisions that differ by one decision component), the lock-in 
problems emerge and agents are unable to improve on the suboptimal local peak. To get to the 
higher peaks the agents would have to traverse valleys. However, they may be unable to evaluate 
97 
distant points and choose the direction of higher optima due to the myopia of their local search. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the search process for a complex versus simple problem. The 
conceptualization of problem complexity using the NK lens is analogous to the notion of 
problem difficulty (Kollman et al., 2000) since high K problems were shown to be NP-hard 
(Rivkin, 2000). 
TECHNOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY AND EMPLOYEE MOBILITY 
Knowledge complexity likely affects how embedded individuals are within the firm and 
what outside options they face. First, to create value individuals solving complex problems may 
need strong internal ties with other employees within the firm (Krackhardt and Porter, 1986; 
Jackson et al., 1991; Dess and Shaw, 2001; Lee et al., 2004). Similarly, new knowledge often 
builds on existing knowledge rather than replaces it (Jones, 2009). This increases knowledge 
depth and specialization and necessitates collaboration (Jones, Uzzi and Wuchty, 2007; Jones, 
2009). It is conceivable that such effects will be stronger for more complex knowledge. Due to 
the strong complementarities with other individuals, and knowledge external to the focal 
inventor (Hoetker and Agarwal, 2007), it may be very difficult to individually exploit complex 
knowledge outside of the parent firm boundaries. 
Second, the exit and mobility decisions are affected by the viability of outside 
alternatives (Lee and Mitchell, 1994). The ability of employees to transfer knowledge through 
mobility to rival firms and create value there likely varies with its complexity. Due to the 
inherent difficulty in communicating dense interdependencies, complex knowledge may be more 
tacit (Polanyi, 1983; Lowe, 2002; Agrawal, 2006), may require unstructured technical dialogue 
(Monteverde, 1995) and the recipient organizations may have difficulty diffusing and utilizing 
such knowledge (Tzabbar et al., 2002). Solution outcomes based on solving complex problems 
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tend to be more varied (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001) and uncertain (Knight, 1921), which can 
make their evaluation by other organizations problematic. The uncertainty can also amplify the 
expropriation hazards faced by the inventors during their negotiation with potential hiring 
organizations (Anton and Yao, 1995). Prior research has shown that more complex knowledge is 
less robust to errors in the transfer process (Rivkin, 2000). Small errors in the replication of 
complex knowledge can have a dramatic negative impact on the ability of individuals to 
successfully solve complex problems (Rivkin, 2000). 
Further, the complementary assets and knowledge in the parent firm may be optimized to 
solve given complex technological problems. Pre-existing structures of other firms may have 
been designed to solve different problems. The hiring organizations may be more interested in 
general knowledge that complements their capabilities rather than in integrating complex 
knowledge from other organizations. Consequently, technological complexity may be a burden 
limiting the number and scope of job alternatives that mobile inventors have.52 
Individuals solving complex problems are more embedded within parent firms and may 
be less able to transfer their knowledge to other recipient organizations - which likely affects 
their mobility decisions: 
H1: The probability of mobility to a rival firm decreases with the technological complexity of an 
employee’s prior innovations. 
However, existing recipient organizations potentially vary in their ability to integrate 
complex technological knowledge. For instance, larger organizations relative to smaller ones 
may have greater financial, managerial, and related technological or marketing resources and 
                                               
52 Note that the argument developed here assumes away how the value of employee’s knowledge within the parent 
firm affects mobility decisions (e.g. Campbell et al., 2010) and focuses on the effect of complexity on an 
employee’s ability to extract the knowledge and transfer it to another setting. Empirically, I control for the value of 
knowledge that inventors hold. 
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capabilities to successfully integrate complex knowledge. If the knowledge brought in by the 
mobile scientist is incompatible with the existing capabilities, the larger firms can create a 
separate unit that would exploit the knowledge. Such an approach is fully consistent with the 
real-options perspective (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Trigeorgis, 1996; Lander and Pinches, 1998). 
In search for breakthroughs that are more likely with more complex knowledge (Fleming and 
Sorenson, 2001), larger firms may exploit complex knowledge from various sources.53 Smaller 
firms are typically more specialized and focused on solving only one or a few technological 
problems at a time. Integrating outside complex technological knowledge may re-direct the 
technological strategy of a small firm and it may be risky. Similarly, small firms may lack 
complementary assets (Teece, 1987) and support structures that are necessary to successfully 
integrate outside complex knowledge. Larger firms may also have greater absorptive capacity 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Zahra and George, 2002) due to more extensive experience in 
activities related to the hired scientist’s knowledge. This reasoning leads to the following 
prediction: 
H2: Conditional on mobility, the probability of moving to a larger rival firm relative to a smaller 
one increases with the technological complexity of an employee’s prior innovations. 
TECHNOLOGICAL COMPLEXITY AND EMPLOYEE ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Solving technologically complex problems may potentially lead to breakthroughs 
(Fleming and Sorenson, 2001). However, complex technological knowledge may be valuable for 
exiting employees because it also embodies entrepreneurial opportunities not exploited by the 
                                               
53 The NK models show that the average performance has an inverted U-shaped relationship with complexity 
(Kauffman, 1993; Altenberg, 1994; Fleming & Sorenson, 2001). Solving very simple problems has a low potential 
payoff and solving very complex problems has a high potential payoff but a low likelihood of actually succeeding. 
However, the variance of performance increases with complexity – individuals who happen to find solutions for 
complex problems enjoy significant payoffs. In other words, breakthroughs are more likely based on solving 
difficult problems (Fleming & Sorenson, 2001). 
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parent firms. The economics and strategy literatures (Agarwal et al., 2004, Klepper and Sleeper, 
2005; Klepper and Thompson, 2009) suggest that the existing firms are prone to leave some 
opportunities idle. Consequently, the value that the knowledge has within the incumbent firms 
does not capture underexploited opportunities. 
Employees frequently try to convince their superiors about the viability of their ideas and 
may leave when they are rejected (Klepper and Thompson, 2009). Working in complex 
technological domains may be prone to a higher likelihood of such rejection of viable 
opportunities. For instance, within the context of Penrose (1959) one could perceive the 
boundary of the firm (and the extent to which projects outside of this boundary are rejected) as 
determined by scarce managerial talent and path dependency. Penrose argues that the bundle of 
current resources determines the services the firm is capable of rendering (Penrose, 1959, p. 5; 
Kor and Mahoney, 2004). Due to the managerial diseconomies of scale or scope, the manager 
may even become a bottleneck in the efficient growth of the firm (Penrose, 1959, p. 237; Kor 
and Mahoney, 2004). It is reasonable to expect that these diseconomies will increase with the 
complexity of technological problems. The likelihood that a manager rejects viable technological 
ideas (i.e. a manager makes a Type II error, Sah and Stiglitz, 1968) thus increases with their 
technological complexity. Rejection of viable ideas can also increase due to the 
miscommunication between managers and inventors. This can be driven by the tacitness of 
complex knowledge (Polanyi, 1983; Lowe, 2002; Agrawal, 2006) and its inherent uncertainty 
(Knight, 1921). The parent firm may also be unable or unwilling to implement proposed ideas 
due to agency considerations. Agency theorists (Anton and Yao, 1995; Hellman, 2007) model 
profitable project rejections as emerging from various incomplete contract settings. Both the 
private benefits of search on inventors’ personal projects as opposed to assigned tasks (Hellman, 
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2007) and benefits of not disclosing some projects to the management (Anton and Yao, 1995) 
increase with the expectation of breakthrough inventions. The rejection of viable entrepreneurial 
ideas may also be driven by their inconsistency with the strategic vision of the firm (Gavetti and 
Levinthal, 2000; Ganco, 2010). Ganco (2010) shows that the likelihood of such inconsistency 
increases with the complexity of the technological problems that are being solved.  
Similar to mobility to rival firms, employee entrepreneurs who try to exploit complex 
knowledge outside of the parent firm boundaries face potential difficulties. I suggest above that 
the ability to transfer knowledge decreases with its complexity and that large recipient 
organization are relatively better at integrating complex knowledge than small ones. Additionally, 
the ability to transfer complex knowledge may dramatically improve when it does not need to be 
integrated into an existing structure. In the case of employee entrepreneurship, the new 
organization is created and optimized to exploit knowledge and ideas brought in by its founders. 
The startup founders assemble complementary assets that match the opportunity they pursue.54 In 
support of this argument, the extant literature found that parent firm routines can be successfully 
transferred when firm structures are created afresh (Wezel et al., 2007). The fact that it is the 
inventor (i.e. the owner of the idea) who controls the startup, potentially mitigates agency and 
communication problems. In other words, there is no need to convince other managers about the 
viability of ideas. Instead, the bottleneck that startup founders face is in the venture funding. 
However, there is again evidence that existing firms and venture capitalists evaluate ideas 
differently (Dushnitsky and Shapira, 2009) and many projects that are rejected by incumbent 
                                               
54 The argument implicitly assumes that such complementary assets are available – either transferred from the parent 
firm (e.g. human complementary assets, Campbell et al., 2010) or bought on the market. If the necessary 
complementary assets are unique and locked in within incumbents then employee entrepreneurship is very difficult. 
For instance, Mitchell (1991), in his study of the diagnostic imaging industry found a persistent incumbent 
advantage due to their dominance in distribution channels. I will revisit this issue when discussing empirical context 
below. 
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firms are funded by VCs (Kenney and Florida, 2002). In fact, Kenney and Florida (2002) 
describe that venture capitalists decide about funding based on a broad range of characteristics 
including recommendations, backgrounds of founders, market conditions and technology. 
The employees may also prefer to pursue underexploited opportunities they identified 
while working on complex technological problems through employee entrepreneurship relative 
to exploiting them within rival firms because they may be able to appropriate a greater share of 
rents (Campbell et al., 2010). The expropriation hazards that may prevent the inventor from 
disclosing the idea to the parent firm may also prevent him from revealing it to other firms 
(Anton and Yao, 1995). Further, the uncertainty associated with complex technological domains 
(Fleming and Sorenson, 2001) may lead employees to overestimate the value of their 
entrepreneurial ideas (Shane, 2002; Lowe and Ziedonis, 2006). 
Overall, knowledge based on solving complex technological problems may embody 
underexploited opportunities. When employees exit to exploit such knowledge, it is more likely 
that they exploit it by founding a new firm relative to joining a rival:55 
H3: Conditional on exit, the probability of starting a new venture relative to joining an existing 
rival firm increases with the technological complexity of an employee’s prior innovations. 
TEAMS AS FACILITATORS OF KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER 
It is in the best interest of recipient organizations to mitigate the problems associated with 
the transfer of complex knowledge. Team transfer may serve as such a mitigating factor. The co-
inventors working together at the parent firm – whether moved together and then allowed to 
collaborate within the hiring organization or within the context of the startup they jointly 
                                               
55 Empirically, I also test the unconditional hypothesis that the technological complexity of prior innovations 
increases the likelihood of employee entrepreneurship relative to staying. I discuss the findings and their 
implications below. 
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establish – may facilitate the transfer of complex knowledge. Co-inventors may also serve as an 
important complementary asset (Campbell et al., 2010) necessary for implementation of complex 
knowledge. Teams can lower transfer costs by providing parallel channels for knowledge 
transfer – minimizing the impact of tacitness (Polanyi, 1983; Lowe, 2002; Agrawal, 2006) and 
transfer errors (Rivkin, 2000). Crucial for solving complex problems is collaboration and 
coordination (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003; Barr and Hanaki, 2008). The team entrepreneurship 
and team mobility allow keeping the team of collaborators intact, maintaining the coordination 
capabilities, communication routines and social interaction developed while working at the 
parent firm.  
The teams should facilitate transfer of complex knowledge whether they are hired by an 
existing firm or found a startup: 
H4: The probability of team founding of a new venture relative to individual founding increases 
with the technological complexity of an employee’s prior innovations. 
H5: The probability of mobility to an existing rival firm with a team relative to individually 
increases with the technological complexity of an employee’s prior innovations. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Industry Context and Data Description 
The context of the study is the U.S. semiconductor industry. The industry exhibits a high 
degree of employee entrepreneurship and mobility and prior studies document that such mobility 
facilitates inter-firm transfers of technological knowledge (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Rosenkopf 
and Almeida, 2003). Firms in this industry also have a high propensity to file patents (Hall and 
Ziedonis, 2001) which allows construction of a patent-based measure of technological 
complexity (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001, 2004; Ganco, 2010). The semiconductor industry is 
104 
also ideal because of its focus on complex technological innovation (Macher, Mowery and 
Hodges, 1998) like the “system-on-a-chip” and ASICs (Linden and Somaya, 2002). Macher et al. 
(1998) document the shift of the US semiconductor industry since the early 1990’s toward the 
emergence of “fabless” firms and the focus on semiconductor design with the outsourcing of 
manufacturing capability. In fact, approximately 90% of new entrants in our recipient firm 
sample are pure design “fabless” firms.56 The separation of design and manufacturing made entry 
relatively easy, which further fostered innovation (Macher el al., 1998). The critical 
complementary assets required within new design firms were highly mobile human assets (Coff, 
1997; Teece, 2003; Campbell et al., 2010). Such characteristics highlight the importance of 
knowledge as a determinant of entrepreneurship and mobility patterns and provide an ideal 
setting for our study. Macher, Mowery and Di Minin (2007) also report that the innovation in the 
semiconductor industry remains largely US-based, which justifies focus on the domestic market 
and allows for abstracting away from the international variation in the knowledge transfer. 
Empirically, I trace the innovative activities of 649 U.S. semiconductor firms over a 
three-decade period, 1973-2003. The construction of the sample is analogous to prior studies on 
mobility (Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Agarwal et al., 2008) by distinguishing between firms 
that are potential sources of inventive talent and other firms in the industry that are potential 
recipients (rivals or startups). 
The source firm sample is drawn from a comprehensive list of publicly-traded U.S. firms 
that a) compete primarily in semiconductor product markets and b) were founded prior to 1995. 
Restricting attention to firms that are public by the mid-1990s (n=136) allows a sufficiently long 
window through which to view possible mobility and employee entrepreneurship events. In 2000, 
these firms collectively generated over $88 billion in annual revenues and spent $12 billion in 
                                               
56 Only 3% of the sample are entrants that entered post-1990 and established a foundry. 
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R&D. To assemble a larger pool of potential recipients of inventive talent within the industry, I 
add to source firms (a) 454 additional venture-backed semiconductor firms that were founded 
between 1980 and 2001, and (b) 59 additional firms in the industry (SIC3674) that went public 
post-1995. Recent public entrants are identified from Compustat. The additional venture capital-
backed startups are identified using data provided by VentureOne.  
Since I am interested in an inventor-level analysis and the USPTO patent data does not 
provide a person’s identifier, I match inventor names to reconstruct individuals’ patenting 
histories. I implement the matching algorithm described in prior literature (Agarwal et al., 2009) 
that creates inventor patenting and employment histories at focal firms within the sample. This 
algorithm identifies 28,123 unique names listed in patents awarded to sample firms of which 
25,339 appear within the source firm sample. I also require that the source firms receive at least 
one patent which eliminates 7 source firms. The final source firm sample includes 129 firms. 
The only method to identify mobility is if inventors patent at both source and recipient 
firms. Consequently, I require that recipient firms receive at least one U.S. patent. This 
restriction eliminates 14 public and 188 startup firms.57 The final recipient sample therefore 
includes 266 private startups and 181 public firms. The matching algorithm yields 1,166 mobility 
events. Of these, 52 individuals moved within teams (with average team size of 2.24) identified 
using the procedure described below.58 
By searching press releases in LexisNexis, analyzing archived websites of the recipient 
firms (www.archive.org) and utilizing several online resources (e.g. smithsonianchips.si.edu) I 
identify founders of the recipient firms. Since I am interested in how past employment histories 
shape the emergence of new firms, I need to identify inventors whose ideas lead to the 
                                               
57 The disproportionate omission of startups is not surprising. Many startups in the larger sample fail or are acquired 
at very young ages, thus reducing the likelihood of observing patent awards for these firms. 
58 Cf. Agarwal et al. (2008) for a comparison of how this algorithm performs to the ones used in the prior literature. 
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emergence of startups and not simply early “board members.” Consequently, I employ a 
relatively stringent requirement to define a person as a founder – the word “founder” or “co-
founder” needs to appear with the person’s name on either the archived corporate website (as 
early as possible after the year of entry), early press releases or industry materials. To look at 
how prior inventive activity affects the decision to start a new firm I match the founder names (I 
verify and clean the matches using LexisNexis and corporate websites to precisely reconstruct 
the founder employment histories) with the source firm inventor pool of 25,339 inventors. Using 
this procedure yields 141 inventor-founders who originated from 49 source firms and founded 
114 startups. Of these, 10 were started by 3 inventor-founders, 19 by 2 inventor founders and the 
rest by single inventor-founders.59 It is important to note that the identification procedure does 
not require the founder to be an inventor within the startup firm. He or she only needs to appear 
as an inventor within the source firm population. The parent firm spin-offs or startups receiving 
corporate venture capital from the parent firm were excluded from the sample. 
For the combined set of firms, I integrate financial, founding and exit year data from 
Compustat, Hoover’s Business Directories, VentureOne,10-k filings and LexisNexis, patent data 
from Delphion and the National University of Singapore. 
Estimation Strategy 
I test H1 and H3-5 using discrete time conditional logit as well as OLS (linear probability 
models) with the employee entrepreneurship or mobility events as the positive outcome. I 
estimate H2 using the OLS with the recipient firm size as the dependent variable. Due to likely 
unobserved heterogeneity across firms and over time, I utilize a relatively stringent empirical 
approach by using the “source firm-year” combinations as the fixed-effect. Consequently, the 
                                               
59 Results for H3 remain unchanged when estimated on the sample of firms started by a single inventor-founder. 
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results are based on the within firm-year. Such an approach significantly simplifies estimation 
since all time-variant firm-level controls are absorbed in the time-variant firm fixed-effect. 
Beyond individual level differences proxied by patenting patterns, I also control for traditional 
variables used in the labor literature that I can infer from the patent documents – gender and race. 
To address individual selection concerns (i.e. higher quality individuals may solve more complex 
problems), I employ a two-stage approach. First, I regress the raw measure of technological 
complexity on all controls discussed below, including individual inventor fixed effects. Then, I 
use the residuals of the first stage in all subsequent regressions. The sample is constructed as an 
unbalanced panel with the inventor-year observations. 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variables 
For H1, the dependent variable mobility is a binary indicator set to 1 if the given 
employment spell in the focal year is followed by a mobility event to a firm in the recipient 
sample different than the source firm and 0 if the employee stays with the parent. For H2, the 
dependent variable is the number of employees of the recipient firm in the first year when the 
inventor patents at this firm. I test H3 using the dependent variable employee entrepreneurship. 
This binary variable is set to 1 if the event of employee entrepreneurship follows the given 
employment spell in the focal year and 0 if the employee stays employed with the parent or joins 
a rival firm (depending on the comparison group).60  
H4 is tested on a sub-sample of employee mobility events. The dependent variable team 
mobility is set to 1 if a given inventor moves to an existing firm within an inventor team and 0 if 
he or she moves individually. Team mobility is an event when co-inventors collaborating in the 
                                               
60 The employee entrepreneurship and mobility events within the sample are strongly correlated over time. 
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last year pre-exit from the parent are also listed as co-inventors in the first year at the recipient 
firm. H5 is tested on a sub-sample of employee entrepreneurship events. The dependent variable 
team entrepreneurship is set to 1 if a given inventor starts a firm within an inventor team and 0 if 
there is only one inventor founder on the team. Team entrepreneurship is an event when co-
inventors collaborating within the parent firm are listed as co-founders of the startup.  
Main explanatory variable: Technological Complexity 
Consistent with prior work (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001, 2004; Ganco, 2010; Sorenson 
et al., 2006), I measure technological complexity utilizing the patent classification into 
subclasses. The NK literature shows (Kauffman, 1993, 1995; Ganco, 2009) that the performance 
when solving complex problems is mainly driven by the ratio between the K – the number of 
interdependencies per component (or the number of component choices that the performance of a 
focal component depends on) – and N – the total number of components. 
The measure of interdependence K is adopted from a prior study (Ganco, 2010), which is 
a single-industry measure analogous to the cross-sectional measure developed by Fleming and 
Sorenson (2001, 2004). The measure is based on the interaction matrix from Kauffman’s NK 
model (1993, 1995). The key idea behind the measure is that when two underlying functions 
(represented by patent sub-classes) are coupled we are more likely to observe components 
belonging to these classes in a single invention. If there is a high coupling between the functions 
A and B and the component a is classified in patent subclass A, aA and b is in B, bB (USPTO 
classifies patents into subclasses by their functions), then we are more likely to encounter 
subclasses a and b appearing on a patent together. In other words, high interdependence between 
A and B implies that whenever an inventor solves a problem related to one of these functions she 
needs to redesign or include the coupled function as well, and we are likely to observe the 
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components optimizing these functions together in a patent. Similarly, if the patent improves the 
architecture of multiple functions we are likely to observe all components that correspond to 
these functions coupled to the architecture. On the other hand, if A and B are independent with 
respect to each other, we are likely to observe A combined with other subclasses without B being 
present. 
The measure of interdependence K is computed in several steps. In the first step, I 
tabulate co-occurrence frequencies for all subclass combinations and also create a table of 
occurrence frequency for each subclass. Then, by selecting entries from the tables, I compute the 
interdependence Ki for each focal component (subclass) of patent l: 

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where j belongs to all subclasses except i. The measure K for the patent l is calculated as follows: 
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For instance, when calculating the interdependence of the first subclass (first subclass is 
focal “i”) the interdependence between the first and the third subclasses is the number of patents 
where the first and third subclasses appear together divided by the number of patents where only 
the first subclass appears.  
Using the focal industry dataset to derive this measure assumes stability in the nature of 
interdependencies between the functional components of an innovation over time within a given 
industry. The variable Ki thus captures the interdependence between functions A and B in general 
and not interdependence that is “patent-specific”. In other words, the inventions are assumed to 
consist of building blocks that have a certain level of interdependence associated with each pair 
of its functions represented by observable components. If functions A and B appear on two 
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patents, one in the beginning of the sample (along the time dimension of the sample) and another 
at the end, the interdependence between them would be the same. The assumption of the stability 
of interdependencies between the subclasses (“building blocks”) is not entirely realistic but 
assuming stability within an industry and at least within a certain time frame is a necessary 
simplification. The measure of K has the correct scaling consistent with the NK model since it is 
in the interval [0, N-1].61 
Similar to prior studies (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001, 2004; Sorenson, Rivkin and 
Fleming, 2006), I operationalize the total number of components N by the number of patent sub-
classes. Consistent with this literature, I obtain the raw technological complexity measure by 
dividing the number of interdependencies K with the number of components N.62 To obtain the 
final raw measure of technological complexity for a given inventor within a given year, I average 
the K/N for all patents awarded to the inventor in the given year. 
Finally to calculate the measure of technological complexity, I develop a panel with 
patents as individual observations. Then I regress (using OLS) the raw measure on all control 
variables described below, including individual inventor fixed effects. The residuals from this 
regression are used as the final measure of technological complexity. 
To triangulate and further validate the measure, I interviewed an expert who is a 
professor of electrical engineering and a leading authority in semiconductor design at a Top 10 
research institution in the field. The expert was asked the question: “How would you describe the 
typical invention in a given patent class in terms of its complexity? I define inventions with Low 
complexity as those that are composed of standardized components that are selected to optimize 
                                               
61 Ganco (2010) highlights the mechanics of the measure and further tests its validity. 
62 Alternatively, one could specify the model using N, K, K/N and their squared terms (Fleming & Sorenson, 2001; 
Ganco, 2008). However, using only K/N parsimoniously captures the effect of the full set of variables and the 
robustness checks showed that having a fully specified model yields qualitatively identical results. 
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a given problem. There are few interdependencies (choice of one component affects performance 
of few other components) between components of these problems. I define inventions with High 
complexity are those that are composed of unique components that are selected or designed to 
optimize a given problem. There are many interdependencies (design of one component affects 
performance of many other components) between components of these problems.” The 
respondent answered High, Medium or Low. Then, I aggregated the patents in my data into main 
classes and calculated average complexity based on the measure described above. Table 4.1 
shows the correspondence between the measure and the expert opinion. This crude validation 
(due to the aggregation into main-class domains) shows that the correspondence is relatively 
good with the correlation of 0.54. 
Control Variables 
Beyond the firm-year fixed effects all models include a set of control variables. To 
control for individual heterogeneity, I introduce variables capturing inventor quality or other 
differences that may affect the propensity to engage in mobility or employee entrepreneurship at 
an individual inventor level. These variables include: Log Number of Patents, Log Number of 
Citations, Female, Nonwhite, Technological Proximity, Log Number of Co-inventors, Log 
Number of Main Classes and Log Years Patenting within Parent. 
Even after controlling for individual heterogeneity, it is possible that differences in the 
opportunity space, both for mobility and employee entrepreneurship, vary with technological 
complexity. Employees may exit to pursue general opportunities in a given area rather than to 
exploit complex technological knowledge they have. To control for these differences, I introduce 
variables that rely on the firm entry and exit rates into a particular technological complexity 
“segment”: Entry Rate of Firms with Similar Tech. Complexity and Exit Rate of Firms with 
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Similar Tech. Complexity. Table 4.2, provides more detail on the variable construction. Table 4.3 
provides bivariate correlations. 
RESULTS 
Table 4.4 shows the results of the regression analysis. The significant coefficients on the 
controls indicate that female inventors are less likely to move to a rival firm and dramatically 
less likely to found a startup (relative to mobility or staying). Nonwhites in the industry are more 
likely to join a rival firm. The coefficient on the number of co-inventors is negative and 
significant in the mobility regression, suggesting that inventors embedded in collaborative 
networks are less likely to move. After controlling for technological complexity, the number of 
main classes negatively predicts employee entrepreneurship (relative to staying), suggesting that 
specialists are more likely to found firms. Number of years inventors patent with the parent firm 
is associated with higher likelihood of both mobility and employee entrepreneurship and makes 
joining a large firm less likely. The coefficient on the entry rate of firms with similar 
technological complexity weakly negatively predicts employee entrepreneurship relative to 
staying. The exit rate of firms with similar technological interdependence is negative and 
significant for both employee entrepreneurship and mobility, implying that if a given 
technological domain is in decline employees opt for the safety of their present employment. 
Consistent with H1, in Model 1, the coefficient on technological complexity is negative 
and significant (employee mobility as the dependent variable). Weakly supporting H2 (p=0.077), 
technological complexity positively predicts joining a larger firm. Consistent with H3, the 
coefficient on technological complexity is positive and significant in Model 3 (employee 
entrepreneurship as the dependent variable). Interpreting these coefficients, one standard 
deviation increase in technological complexity causes the likelihood of employee mobility to 
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decrease by 13%, increases the size of the recipient organization by 1500 employees and predicts 
the employee entrepreneurship relative to mobility to increase by 28%. Even though not 
hypothesized, Model 4 predicts the likelihood of employee entrepreneurship relative to staying 
(unconditional) and also shows a positive and significant relationship. One standard deviation 
increase in technological complexity increases the likelihood of employee entrepreneurship 
relative to staying by 17%.63 
A test of the Hypotheses 4 and 5 is provided in Table 4.5 using both conditional logit and 
a fixed-effect linear probability model. The coefficient on technological complexity for team 
mobility has the correct sign but is not significant (Models 1-2), suggesting that technological 
complexity does not increase the likelihood of team mobility. Hypothesis 4 is thus not supported. 
The results (Models 3-5) provide support for Hypothesis 5 suggesting that technological 
complexity makes team founding more likely. Increase of technological complexity by one 
standard deviation increases the likelihood of team founding as opposed to individual founding 
by 60%. Using a t-test to compare the coefficients of the linear probability models reveals that 
the coefficients on technological complexity for team entrepreneurship and team mobility are 
significantly different at the 5% level (even as the coefficient on team mobility is not 
significant).64 
DISCUSSION 
Employee mobility is considered to be a vibrant channel for knowledge transfer. 
Similarly, employee entrepreneurship is widely heralded as an important driver of innovation, 
                                               
63 Note that in Model 2, I had to revert to Firm & Year fixed effects instead of Firm-Year due to many missing 
observations for the recipient firm size. 
64 It is important to note that some compromises were necessary in the conditional logit model of team 
entrepreneurship. Model 3 includes only Firm and Year fixed effects (as opposed to Firm-Year elsewhere) but 
retains a substantial portion of the observations. Model 4 uses a full fixed effect structure, but the number of 
observations drops substantially. At the same time, the firm entry and exit rate controls had to be dropped from 
Model 4 to prevent even further loss of observations. 
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firm formation and growth. However, far less is known about how the nature of technological 
problems solved by employees affects their propensity to engage either in employee 
entrepreneurship or mobility. I investigate how technological complexity affects the propensity 
of inventors to engage in employee entrepreneurship and mobility and examine additional factors 
like mobility to large firms or team transfer. In doing so, I shed new light on a contingency that 
has received little empirical attention despite the fact that it relates to anecdotal evidence and a 
significant body of theoretical literature. Importantly, the study highlights that the nature of 
technological problems may have wider implications for knowledge flows and competitive 
patterns. 
Drawing on a uniquely rich database of employee entrepreneurship and mobility events 
and firm patenting in the U.S. semiconductor industry during a three-decade period, I find that 
the mobility of inventors to rival firms decreases with technological complexity (consistent with 
H1). This finding is consistent with the view that technological complexity is locking inventors 
within parent firms, inhibiting transfer of knowledge to rival firms. Even though the number of 
underexploited opportunities increases with the technological complexity, not all mobile 
inventors may be able to exploit them, and the nature of such knowledge inhibits its applicability 
within rival firms. As the complexity of inventors’ prior technological experience increases, the 
potential hiring firms face difficulties in deploying the knowledge within their existing structures 
which translates into limited job alternatives (Lee et al., 1994) and lower probability of actual 
mobility. The results also suggest that larger firms may be able to better mitigate the problems 
associated with the transfer of complex knowledge (H2). The complex knowledge is more likely 
to stay locked in within the structures of parent firms, but if it does diffuse it is more likely to 
flow to larger firms. 
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Consistent with H3, I find that the technological complexity of an inventor’s prior patents 
positively affects the inventor’s propensity to engage in employee entrepreneurship. Such a 
finding is consistent with the view that the prevalence of underexploited opportunities increases 
with the technological complexity. The inventors directly working with potentially 
underexploited technologies are in the best position to recognize these opportunities due to being 
in the appropriate “knowledge corridor” (Venkatamaran, 1997) or work context (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1990; Schoonhoven and Romanelli, 2001; Sørensen, 2007). However, note that 
the technological complexity increases the likelihood of employee entrepreneurship both 
conditional on exit (as hypothesized in H3) and unconditionally (relative to staying). The 
unconditional relationship highlights the fact that within the context of semiconductor startups 
(that are mostly design firms) the transfer costs are sufficiently mitigated when inventors start 
their own firms. As the results on team entrepreneurship reveal, the complementary assets are 
mostly human, and they are transferable from the parent firms (Campbell et al., 2010). The 
employee entrepreneurship thus allows exploitation of opportunities arising from complex parent 
firm technologies while mitigating transfer costs. 
Further, I find that teams facilitate knowledge transfer to startups with technological 
complexity, substantially increasing likelihood of team founding. However, I do not find support 
for the hypothesis that complexity increases the likelihood of team mobility. In fact, team 
mobility is a rare event – only less than 4.5% of inventors moved in teams (as opposed to 48% of 
inventors who co-founded firms together). It shows that existing organizations face difficulties in 
absorbing entire teams of inventors and perhaps are more interested in generic transferable 
knowledge that readily recombines with their existing structures rather than integrating complex 
technological knowledge. 
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The findings of the study have important implications. First, the results imply that it is 
the more simple knowledge that flows easily through the channel of inventor mobility to rival 
firms. This finding is consistent with prior studies that find that less complex knowledge diffuses 
more easily (Fleming and Sorenson, 2004; Sorenson et al., 2006). Nevertheless, the findings in 
this study suggest that the most easily assimilated knowledge within the structures of the hiring 
firms may not always be optimal. Hiring firms may want to accommodate inventors working on 
more technologically complex problems, and more so within the context of teams, to exploit 
potential underexploited opportunities brought in by these inventors.  
Second, the analysis suggests that the underexploited knowledge tends to flow to startups 
through employee entrepreneurship. This implication may partly explain the “startup 
phenomenon” – startups rather than the established firms are more innovative and better 
performers in some settings (Christensen, 1997; Khessina, 2002, 2003; Agarwal et al., 2004; 
Carrol and Khessina, 2005; Ganco and Agarwal, 2009). At the same time, the findings suggest a 
new mechanism for why inventors exiting to start their own firms are likely to have a more 
negative impact on parent firm performance than inventors exiting to join rival firms (Campbell 
et al., 2010; Wezel et al., 2006). Inventors leaving to startups are fundamentally different that 
inventors who leave to rival firms in terms of knowledge they carry and exploit. Parent firms 
may need to use strategic levers to protect their intellectual property (Agarwal et al., 2008) from 
its exploitation by new firms even though such knowledge may be less prone to imitation by 
rival firms (Rivkin, 2000). 
Limitations and Alternative Explanations 
Both the limitations and the findings of the study present avenues for future research. 
First, while the semiconductor industry represents a canonical context for examining the research 
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questions, the findings may be limited in generalizability given this single-industry focus. In 
theory, I should expect the technological complexity as an important driver of employee 
entrepreneurship patterns in sectors characterized by high technological intensity, innovation 
rates and difficult technological problems that need to be solved by the firms. Following this 
logic, the findings should generalize to other hi-tech regimes and to other knowledge-intensive 
sectors, such as biotechnology or medical devices.  
Second, since my empirical analysis hinges on the use of patent data to identify the 
employee entrepreneurship and mobility events across firms, the observations are necessarily 
restricted to instances where the inventor was identified on patents assigned to parent firms and 
was identified as a founder (employee entrepreneurship) or appeared as an inventor both within 
the parent and recipient firm within my focal sample (mobility). Missing from the sample, thus, 
are instances where the employee entrepreneurs or mobile employees may have had minor 
involvements or had general awareness of the technology while it was being developed (but no 
patent). Similarly, technologies that were in the initial stages of development but not patented 
prior to the employee departure are not captured in the study. However, a priori, there is no 
reason to expect that the technological complexity would differentially affect the behavior of 
inventors who are involved in the technology development without being documented through 
patents. 
The validity of the results also hinges on the ability to rule out alternative explanations. 
For instance, the findings may be driven by the variation in the general attractiveness of 
opportunities if they correlate with technological complexity. To address this issue in the 
estimation, I include the control Entry rate of firms with similar technological complexity. I have 
also experimented with similar controls – including Weighted number of patents (and citations) 
118 
in the same main classes (and complexity bins) as the focal inventor – all yielding identical 
results.65 To further rule out the endogeneity, I performed additional analysis that shows that, 
while there are significantly more firms present (higher firm density) in low complexity 
categories, the entry and exit rates within years do not seem to vary significantly with 
technological complexity. Similarly, when one tracks the patenting histories of founders who 
patent post-departure from the parent firm, the observed technological complexity tends to 
exhibit a trend downward toward lower complexity. Such a pattern is consistent with the 
industry-wide trend toward higher modularity and possibly relates to the findings reported in the 
literature (Linden and Somaya, 2000) that startups tend to address complex problems (in our case, 
identified while working within parent firms) through modular solutions.66 Such a comparison 
hinges on the assumption that innovations composed of modular components are simpler to solve. 
The prior literature has indeed suggested that to tackle underlying problem complexity, problems 
may be modularized by delineating modules and standardizing interfaces between the modules 
(Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004; McCormack et al., 2006). 
Standardization of interfaces limits degrees of freedom for the designers (and thus may lower the 
ability to find breakthrough innovations) but also limits cross-module interactions. This, in turn, 
makes problems simpler. Consequently, the conjecture that generally attractive technologically 
complex technologies are driving the results does not seem to be the case. Solving more complex 
technological problems may present more underexploited opportunities and may lead to 
                                               
65 Available from the author. 
66 Linden and Somaya (2000) discuss how integrated designs (i.e. “system-on-a-chip” solutions) typically pursued 
by large integrated incumbent firms were challenged by more specialized startups pursuing modular solutions and 
their trading with similar firms. 
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breakthroughs, but complex technological domains are not, in general, more attractive. Such a 
finding is fully consistent with the complexity theory (Kauffman, 1993; Altenberg, 1997).67  
Similarly, selection bias is a valid concern. Higher quality inventors may more likely be 
solving more complex technological problems. To alleviate this issue, I implemented a two-step 
approach – I regress the raw complexity measure on controls and individual inventor fixed 
effects and then utilize a set of controls in the final regression. A further look at the observable 
differences comparing employee entrepreneurs with mobile inventors and inventors without 
observable event in the sample (Table 4.6) reveals that there no observable quality differences 
between employee entrepreneurs and inventors joining rivals (e.g. in terms of number of patents, 
citations, etc.). Even though such interpretation needs to be taken with caution, it may suggest 
that unobservable quality differences do not differentiate employee entrepreneurship and mobile 
inventors. However, one could also argue that future entrepreneurs self-select into technological 
areas that make future entrepreneurship more likely due to the discovering of underexploited 
opportunities (i.e. more complex domains). Although I cannot completely rule out this conjecture, 
it implies significant foresight by the future entrepreneurs. They self-select into technological 
domains with more frictions and fewer outside mobility options. 
It may also be valuable to look at technological complexity from a different perspective. 
Murmann and Frenken (2006) suggest that technological complexity of a given component with 
other components is a proxy of how core this component is to the technology. They develop a 
theory relating the core versus periphery nature of components to the emergence of dominant 
design and the technology cycles. Such a view is not only fully consistent with my theorizing 
                                               
67 In support of this argument, examining technological distance between patents filed by firms founded by 
employee entrepreneurs and parent firms shows that employee entrepreneurs working in more complex 
technological domains tend to stay technologically closer to their parent firms. This is consistent with the finding 
that simple knowledge diffuses more easily. It should also alleviate the concern that more complex technologies give 
rise to entrepreneurial ideas that the parent firms are not interested in. 
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above but looking at the empirical phenomena through the new lens potentially offers additional 
insights. For instance, the findings in this paper suggest that most employee entrepreneurs 
emerge from core technological domains as opposed to the mobile inventors who originate at the 
periphery. Murmann and Frenken (2006) propose that core components are typically decided 
early within the technology life cycle (defining dominant design) and are difficult to change 
successfully afterwards. The theory in this paper suggests what may underlie these frictions and 
how it can lead to employee entrepreneurship – exploitation of ideas outside of the constraints of 
the parent firms. 
Examining the patent documents of employee entrepreneurs and mobile inventors in my 
sample provides consistent patterns and reveals differences between employee entrepreneurs and 
mobile inventors. For instance, employee entrepreneurs originating in Intel in 1997 seemed to be 
mostly solving problems that involved components that were part of the core of the 
microprocessor technology – speed path, timing, parallel processing, etc. – and ended up 
applying their knowledge within their startups but in a different context – network processors, 
network switches, wireless chips, and so on. The inventors who merely moved across existing 
firms worked on important (highly cited) problems but nevertheless contained more peripheral 
components – cache memory, processor bus, slot design, etc – and typically patented in the same 
domain post-mobility. Looking at other examples in the sample reveals similar patterns – 
inventors working on problems composed of more densely connected components are more 
likely to become entrepreneurs. 
Overall, the patterns discussed above offer intriguing opportunities for further research. 
The current paper is only the first step. What exactly happens post-exit with the inventors and 
what are the performance implications? How does technological complexity change over time 
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and across firms? How does it relate to performance? What roles do inventor founders and 
mobile inventors play in the technological evolution of the industry? 
Finally, the study opens up interesting avenues for research on the impact of the 
technological environment on employee entrepreneurship, knowledge flows and competitive 
patterns with the potential to look at a number of important contingencies. How do individual 
inventor characteristics interact with technological complexity in their impact on employee 
entrepreneurship? How does the stage of the industry life cycle affect the dynamics? I hope that 
the study will trigger additional research that examines many of these questions. 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND CONCLUSION 
These limitations notwithstanding, the study makes several important contributions. 
Within the context of employee entrepreneurship literature (Agarwal et al., 2004; Klepper, 2005; 
Klepper and Sleeper, 2005) the study shows that the nature of technology is an important 
contingency in the emergence of employee entrepreneurship. By looking at the technology at a 
finer-grain, the study goes beyond the results in the prior literature that suggested firms with 
better technology produce more employee entrepreneurs (Freeman, 1987; Franco and Filson, 
2006). The study contributes to the literature on employee mobility and knowledge spillovers 
(Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco and 
Sarkar, 2004; Agarwal, Ganco and Ziedonis, 2008) by showing that the nature of technology 
may affect not only how much of the knowledge flows but also what kind and its destination.  
In conclusion, my study theorized and found evidence that technological complexity of 
prior activities negatively affects the likelihood that employee inventors join a rival firm, 
positively affects the likelihood that they join a larger firm relative to smaller one and engage in 
employee entrepreneurship relative to join a rival firm. Technological complexity also increases 
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the likelihood of team entrepreneurship relative to individual founding. The study sheds new 
light on one of the important contingencies affecting entrepreneurship and mobility patterns and 
reveals promising pathways for continued research. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 4.1 Complexity of semiconductor Inventions: measure versus questionnaire 
# 
Patents aggregated by 
main class (domain) 
Complexity 
measure (mean) 
Questionnaire 
 
323 Power supply -0.0637 Low 
330 Amplifiers -0.0521 High (Due to noise issues) 
371 Error detection I -0.0476 Low 
714 Error detection II -0.0298 Low 
711 Memory -0.0466 Low 
327 Non-linear circuits -0.0450 Medium 
365 Static information storage -0.0433 Medium 
712 Processors -0.0314 Low 
345 Graphics processing -0.0277 Low 
713 Digital processing support -0.0255 Low 
257 Active solid state device -0.0238 Low 
326 Digital logic -0.0213 Medium 
438 Manufacturing process -0.0160 High 
395 
Processing system 
organization -0.0127 Medium 
710 Input/output -0.0106 Medium 
375 
Pulse and Digital 
communication -0.0025 High 
331 Oscillators 0.0030 High 
360 Magnetic storage circuits 0.0051 High 
324 Measure and Testing 0.0235 Medium 
348 TV circuits 0.0280 Medium 
250 Radiant energy (photocells) 0.0422 Medium 
702 Calibration 0.0613 High 
379 Telephonic communication 0.0914 High 
  Correlation = 0.5378   
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Table 4.2 Variable Definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Mean S.D. 
Employee 
entrepreneurship 
(unconditional) 
1 if the event of employee entrepreneurship follows the given 
employment spell and 0 otherwise The event is pegged to the 
application year of last patent within the source firm. Employee 
entrepreneurship events that coincide with corporate venture 
investment or direct parent involvement are excluded.  
0.002 0.045 
Employee 
entrepreneurship 
(conditional) 
Sub-sample when exit =1 (employee mobility or 
entrepreneurship = 1) 
0.108 0.311 
Mobility 
(unconditional) 
1 if the event of employee mobility to a within-sample firm other 
than the source follows the given employment spell and 0 
otherwise. The event is pegged to the application year of last 
patent within the source firm. As discussed in the Appendix, the 
mobility events that correspond to acquisition events are 
excluded from the sample. 
0.017 0.127 
Recipient size Number of employees of the recipient firm (sub-sample with 
mobility = 1) 
5723 11881 
Team entrep. As defined in the text (sub-sample with employee 
entrepreneurship = 1) 
0.32 0.468 
Team mobility As defined in the text (sub-sample with employee mobility = 1) 0.047 0.213 
Tech. Complexity As defined in the text. 0.004 0.127 
Log Number of 
Patents 
Capturing inventor “quality.” Log number of valid patents the 
focal inventor applied for in the focal year. 
0.621 0.511 
Log Number of 
Citations 
Capturing inventor “quality.” Log number of citations the focal 
inventor received within the next 5-years for patents applied for 
in the focal year. 
1.37 1.33 
Female Capturing gender differences in propensity to exit focal firms 
(e.g. Kim and Marschke, 2005). 1 if the first name on the patent 
application sounds female, 0 otherwise. 
0.024 0.152 
Nonwhite Capturing race differences in propensity to exit focal firms (e.g. 
Kim and Marschke, 2005). 1 if the first and last names on the 
patent application sound of non Anglo-Saxon origin, 0 
otherwise. 
0.242 0.428 
Technological 
Proximity 
Capturing how “close” the inventor is to the technological core 
of the parent firm. Inventors who are closer may possess more 
valuable knowledge. Calculated as the angular distance (Jaffe, 
1989) between the “technology” vectors of focal inventor and all 
other inventors in the parent firm in the focal year. Each 
dimension of the vectors is calculated as the proportion of the 
patenting in a focal main class over the focal year. 
0.358 0.279 
Log Number of Co-
inventors 
Capturing extent of collaboration with others. Log of the average 
number of patent co-inventors at the parent firm in a given year. 
0.701 0.641 
Log Number of Main 
Classes 
Captures technological breadth or generalization vs. 
specialization. Log of the average number of patent main classes 
for the focal inventor in the focal year. 
0.914 0.258 
Log Years Patenting 
within Parent 
Captures experience. Calculated as the difference between the 
focal year minus the application year of the first patent within the 
given parent firm plus one. 
1.29 0.617 
Entry Rate of Firms 
with Similar Tech. 
Interdependence 
Captures activity in the focal domain. The technological 
complexity variable is split into 10 equal-sized bins. The 
measure is calculated as the firm entry rate within the same bin 
as the focal inventor in the focal year. It is a ratio between the 
number of new firms entering with patents for which 
technological complexity is on average in the same bin as the 
focal inventor’s patents in the focal year and the total number of 
firms with patents applied for in the focal year in the same bin. 
The technological complexity of a firm’s patents is calculated 
based on the first year post-entry when a given firm applies for a 
patent. 
0.182 0.151 
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Table 4.2 (Cont.) 
 
Exit Rate of Firms 
with Similar Tech. 
Interdependence 
Captures default risk of the focal domain. The measure is 
calculated as the firm exit rate within the same bin as the focal 
inventor in the focal year. Only actual bankruptcies are 
considered as exits. It is a ratio between the number of firms 
failing with patents for which technological complexity is on 
average in the same bin as the focal inventor’s patents in the 
focal year and the total number of firms with patents applied for 
in the focal year in the same bin. The technological complexity 
of firm’s patents is calculated based on the last year pre-exit 
when a given firm applies for a patent. 
0.015 0.061 
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Table 4.3 Correlations 
 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10) 11) 12) 13) 14) 15) 
1) Employee entrepreneurship  1.000              
2) Mobility -0.003 1.000             
3)Recipient size -0.072 0.097 1.000            
4) Team Entrepreneurship (Emp. Ent.=1) 1.000           
5) Team Mobility (Mobility=1) 1.000          
6) Technological Complexity (raw) -0.002 -0.036 0.045 -0.004 0.004 1.000         
7) Log Number of Patents 0.015 0.038 -0.009 0.004 0.011 0.114 1.000        
8) Log Number of Citations 0.016 0.052 0.023 0.020 0.012 -0.051 0.701 1.000       
9) Female -0.005 -0.011 0.013 0.002 0.000 0.010 0.001 0.003 1.000      
10) Nonwhite 0.014 0.026 -0.017 -0.004 0.012 -0.053 0.050 0.037 -0.053 1.000     
11) Technological Proximity 0.005 0.001 -0.004 0.010 0.003 -0.150 0.307 0.254 0.003 0.058 1.000    
12) Log Average Number of Co-inventors 0.013 0.018 -0.001 0.021 0.010 0.010 0.524 0.485 0.046 0.064 0.125 1.000   
13) Log Average Number of Main Classes -0.007 -0.006 0.012 -0.008 -0.009 0.181 0.082 0.062 0.005 -0.050 0.012 -0.023 1.000  
14) Log Number of Years Patenting within 
Parent 0.006 -0.028 -0.094 -0.006 0.003 -0.015 -0.151 -0.166 -0.051 -0.077 0.089 -0.225 -0.023 1.000 
15) Entry Rate for Firms Entering with 
Similar Tech. Complexity -0.003 -0.010 -0.007 0.004 0.000 0.042 -0.113 -0.105 0.001 -0.032 -0.073 -0.067 0.005 -0.027 1.000
16) Exit Rate for Firms Entering with Similar 
Tech. Complexity -0.005 -0.003 0.014 -0.004 -0.002 0.018 0.047 -0.023 0.003 0.010 0.006 0.062 0.005 -0.017 -0.107
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Table 4.4 Conditional fixed-effects logit testing H1, H2 and H3 
 
Mobility 
(H1) 
Recipient size 
Conditional 
on Mobility 
(H2) 
Employee 
Entrepreneurship 
Conditional on 
Exit (H3) 
Employee 
Entrepreneurship 
Unconditional  
  
Model 1 
(Logit) 
Model 2 
(OLS) 
Model 3 
(Logit) 
Model 4 
(Logit) 
Dependent Variable 
   Positive outcome (Logit) 
Mobility Recipient firm size 
Employee 
entrepreneurship 
Employee 
entrepreneurship 
   Zero outcome (Logit) Staying  - Mobility Staying 
     
Technological Complexity -1.003*** 11720.37* 3.482** 1.937*** 
Log Number of Patents -0.139 -2820.728 -0.284 -0.445 
Log Number of Citations -0.061 328.835 0.212 0.066 
Female -0.444** -452.401 -14.029*** -13.295*** 
Nonwhite 0.395*** -9.284 -0.084 0.29 
Technological Proximity 0.017 2719.329 0.457 0.651 
Log Number of Co-inventors -0.336*** -563.867 0.218 -0.103 
Log Number of Main Classes -0.065 -1016.376 -0.451 -0.871* 
Log Years Patenting within Parent 0.204** -2280.249*** 0.934*** 0.849*** 
Entry Rate of Firms with Similar 
Tech. Complexity 0.027 -1426.592 0.782 -1.489* 
Exit Rate of Firms with Similar 
Tech. Complexity -0.714* 3565.83 -21.855** -21.581** 
Fixed Effect Firm-year Firm Firm-year Firm-year 
Pseudo R-square 0.013 0.021 0.127 0.058 
χ2 260 F: 1.45 2168 2942 
p-value 0 0.14 0 0 
Log Likelihood -2904  -92 -324 
N 30742 802 316 10709 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01     
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Table 4.5 Conditional logit and fixed-effects linear probability model testing H4 and H5 
 
 Cond. Logit FE LPM Conditional Logit FE LPM 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Dependent Variable 
     (Positive outcome) Team mobility Team entrepreneurship 
     (Zero outcome) Individual mobility Individual entrepreneurship 
      
Technological Complexity 3.93 0.019 21.51*** 37.48*** 2.24*** 
Log Number of Patents -2.22 0.008 0.4 6.64*** 0.084** 
Log Number of Citations -0.411 -0.001 -0.25 -0.54 -0.24 
Female 14.9*** 0.15 15.36*** 15.36*** 0.72*** 
Nonwhite -0.91 -0.008 2.099*** 1.64 0.06 
Technological Proximity 6.03 0.035 1.65 -0.046 -0.04 
Log Number of Co-inventors 2.32*** 0.029** -0.66 -1.36 -0.16 
Log Number of Main Classes -0.665 -0.019 -1.19 1.45 -0.29 
Log Years Patenting within Parent -1.66** -0.022 -0.7 -1.94* -0.27** 
Entry Rate of Firms with Similar 
Tech. Complexity 2.09 0.051 1.414 - 2.03** 
Exit Rate of Firms with Similar 
Tech. Complexity -12.47 -0.027 -60.59*** - -9.69* 
Fixed Effect Firm-Year Firm-Year Firm and Year Firm-Year Firm-Year 
p-value 0 0.1 0 0 0 
N 89 935 72 28 111 
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01      
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Table 4.6 Observable differences between employee entrepreneurs, mobile inventors and non-exiting Inventors 
 
 
Employee 
Entrepreneurs 
(Obs.=119) 
Inventors exiting 
and joining rivals 
(Obs. = 1038)  
Inventors staying 
within parents 
(Obs.=21682)  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Difference, 
Entrepreneurs 
vs. Movers 
(t-stat) Mean Std. Dev. 
Difference, 
Entrepreneurs 
vs. Stayers 
(t-stat) 
Technological Complexity 0.007 0.044 -0.0013 0.039 1.97** 0.0003 0.035 1.65* 
Log Number of Patents 0.80 0.38 0.77 0.30 0.80 0.62 0.51 5.34*** 
Log Number of Citations 1.84 1.18 1.90 1.04 -0.58 1.37 1.33 4.63*** 
Female 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.10 -0.40 0.02 0.15 -2.14** 
Nonwhite 0.38 0.49 0.33 0.47 1.14 0.24 0.43 3.19** 
Technological Proximity 0.39 0.28 0.36 0.28 0.91 0.36 0.28 1.08 
Log Average Number of Co-inventors 0.89 0.62 0.79 0.55 1.71* 0.70 0.64 3.44** 
Log Average Number of Main Classes 0.88 0.22 0.90 0.26 -1.22 0.92 0.26 -1.94* 
Log Number of Years Patenting 
 within Parent 1.37 0.58 1.15 0.57 4.02*** 1.29 0.62 1.50* 
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Figure 4.1 Technological complexity and characteristics of search space 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
The objective of my dissertation is to examine micro-level technological variation as a 
new antecedent of innovation performance, idea rejection, knowledge flows and employee 
entrepreneurship and mobility decisions in a coherent framework. By studying how a common 
driver of technological complexity affects these phenomena, I bring together multiple levels of 
analysis – innovation, individual inventor and incumbent firm. This provides an opportunity not 
only to address multiple questions proposed in the introduction chapter but also look at the 
creation and exploitation of knowledge from a broader perspective. I summarize findings and my 
main questions addressed in each of the essays in Table 5.1.  
The findings of the first essay underscore the difference between the search in biological 
evolution, which is “blind” and driven by mutations, and technological search, which is driven 
by human cognition and its heterogeneity. Consistent with the notion that technological problem-
solving can be approximated with an iterative and adaptive search of boundedly rational agents, I 
find that, on average, inventors face difficulty when solving complex technological problems and 
are unable to capture opportunities present in complex technological domains. For an average 
inventor, performance declines with high problem complexity. However, in contrast with such a 
view of the innovative process, I find that variance of achieved performance increases with 
complexity. In a “biological” view of the innovative process represented by the iterative search 
of boundedly rational agents, all inventors are assumed to have identical search capabilities. In 
practice, inventors are heterogeneous in their ability to recognize and exploit opportunities. Even 
though an average inventor faces difficulties when solving complex problems (and iterative 
experimentation and luck aren’t sufficient to ensure discovery of the best solutions), some 
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inventors may have the required abilities to discover and exploit such opportunities. The findings 
of the essay thus emphasize that the applicability of the simple agent-based models to human 
processes may be valuable but must be taken with caution and with attention to boundary 
conditions. 
The essay has important implications for the following two essays. It justifies the use of 
the iterative and adaptive search of boundedly rational agents as a reasonable approximation of 
the technological problem-solving process, and it shows that technological complexity has a 
significant impact on patterns of innovation performance. It also informs the theory in essay 3 by 
suggesting that innovation outcomes become more varied with highly complex problems even as 
average performance declines. The opportunities in complex technological domains are more 
abundant but only some inventors are able to exploit them. Further, the study develops and 
validates a novel measure of technological complexity that allows the examination of the 
empirical relationships between complexity and employee entrepreneurship and mobility in 
essay 3. 
In the second essay, I build on the notion that the agent-based models are a valid 
approximation of the innovative process and develop a model connecting technological 
complexity with the probability of idea rejection within incumbent firms. I find that rejection of 
profitable ideas may be driven purely by the attributes of the underlying technology without the 
presence of agency considerations, asymmetric information or resource constraints (Anton and 
Yao, 1995; Cassiman and Ueda, 2006; Hellman, 2007; Klepper and Thompson, 2010). The idea 
rejection in the model is driven by attributes of the task that is being solved (complexity, breadth, 
volatility of the environment) and their interaction with the bounded search abilities of inventors 
who solve this task. Even though inventors are assumed to be homogeneous in terms of quality 
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they have different expertise. Further, their expertise is a subset of the dimensions of a given 
problem, which necessitates collaboration. The model predicts that the likelihood of idea 
rejection increases with problem complexity and with the size of technological shock; there is a 
negative interaction between problem complexity and technological shock size; and project 
rejection has an inverted U-shaped relationship with problem breadth. Assuming that idea 
rejection is a precursor to the emergence of an employee founded startup, the model suggests that 
technology can provide an independent driver of employee entrepreneurship. 
The mechanics of the model developed in essay 2 informs the theory in essay 3 that 
connects technological complexity with employee entrepreneurship and mobility decisions. More 
specifically, the model emphasizes that knowledge originating from more complex technological 
domains may embody underexploited opportunities – viable ideas which are rejected by the 
incumbent firms. 
In the third essay, I set out to address the question of how does technological complexity 
affect the ability of employees to transfer and replicate their knowledge outside of the parent 
firm and how important is the organizational setting of the recipient organization in this transfer. 
I develop the theory along the tension that more complex knowledge not only contains 
underexploited ideas but may be also be more embedded within the parent firm structures and be 
more difficult to transfer to other organizational settings. In particular, I develop a theory 
connecting the technological complexity of employees’ prior innovations with their decisions to 
engage in employee entrepreneurship and mobility while also examining some of the 
contingencies like target firm size and team movements. I find that, after controlling for the 
value of innovations within incumbent firms and the attractiveness of the technological domain, 
technological complexity affects whether inventors exit and the destinations of their moves. The 
134 
likelihood of joining a rival firm decreases with technological complexity of inventors’ prior 
work. Conditional on mobility to rivals, complexity increases the likelihood of joining a larger 
firm. However, conditional on exit, the technological complexity increases the likelihood of 
founding a startup relative to joining a rival firm. Further, I find that the likelihood of team 
founding relative to individual founding increases with the technological complexity.  
The results show that characteristics of knowledge not only determine whether inventors 
may transfer such knowledge outside of the incumbent firm but also its destination. Complex 
knowledge that potentially embodies valuable opportunities is more likely to flow through 
employee moves to startups relative to established firms. If it does flow to existing rival firms it 
is transferred to those firms that are sufficiently large to provide necessary slack resources for 
exploratory activities leading or that have the ability to absorb such knowledge. These findings 
have important implications. It may explain why employee entrepreneurship is so prevalent in 
early phases of industry evolution (Klepper and Thompson, 2010) when firms possibly generate 
more knowledge than they utilize. It may also explain why, in some settings, startups outperform 
other firms (Christensen, 1997; Khessina, 2002, 2003; Agarwal et al., 2004; Carrol and Khessina, 
2005; Ganco and Agarwal, 2009). The results also imply that nature of technology affects 
industry structure. Complex technological domains favor entrepreneurship and perhaps lead to a 
more volatile competitive environment in which incumbent firms are frequently displaced by 
new entrants. 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
As I highlight in Table 5.1, the dissertation opens rich venues for future research. A 
particularly relevant question connecting all three essays relates to the cross-industry differences 
in how technological complexity affects innovation performance, employee entrepreneurship and 
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mobility patterns. For instance, the cross-industry differences in the nature of complementary 
assets may affect how technological complexity affects inventors’ exit decisions. In the 
semiconductor industry that I study in essay 3, the entrants were predominantly non-
manufacturing firms. This is consistent with the standardization of core designs and transition 
towards the “fabless” business model (Monteverde et al., 1995). In such a context, the 
complementary assets are in the knowledge domain and are embedded in the highly mobile 
human assets (Campbell et al., 2010). However, in some other industries the linkages between 
the intangible and tangible assets may be tighter, and necessary complementary assets may be 
embedded within incumbent firms. This may interact with technological complexity and affect 
inventors’ exit choices. The broader related question is how industry context affects creation and 
exploitation of knowledge. The differences in the nature of complementary assets (Campbell et 
al., 2010) and characteristics of knowledge may affect studied phenomena through different 
drivers than the ones explored in this dissertation. 
Similarly, characteristics of knowledge may interact with firm strategies in their effect on 
inventors’ incentives and exit choices. For instance, parent firms may design strategies to protect 
their intellectual property (Kim and Marschke, 2005; Agarwal et al., 2009) or rely on outside 
legal mechanisms (Saxenian, 1995; Gilson, 1999; Marx et al., 2009, 2010). Such potential 
interactions underline the necessity to examine these phenomena in a coherent framework. 
Consistent with prior research (Anton and Yao, 1995; Cassiman and Ueda, 2006; Klepper 
and Thompson, 2010), I assume that idea rejection correlates with employee entrepreneurship 
and a certain proportion of rejected ideas are implemented through employee founded startups. 
Even though such an assumption may hold in most cases, it may be interesting to examine 
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contingencies and cases when rejected ideas are potentially profitable but do not lead to 
employee entrepreneurship. 
Critical questions that emerge in both essays 2 and 3 (Table 5.1) relate to the post-exit 
performance of employee entrepreneurs and mobile inventors. Do inventors successfully exploit 
opportunities embodied in complex knowledge? What are the contingencies? Based on findings 
of essay 1, it may be the case that average performance is low in very complex technological 
domains while the variance of performance is high. Founding a startup that exploits a complex 
technological knowledge may thus represent a high-risk-high-return strategy. 
The questions related to post-exit performance also have an international dimension. The 
existing literature shows the performance premium experienced by startups founded through 
employee entrepreneurship relative to other startups (Agarwal et al., 2004; Klepper and 
Thompson, 2010). With the increasing importance of international mobility (Saxenian, 2006), 
the question is how knowledge characteristics and knowledge transfer affect performance of 
inventors moving across national borders. Disentangling these contingencies and performance 
implications is an important project for future research. 
The findings in essay 3 suggest that technological complexity affects industry structure 
by shaping the likelihood of entrepreneurial entry. This has potential implications for overall 
technological evolution, competitiveness and turbulence of a given industry (Ganco and Agarwal, 
2009). How exactly knowledge structure affects industry structure is another important question. 
Examining the role of technological complexity may provide a meaningful contribution to this 
discussion. 
Another overarching question connecting all three essays (Table 5.1) relates to the 
drivers of technological complexity, its changes over time and the cross industry differences in 
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its patterns. Does technological complexity increase over time? If yes, in what settings? Why 
does it change over time and what are the implications? These questions go beyond the scope of 
my dissertation but are nevertheless important in improving our understanding of drivers of 
innovation, firm and industry performance. My dissertation provides a first step in the 
examination of these fascinating phenomena. 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
The dissertation contributes to technology and innovation management literature, 
complexity literature and literatures on employee entrepreneurship, employee mobility and 
knowledge diffusion. 
In the first essay, I contribute to innovation and complexity literatures by showing that 
the innovation process can be successfully modeled as an iterative search of boundedly rational 
agents. I develop a novel measure of patent-level technological complexity and show that it 
improves the fit of the NK model over prior studies (Fleming and Sorenson, 2001, 2004) with 
important theoretical implications. 
The second essay contributes to employee entrepreneurship literature by focusing on 
factors that condition the emergence of employee entrepreneurship. The paper connects 
employee entrepreneurship literature with the technology management literature by providing a 
first model that explicitly links technology with employee entrepreneurship. The model also 
contributes to complexity literature by extending the NK models with cognitive search (Gavetti 
and Levinthal, 2000) by incorporating team interaction. 
The third essay contributes to the employee entrepreneurship literature by empirically 
documenting that the nature of technology is an important contingency in the emergence of 
employee entrepreneurship. The study contributes to the literature on employee mobility and 
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knowledge spillovers by showing that the nature of technology may affect the ability of 
employees to transfer and replicate knowledge in other organizational settings. 
In conclusion, the study shows that knowledge creation and exploitation are inherently 
connected. Common drivers like technological complexity may affect creation and exploitation 
of knowledge at multiple levels, which underscores the value of examining these phenomena 
within a joint framework. The study thus provides a unique opportunity to shed new light on an 
important contingency, opening rich pathways for continued research. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 5.1 Dissertation summary: Questions, findings and future research 
 Main Question 
 
Main Finding Questions for Future Research 
Essay 1 Does the NK model provide 
a valid approximation of 
innovative process? 
NK model correctly 
predicts conditional 
mean of innovation 
performance. 
However, inconsistent 
with model, variance 
of performance 
increases with 
complexity. 
 
Does heterogeneity 
in human ability 
account for the 
inconsistencies? 
 
 
Essay 2 How could characteristics of 
technological tasks affect 
idea rejection within 
incumbent firms? 
Micro-level variation 
in technology can 
serve as an 
independent driver of 
idea rejection. 
What is the 
relationship between 
idea rejection and 
employee 
entrepreneurship? 
 
Essay 3 How does technological 
complexity affect ability of 
inventors to transfer their 
knowledge to other 
organizational setting? 
Technological 
complexity affects 
inventors’ exit 
choices and 
destinations of their 
moves. 
How does 
technological 
complexity affect 
industry structure? 
What are the 
performance 
implications 
post-exit? 
What 
determines 
technological 
complexity? 
 
How do the 
performance 
patterns vary 
across 
industries? 
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APPENDIX 
THE NK MODEL 
To generate the NK landscape, Chapters 2 and 3 utilize the original NK model 
specification proposed by Kauffman (1993). The model is characterized by the correspondence 
mapping of the vector x in the decision space to the outcomes (payoffs). Within the context of 
technological invention, each component of the vector xi represents a decision of an agent or a 
group of agents about a component of the invention. The decisions are modeled as zero or one 
(component A vs. B is chosen) and the landscape is a mapping from the set X = {0,1}N to R+  An 
element x  X is a vector of binary digits of length N. The mapping assigns to each x  X a 
payoff (x)  R+. The mapping  depends on the parameter K, with (x, K) reflecting the 
interdependence of the individual components of x. The change in the payoff contribution of the 
ith component is not only influenced by the change in the ith decision xi, but also by the changes 
in K other components of x. If K = 0, there are no interdependencies and the (.) function is 
additive. The mapping (and the landscape) is generated by assigning a payoff i(.) which is a 
random number from a standard normal distribution to each decision xi, i = 1,…,N and each 
instance when either xi changes or some of the K decisions that are associated with xi change. 
The mapping for a particular vector x is given by 
 
 
 
where for any i we obtain a vector of indexes j(i) mapping from N to NK. None of the indexes of 
j(i) is equal to i. The notation xkj(i) means that the index of x is the kth element of the vector j(i). 
To create an overall mapping, we randomly generate 2K+1N payoff values. The landscape created 
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in this manner is “rugged” for high values of K. The structure of the mapping (.) is often 
depicted as a matrix called the interaction or influence matrix. The rows and columns represent 
the individual decisions. The matrix has ones in all those entries that affect (or are affected) by a 
particular decision. For instance, for K = 0, the interaction matrix is an N x N identity matrix and 
for K = N - 1 it is N x N matrix of ones. 
The distance in the space X (distance over the landscape) between two decision vectors x 
and x’ is defined in a standard way by: 



N
i
ii xxxxd
1
|'|)',(  
d(.) is a mapping from x to N, where d(.) is between 0 and N. The term “local” region of the 
landscape denotes the set of vectors that have only one element of the decision vector different. 
The term “search” on the rugged landscape denotes the process of discovery of a decision vector 
with a higher payoff. In Chapter 2, I utilize a simple version of a gradient or local search where 
one decisions of the vector is randomly altered. If the new vector yields a higher payoff than the 
original vector, the system shifts to the “new location” on the landscape. If the payoff is lower, 
the new vector is disregarded and the system stays at the original position. In Chapter 3, I use the 
search algorithm as described in the text. 
 
